Commentary

VOLUME EIGHTY-TWO • NUMBER FOUR • OCTOBER 1986

Team B
The Reality Behind the Myth

Richard Pipes

The Tenured Left/Stephen H. Balch and Herbert I. London

Shcharansky's Secret/Edward Alexander

Sodomy and the Supreme Court/David Robinson, Jr.

Our Conservatism and Theirs/Brigitte Berger and Peter L. Berger

The Truth About Titoism/Nora Beloff

Walter Laqueur at Sixty-Five/Roger Kaplan

"Whose Palestine?"–An Exchange/Erich Isaac and Rael Jean Isaac & Critics

Books in Review: Alvin H. Bernstein / Scott McConnell / S. Fred Singer / Kenneth S. Lynn / Joshua Muravchik

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Commentary

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"Whose Palestine?"

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

"Whose Palestine?" by Erich Isaac and Rael Jean Isaac [July] is a valuable addition to the growing literature on Joan Peters's *From Time Immemorial*. Some of the exegeses of the book over the last year have unhappily had the appearance of a political witchhunt. Attention has thus been diverted, sometimes for motives unrelated to any concern for scholarly accuracy, from the main theses of the book and has been concentrated, for obvious tactical reasons, on a small number of population statistics about which demographic experts can legitimately disagree.

The main theses thus have disappeared from view and need to be reiterated as a healthy corrective. There was a continuous Jewish presence in Palestine. British governments after 1922 did not abide by the obligation of the Balfour Declaration and the League of Nations Mandate to foster a Jewish National Home. Some British officials who wanted their government to honor its obligation suffered a sad fate. There was substantial Arab migration into the Mandate territory, especially into those areas settled by Jews. This was unimpeded and unacknowledged by the British who did, in contrast, impose severe restrictions on Jewish immigration. Britain did remove three-quarters of the total area from the Mandate by setting up the emirate of Trans-Jordan, which in its present form of Jordan can logically be regarded as the Arab state in Palestine. Some Arab leaders, especially the Mufti of Jerusalem, established a relationship with the Nazi regime and encouraged its persecution of Jews. The number of Jewish refugees from Arab lands in the late 1940's was at least equal to the number of Palestinian Arabs displaced from areas held by Israel.

Underlying these theses is the simple fact that the essence of the Arab-Israel conflict is the refusal of the Arab world, except now Egypt, to admit the legitimacy and reality of the existence of Israel. No solution is possible until that reality is acknowledged.

MICHAEL CURTIS
Rutgers University
New Brunswick, New Jersey

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

COMMENTARY is to be commended for opening its pages to a candid discussion of the controversy surrounding Joan Peters's *From Time Immemorial* and, in particular, for forthrightly addressing the very grave allegations of misrepresentation that have been leveled against the book. In this respect, the article by Erich Isaac and Rael Jean Isaac compares very favorably with, say, the *New York Review of Books* which elected to shield its readers from so "indelicate" a subject. . . . Furthermore, despite its evidently sharp disagreement with both the tone and substance of my charges, the Isaacs' article fairly acknowledges my specific contribution to the controversy. . . .

The Isaacs do, however, take great exception to my findings. They purport that (1) my scholarship is flawed, (2) even if it weren't, there is still no basis to my allegations of "fraud," "hoax," etc., and (3) even if everything I had written were true, the central theses of *From Time Immemorial* are, nonetheless, "generally sound." I will discuss each of these points in turn.

1. The Isaacs cite two examples of my allegedly flawed scholarship. Let me note straightaway that if this is the best they can do, then Joan Peters's book is, at the very least, a disgraceful piece of scholarship, since, in various periodicals during the past two years, I have identified *dozens* of gross misrepresentations in *From Time Immemorial*. (Much of this material will appear in a forthcoming collection to be published by Verso press.) But, as it happens, in neither of the instances cited by the Isaacs was I in error.

The Isaacs first allege that I "incorrectly" added 40,000 Arabs to one of Miss Peters's demographic projections and then accused her of "not accounting for them properly." Let me first briefly rehearse the argument. Miss Peters claims to plot the population movements of indigenous Palestinian Arabs between the years 1893 and 1947. She first takes the 1893 population figures for each of the five regions into which she has divided Palestine (Areas I through V) and then projects what the population in each of these regions would have been in 1947 had growth been ex-

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clusively the result of natural increase. She then compares these projections with the actual 1947 census figures for each of the five regions (minus all immigrants and nomads) to establish the magnitude of "in-migration" for each region, that is, the number of indigenous Palestinian Arabs who had migrated into (or out of) Area I, Area II, and so on (see p. 256 of Miss Peters's text for an explicit account of her method).

For Area I, my calculations tally almost precisely with her own and also with those of Philip Hauser, the demographer who has certified Miss Peters's finding for Area I in an appendix:

92,300	(1893 population)
× 2.7	(factor of natural increase)
249,210	(projected 1947 population)
417,300	(actual 1947 populational minus immigrants and nomads)
+168,090	(net in-migration to Area I)

Yet if the same computations are made for Area IV, the resulting figure is 40,000 greater than the one listed in Miss Peters's table. The Isaacs' criticism is clearly misplaced. What is more, the Isaacs are deafeningly silent on the crucial context in which I took note of this discrepancy, namely, that Miss Peters ignored *all* the demographic changes in Area IV because, if taken into account, they would render her actual findings at best trivial. This point was the subject of a detailed communication, "The Strange Case of Area IV," which I submitted some two years ago to the scores of periodicals, including COMMENTARY, that had acclaimed Miss Peters's demographic study (none of which, alas, published it). Likewise, fully one-half of my *In These Times* review was taken up with an elucidation of this point. Yet the Isaacs curiously omit any discussion of it in their article.

The Isaacs also fault me with misrendering the findings of the Anglo-American Survey of Palestine on Arab immigration into Palestine during World War II. The document in question divides this Arab immigration into two categories: first, the 3,800 Arabs who were brought in under "official" arrangements and, second, the "considerable numbers," of which "no estimates are available," who were either recruited by private contractors or else "entered individually." The Survey then suggests figures for the number of Arabs who remained in Palestine after October 1944, to which I will return presently. Miss Peters's summary description of this section in the Survey reads as follows:

> What the official Anglo-American Survey of 1945-46 definitively disclosed . . . is that . . . tens of thousands of "Arab illegal immigrants" [were] *recorded* as having been "brought" into Palestine. . . . In addition, other *un*estimated "considerable" numbers immigrated "unofficially" or as "individuals" during the war, according to the report (p. 379, all emphases in original).

The latter sentence refers unmistakably to the second category of Arab immigrant workers: note, for

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example, the quotation marks around "considerable," "unofficially," and "individuals," and the italics in "*un*estimated." The "tens of thousands" of Arabs "*recorded* as having been 'brought' into Palestine" must then refer to the first category—those who entered "under official arrangements." Yet the Survey records only 3,800 such immigrant workers. Moreover, Miss Peters completely misrepresents the Survey's tabulations of Arab immigration. For example, she first lists the 3,800 Arabs who entered Palestine with official permission (p. 378) and, further on, the roughly 4,000 illegal immigrants who were employed by the War Department and the Royal Air Force in Palestine (p. 379). But she *also* splices these two groups together and catalogues as a *third, separate* group "nearly 10,000 reported foreign workers. . . ." (p. 378). Astonishingly, the Isaacs credit Miss Peters's handling of this document.

Finally, nothing in the Survey's text supports the conclusion that substantial numbers of Arab immigrants *remained* in Palestine at the end of World War II. Indeed, the Survey explicitly (and consistently) concludes that "Arab illegal immigration for the purposes of settlement is insignificant." Yet the Isaacs themselves make the pertinent point that Miss Peters's thesis depends crucially on evidence that Arabs not only entered Palestine but also took up permanent residence there.

2. The Isaacs acknowledge that Miss Peters's "handling of materials . . . is flawed" and that "even some of Finkelstein's specific criticisms, setting aside his accusations of deliberate deception, are well taken." Before taking up the evidence of "deliberate deception," I should like to make a preliminary observation. The Isaacs rightly point out that all my findings were brought to the attention of Miss Peters's publisher, Harper & Row, within months of the book's publication. The Isaacs also readily concede that at least certain of my criticisms are "well taken." Yet Harper & Row . . . steadfastly refused to correct, in either the seven subsequent hardback printings of *From Time Immemorial* or in the paperback edition, any of the dozens of egregious errors I spotted. (I will gladly make available to interested readers the relevant correspondence.) This was clearly not a "technical" problem, since both the seventh hardback printing and the paperback edition do contain "corrections." The explanation . . . is not hard to find: if all the "errors" I identified were "corrected," nothing would remain of the fabulous "scholarly" foundation on which Miss Peters built her "thesis." The Isaacs practically admit as much. They describe Miss Peters's nineteen (or more) falsifications of one paragraph in the Hope Simpson Report, for instance, as an uncorrectable "lethal systemic error." What does this mean if not that this "error" goes to the very heart of Miss Peters's argument, exactly as I wrote in my original *In These Times* piece?

Let us now turn to the matter of "deliberate deception." The Isaacs offer an ingenious, if scarcely convincing, explanation of the above-mentioned "error," repeated more than nineteen times in Miss Peters's text. Yet they do not even attempt to account for the second "error" in *From Time Immemorial* that they concede—and with good reason.

Miss Peters writes that, according to an anonymous "thirty-year archivist—a specialist in the Foreign Office and Colonial Office records on the Middle East for the Public Record Office," the British "[n]ever kept track" of Arab immigration into Palestine. To substantiate this extraordinary claim, she goes on to cite the 1935 annual Report to the League of Nations in which, she avers, "only 'Jewish immigration into Palestine' was catalogued; that was the only heading" (p. 275). In fact, the British report in question meticulously and exhaustively tabulated every conceivable aspect of Arab immigration into Palestine on *nine* consecutive pages. Miss Peters could hardly have overlooked these tabulations since the comparable statistics for Jewish immigration appear on the *very same pages in parallel columns*. *Every* annual British report on Palestine—and Miss Peters purports to have scrutinized *thirteen* of them—contains identical exhaustive tabulations of Arab immigration under the exact same chapter heading, "Immigration and Emigration." The Isaacs breezily chalk up the "error" to "carelessness." Personally, I much prefer Miss Peters's defense. When I queried her on this point during a London radio broadcast, citing her text verbatim, Miss Peters, totally unruffled, replied: "I never wrote that."

3. The Isaacs conclude their defense of *From Time Immemorial* on a singularly low-key note: "Despite its lapses, then, Joan Peters's book offers a generally sound thesis." We have clearly come a long way from those first heady days when *From Time Immemorial* was being touted as a "revelation" (Barbara Tuchman), "the historical truth about the Middle East" (Lucy S. Dawidowicz), destined to "change the mind of our generation" (Martin Peretz), and so on for two hundred reviews ranging from awe to ecstasy. But how sound is Joan Peters's thesis? I have in front of me *Haaretz*'s account (June 15, 1986) of an international conference at Haifa University, the focus of which was Joan Peters's *From Time Immemorial*. According to *Haaretz*, virtually all the participants dismissed Miss Peters's demographic theses and the most authoritative scholar in attendance, Yehoshua Ben-Arieh of Hebrew University, denounced the Peters enterprise for discrediting the "Zionist cause."

Even more to the point, the Isaacs seem unaware that Miss Peters's *own data* stunningly refute all her demographic "arguments." Consider the following:

• According to Miss Peters's demographic study, Palestine's Arab population expanded naturally by a factor of at least 2.7 between 1893 and 1947. Miss Peters puts Palestine's Arab population at 466,400 in 1893. Multiplying 2.7 by 466,400, we get 1,259,280. Palestine's total Arab population stood at 1,303,800 in 1947. Natural increase therefore accounts for all but at most 44,520 of the Arabs in Palestine in 1947. Yet Miss Peters contends that a minimum of *hundreds of thousands* of Arab immigrants settled in Palestine during these years.

• The case Miss Peters mounts for massive illegal Arab immigration into Palestine nullifies her "thesis" on Arab in-migration. Miss Peters's own demographic study conclusively demonstrates that Arabs could not have both immigrated and in-migrated in significant numbers to Area I (the "main areas of Jewish settlement"), as she claims. (On this point, see my unpublished manuscript, *Protocols of Joan Peters*.)

• Miss Peters asserts that in 1893 some 60,000 Jews and 92,300 non-

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Jews inhabited the "Jewish-settled areas" of Palestine. (For the pre-1948 period she uses the phrase "Jewish-settled areas" to designate the region of Palestine that later became Israel; cf. p. 264: "[W]hat is now Israel, i.e., Jewish-settled areas.") Since 38,000 of the non-Jews were Christians, Jews were "perhaps" a "marginal majority." But, according to Miss Peters's own table in the back of the book, not 92,300, but fully 218,000 non-Jews resided, in 1893, in the slice of Palestine that became Israel.

Not too long ago, I described *From Time Immemorial* in the pages of the (London) *Times Literary Supplement* as "the most spectacular . . . disinformation effort ever mounted by Israel's self-styled 'friends' abroad." Nothing I read in the Isaacs' article persuades me to reconsider or qualify that judgment. Permit me to suggest that, rather than indict the bearers for bringing the bad news, COMMENTARY would do better to reflect on what this extraordinary episode reveals about the state of American intellectual culture.

NORMAN G. FINKELSTEIN
New York City

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

"Whose Palestine?," Erich Isaac and Rael Jean Isaac's article in defense of Joan Peters's book, leaves that book as exposed to criticism as it has ever been. I do not want to repeat my ideological debate with Miss Peters about the nature of Zionism and the parallel movements of population, although in opposite directions, which took place during the 1948 war. I would only like to stress once again that her presentation plays into the Arabs' hands: if both Jewish immigrants to Israel from Arab countries and Palestinian Arab refugees left their traditional abodes against their will, as a result of pressure exerted upon them, the best solution to their plight would lie in the return of all of them to their original places. And, indeed, since the mid-70's this has been the official position of Iraq, Yemen, Libya, Morocco, etc. Only by underlining the different character of the Jewish immigation to Israel, only by stressing that the Jewish immigrants were returning to their historic home ("Ascending to Zion"), will we be able to refute the equation of Arab refugees with Jewish immigrants.

From an ideological point of view I found that argument most disturbing, but from the angle of historical analysis, Joan Peters's treatment of the demographic process which has taken place in Palestine since the late 19th century is even more misleading.

I would like to stress three points which were the kernel of my article on *From Time Immemorial* in the *New York Review of Books* (January 16, 1986) and of my letter replying to the correspondence on my article (*New York Review of Books*, March 27, 1986). These points were not refuted by the Isaacs.

1. The Isaacs agree that Miss Peters's figure for non-Jews living in the "Jewish-settled areas" of Palestine in 1893 (about 92,000) is neither an official Ottoman figure nor that of the French geographer Vital Cuinet but "Miss Peters's estimate." This is a most important confession. Furthermore, in a footnote the Isaacs add that, rather strangely, Miss Peters arbitrarily chose which subdistricts (kazas) of Ottoman Palestine should be included in her definition of the Jewish-settled areas. To that I would like to add that Miss Peters omits another subdistrict, Hebron, in which, according to the same Cuinet, 1,072 Jews lived. Miss Peters does not explain that omission, but one can rather easily guess the reason: the Hebron subdistrict contained 92,600 Muslims, and if she had included it, the number of non-Jews would have perforce been much higher than the figure stated in her book.

We are left, therefore, with a very weak foundation for the claim that in the "Jewish-settled areas" of Palestine the population up to 1947 quintupled whereas in other parts of the country it only more than doubled, because even Cuinet's figures and the official Ottoman figures (and both, for different reasons, which I explained in my *New York Review* pieces, actually underrate the Muslim population) give us at least double Miss Peters's figure for non-Jews living in "Jewish-settled areas" in 1893. The significance of this mistake was not fully appreciated by the Isaacs.

2. Miss Peters argues that since a great many of the Arabs living in these "Jewish-settled areas" were simply newcomers, they did not remain during the 1948 war but rather returned to their original places in the Arab parts of Palestine or even beyond the borders of Palestine. She also maintains that they were not forcibly evicted by the Israeli army, and she quotes several sources confirming this view. In my article I drew attention to the publication of the "Daled Plan" of the Haganah (the Jewish fighting forces in Palestine) in which the possibility of eviction was contemplated, but the Isaacs preferred to ignore it. Therefore, I would like to elaborate a little on that point.

In February and March 1948 the Haganah went through its most dangerous experience. The Arabs had succeeded in gaining the upper hand in the "battle for the roads," by cutting the transportation and physical connection between the Jewish center in Tel Aviv and the areas to the north and Jerusalem and the areas to the south. The Haganah lost three big convoys—the Yehiram, Huldah, and Nebi Daniel—and with them the majority of its makeshift armored cars. Only toward the end of March did it succeed in relieving the situation.

To prevent a repetition of that dangerous state of affairs should the regular Arab armies invade the newly founded state of Israel, the Haganah's high command then prepared a strategic plan designed to ensure the territorial linkage of the Jewish areas. It was learned from the bitter battles of February and March that a hostile Arab village along the road was a source of danger to the transportation system. Consequently, the plan provided that "each village must be surrounded and searched. In case of resistance the armed force [in it] must be destroyed and the population must be expelled beyond the borders of the state." A similar provision was made for Arab urban quarters.

That document was published as Annex 49 to the third part of volume three of *The History of the Haganah* (in Hebrew, Tel Aviv, 1972, pp. 1955-59). Miss Peters does not deal with this but simply ignores it. Her defenders could at least have claimed that the actual developments of the war proved that the plan had not been carried out. But they, too, ignore the whole question. I think the Isaacs preferred to remain silent because an analysis of the actual developments indicates that the plan was indeed carried out. In order to assure the safety of transportation along the coastal shore (from Tel Aviv to Haifa) and thence to Jeru-

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salem and to the Negev in the south, most of the Arab villages along these roads were destroyed and their population expelled.

These facts are not new, and Miss Peters could have dealt with them. She could not, of course, have known of the work of Israeli historians which has been published only recently, such as Tom Segev's *1949—The First Israelis* (1985) and Benny Morris's articles in the *Middle East Journal* (Winter 1986) and *Middle Eastern Studies* (January 1986). These studies, based on Israeli archival material, prove what I argue above. But the Isaacs, having written their article not before the end of March 1986, should have known better.

It is impossible to maintain the traditional Israeli view that in 1948 there were no expulsions, even large-scale ones, of Arabs. It is much more useful in the long run to face the real situation and account for it than to deny the undeniable. The 1948 war (for Israelis, the War of Independence, of course) was launched by the Arabs who rejected the United Nations partition solution. Many Arabs, mainly town dwellers, left because they could not endure the worsening conditions in their towns. But many other Arabs were forcibly expelled by the Israeli army out of sheer military considerations. Those who began the war are responsible for its consequences, including the expulsion of Arabs from places where their continued presence could have constituted a mortal danger to the young state of Israel fighting for its survival against almost overwhelming odds. This to my mind is the true explanation.

3. The Isaacs still cannot believe that the Palestine Arab population could have doubled itself during the thirty years of the British Mandate by the sheer force of natural increase. Let me remind them that a population can double itself in thirty years if its average annual rate of natural increase is 2.45 percent. And the actual average annual rate was very close to that figure; it rose from 2.1 percent in 1923 to 3.1 percent in 1947. Furthermore, in my article I drew the readers' attention to the fact that in Israel since 1948, during an equivalent period of thirty years, the Arab population not only doubled but more than tripled itself. And that phenomenon took place under Israeli control—in the absence of British authorities who, maliciously of course, would have encouraged Arabs to immigrate to the Jewish state. This point, a crucial one in my view, was totally overlooked by the Isaacs.

Many other small factual mistakes or false allegations made by Miss Peters have been exposed by many reviewers so that even some of her defenders have had to admit that she committed "numerous examples of sloppiness" or that she "quotes carelessly, uses statistics sloppily, and ignores inconvenient facts" (*New York Review of Books*, March 27, 1986). I wonder if the Isaacs would do the same.

YEHOSHUA PORATH
Jerusalem, Israel

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

While Erich Isaac and Rael Jean Isaac have discussed the merits and demerits of Joan Peters's *From Time Immemorial*, they have not adequately dealt with the criticism of that book by Yehoshua Porath, professor of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, which appeared in the *New York Review of Books*. The Isaacs say that his attack was long awaited by those eager to do in Miss Peters and her book. The purpose of this letter is not to defend or to attack Miss Peters's book, its thesis, or its scholarship, but to ask whether Mr. Porath's criticism is fair and meets the standards one would expect from a scholar damning an author's work.

Miss Peters states in her book that in 1893 there were living in the "main areas" of Jewish settlement in Palestine 92,300 non-Jews at most and almost 60,000 Jews; and that if the first group were divided between Christians and Muslims, the Jews would outnumber each part—or, as she puts it, "the Jews were at least as numerous as the Muslims."

In his article, Mr. Porath claims that Miss Peters's "very tendentious reasoning on this point has already been exposed," and he refers his readers to a criticism of Miss Peters's book by one Bill Farrell in the *Journal of Palestine Studies* (Fall 1984), based primarily on an analysis of the 1893 Ottoman census.

Mr. Porath goes on to say:

> What she [Miss Peters] has done, to put it briefly, is to compare the figures for non-Jews in the 1893 Ottoman census of Palestine with the estimate of the Jewish population proposed by the French geographer Vital Cuinet in 1895. She dismisses the Ottoman figures for the Jews because, she says, "the Ottoman census apparently registered only known Ottoman subjects; since most Jews had failed to obtain Ottoman citizenship, a representative figure of the Palestinian Jewish population could not be extrapolated from the 1893 census."
>
> This may sound plausible, until one discovers, first, that Cuinet's estimates are generally considered to be unreliable, and, second, that Professor Kemal Karpat of the University of Wisconsin, whose analysis of the Ottoman census Miss Peters relies on, does not find the census estimate of the Jewish population to be inaccurate in the way she claims.

Thus in his article Mr. Porath in no way takes issue with the 1893 Ottoman census or with Farrell's study based on that census, but rather implies that Miss Peters should have used it for Jews as well as for non-Jews. (I will not here argue the merits of Cuinet except to say that other demographers do not share Mr. Porath's views of him. Justin McCarthy, for example, in his article "The Population of Ottoman Syria and Iraq, 1878-1914," *Asian and African Studies* 15, No. 1, March 1981, calls Cuinet "the best known and most reliable European author on Ottoman population.")

In turning to Farrell's article, one finds that Farrell, using figures developed by Kemal Karpat, gives the 1893 Ottoman census figures for Muslims and Jews for all of Palestine as 371,969 Muslims and 9,817 Jews. After certain "corrections" have been made for "undercounting," the figures become 419,311 Muslims and 10,746 Jews.

These statistics (particularly the comparison of Miss Peters's figure of almost 60,000 Jews with the census figure of 9,817 Jews in 1893) were picked up and repeated by Anthony Lewis in his column in the New York *Times* for January 13, 1986, where he praises Mr. Porath's article in glowing terms and states triumphantly that "Miss Peters's evidence is cooked. That is what a growing number of scholarly critics have said. It is what I believe."

Miss Peters also refers in her book to certain statistics by the sociologist Arthur Ruppin on the number of Jews in Palestine. In

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the article to which Mr. Porath directs his readers, Farrell calls Ruppin "unreliable" and dismisses him and his statistics saying:

> Arthur Ruppin, upon whom Miss Peters also relies, was a Zionist who went to the Middle East around the turn of the century to scout out the territory. He wrote with a clear political purpose. Ruppin had no way of counting the population, and, as all European observers, he cannot be considered an objective source.

The *New York Review* subsequently published Mr. Porath's letter answering critics of his article. In the course of this letter he rather surprisingly states:

> I never claimed . . . that the 1893 Ottoman census figure of the number of Jews living in Palestine (9,817) is correct; nor do I accept that the Ottoman figure for the Muslims (371,959), also cited by Miss Peters from an article by K. Karpat, is correct.

In his letter, Mr. Porath now takes issue with the *Muslim* count, claiming that attention has not been given to the fact that in 1893 only Muslims were subject to conscription and thus Muslims would try to avoid the census. This, however, overlooks the fact that since the census was the principal means to obtain conscripts, the Ottoman authorities would, and did, take special pains to see that all Muslims subject to conscription were registered.

But it is with the figures for Jews that we are most concerned here. Mr. Porath in his letter now finds that "[t]he Jews were certainly undercounted in that [1893] census . . ."—and *for the very reason given by Miss Peters*. She stated that she did not rely on the 1893 Ottoman census for the Jews because the census apparently registered only known Ottoman subjects and most Jews were not Ottoman subjects. Mr. Porath now asserts that the count for Jews was wrong because "all the Jewish newcomers were foreign nationals who cherished their privileged status under the capitulatory regime and would have refused to have anything to do with the census authorities."

Thus, having first cast doubt on Miss Peters's reasons for not using the 1893 Ottoman census for Jews, Mr. Porath now concedes that her reasons were valid. He himself gives no figures for Jews, but he also no longer suggests that Miss Peters's figure of almost 60,000 Jews in 1893 is far off the mark.

In his letter, Mr. Porath moreover pays tribute to Arthur Ruppin, calling him "an outstanding demographer and sociologist" who cannot be accused of "superficial work" and whose estimates are "plausible" and based on "thorough analysis." This is the same man disparaged by Farrell in the article to which Mr. Porath had previously referred his readers.

Arthur Ruppin (1876-1943) was a towering figure in the history of modern Palestine. He came to Palestine in 1907 and from that time until his death he directed Jewish settlement. He was a world-renowned statistician and sociologist and a full professor at the Hebrew University.

Mr. Porath's comments on Ruppin are welcome. However, he uses Ruppin's name for an odd purpose, namely, to lend authenticity to a total population estimate for Palestine of 689,275 persons. He gives no specific year for this estimate, but it happens to be a figure for the year 1915 (Ruppin, *Syrien Als Wirtschaftsgebiet* [Harz Berlin/Wien, 1920] pp. 11-16).

It is strange that Mr. Porath should use Ruppin's name in connection with the estimate, because in that book Ruppin states that the figures come mainly from official Ottoman sources and that he makes no claim for their accuracy. In fact, they appear to be figures from the 1914-1915 Ottoman census as adjusted by Ruppin's estimate for Jews. (According to the *Survey of Palestine 1946-47*, Vol. 1, p. 144, the figure 689,000 comes from "Turkish sources.") But strangest of all is that Mr. Porath should have turned to Ruppin's obscure, hard-to-come-by book for this information when the figure is on p. 425 of Miss Peters's book, where she gives the 1915 population of Palestine as 604,300 non-Jews and 85,000 Jews, for a total of 689,300.

Ruppin might better have been quoted on the question of the al-

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leged displacement of the Arabs by the Jews. In *The Jews in the Modern World* (1934) Ruppin wrote:

> The Palestine census of 1931 has proved the remarkable fact that the Arab population has increased in the districts where Jewish immigrants have settled, and has remained stationary, or decreased, where there was no Jewish immigration. Obviously, so far from displacing the Arabs, the economic activities of the Jews have created additional possibilities for the Arabs also.

When Mr. Porath referred his readers to Farrell, he knew that Farrell's statistics, at least as to the number of Jews in Palestine in 1893, were wrong, and that Farrell's remarks about Arthur Ruppin were also wrong. Yet he directed his readers to Farrell without warning or qualification. The erroneous statistics as to Jews were then disseminated in Anthony Lewis's widely-read column, together with Lewis's comment that Mr. Porath's article was "devastating on Miss Peters's methods," and with the nasty insinuation of fraud. On analysis, however, it is Mr. Porath's methods that appear questionable. Subject to debate though Miss Peters's book and its thesis may be, and though there may be justification for Mr. Porath's criticisms on some points, the manner in which he sought to torpedo Miss Peters's work in the respects noted here should, I believe, be unacceptable to any fair-minded person.

LAWRENCE R. ENO
New York City

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Erich Isaac and Rael Jean Isaac in "Whose Palestine?" have, like Yehoshua Porath in the *New York Review of Books*, begun to correct the unfortunate but growing impression that Joan Peters's book *From Time Immemorial* is a legitimate work of scholarship with accurate findings. The Isaacs have correctly focused on Miss Peters's piling-on of statistics, her misreading of source materials, and her biased interpretation of apparent fact. But the Isaacs are too gentle in their criticism of her book. Their limited censure only begins to scratch the surface of Miss Peters's misuse and abuse of her sources.

Miss Peters's main assertion is that approximately 36 percent of the Palestinian Arab population displaced by the creation of Israel in 1948 were not Arabs of long-term residence, but Arabs who had taken up temporary residence in primarily Jewish-settled areas (p. 256). Thus, the massive numbers of Arab refugees created by the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948 are much less than Arabs claim, according to Miss Peters, and they cannot be characterized as true refugees or Palestinian Arabs.

This is where *From Time Immemorial* misrepresents the social and political history of 19th- and 20th-century Palestine. First, Jews too immigrated to Palestine and ultimately created the state of Israel. Would Miss Peters suggest that the Jews who came to Palestine after 1882, 1917, or 1948 had no right to settle there because they had not been permanent residents for a prolonged period of time?

Second, short of knowing the population of individual Arab towns and villages in Palestine in 1948 as compared to 1922 or 1931 when censuses were carried out, it is virtually impossible to state categorically how many Palestinians were temporary, semi-permanent, or permanent residents. Other scholars, like Martin Kramer (the *New Leader*, May 14, 1984), have already correctly questioned Miss Peters's misuse of the tenuous 1893 Ottoman census figures. Her statistical acrobatics for determining the permanency of the Arab population in Palestine are not based upon a credible data base.

Third, when Jews immigrated to Palestine they purchased land from resident and non-resident owners, sometimes displacing local Arab peasants. Many Palestinian Arabs themselves sold land directly to Jewish immigrants. Palestinian Arab notables repeatedly lined their pockets quietly, but screamed "unfair" publicly to the British administrators in London and Jerusalem about the development of the Jewish National Home. The land-owning political leadership which led the Palestine Arab national movement in the 1920's, 1930's, and 1940's was deeply and continuously involved in the land-sale process to Jews. Palestinians directly aided the fulfillment of the Zionist dream of creating a Jewish state. (See my recently published *The Land Question in Palestine, 1917-1939*, University of North Carolina Press, 1985.)

Arab land sales caused the displacement of Arab peasants from the lands they traditionally worked. Many of those displaced by Arab land sales, whether they sold land themselves or had land sold "over their heads" by large land owners, became migratory laborers and were attracted to Jewish capital and development. Many others who were agricultural laborers, tenants, manure carriers, plowmen, threshers, and shepherds who worked the land *before* Jewish land purchase *later* became per-diem workers, or Miss Peters's migratory laborers in Jewish-settled areas and ultimately the state of Israel.

Besides these errors of interpretation and fact, the core issues for the historian are the research sources and methods employed. Miss Peters's work reveals a startling lack of rigor in using the available source material. There are glaring errors of omission and perhaps commission. After hearing Miss Peters speak four times in a weekend to various Jewish communal organizations and gatherings in Atlanta in late September 1984, my opinion was reinforced that she lacked a familiarity with the key primary sources she claims to have used.

Though *From Time Immemorial* displays a bulging bibliography, more than 1,800 footnotes, and 400 pages of text, poundage alone is not a criterion for assuming excellence, accuracy, or proof of an author's assertions. Miss Peters may claim that she has not written and had no intention of writing a scholarly book, yet she carefully "drops" the names of some of the most authoritative Middle East historians in her acknowledgments. She has cultivated the assumption that because individuals are helpful in the execution of research, they are, by extension, also automatically supportive of one's findings. The adulation accorded her work by a raft of enthusiasts on the jacket cover of the book seems cleverly designed to imply that her findings have a cloak of legitimacy from very reputable individuals.

In general, Miss Peters has relied mostly on official published materials, selected secondary sources, archival materials (to a lesser degree), and on the archival findings of others. If one applies the criterion of sources used, the findings and scholarship of this book are unsound.

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

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Miss Peters failed to use important and available archival sources. She failed to use critical non-English sources. She failed to use crucial English-language sources. The footnoting method and support of assumptions made are lackadaisical, careless, and unprofessional.

From what appears in Miss Peters's bibliography and footnotes, there is very little evidence that either Hebrew- or Arabic-language sources were used extensively. She may have employed others to assist in translating foreign-language material, but to write on the origins of the Arab-Israel conflict with the authoritative nature of her assertive findings without an apparent ability to use the language of the region is a serious shortcoming for some, and for others just scholarly unacceptable.

If Miss Peters had used just-published Hebrew materials such as candid memoirs of the Jewish nation-builders, her distorted conclusions about the origins and movement of the Palestinian Arab population would have been clarified. She should have read the personal diaries of Chaim Arlosoroff, Moshe Sharett, David Ben-Gurion, Joseph Weitz, Arthur Ruppin, and others to understand the social dynamic causing Arab in-migration and internal migration within Palestine during the Mandate.

Miss Peters in her acknowledgments claims that she used the documentation at the Central Zionist Archives in Jerusalem. But her footnotes give virtually no indication that she utilized this vast and rich archive with source material in German, Hebrew, French, and Arabic. Miss Peters would have learned from reading these numerous, incredibly detailed, and secret internal memoranda of Jewish Agency departments and affiliated organizations about how Jewish land-settlement organizations planned to handle Arab populations displaced by Arab land sales and Jewish land purchases.

Jews purchased land mainly in the coastal and plains regions of Palestine in which Arab peasant cultivators were sometimes in residence. After a purchase, these cultivators and their families sometimes moved eastward where they settled their families, but more often than not they continued to work in the newly developing Jewish-owned areas, mostly in the valley and plains regions, commuting on a daily or weekly basis. This simple point would have been confirmed several times for her had she systematically used the files of the Jewish Agency's Political Department and the Jewish National Fund which contain the copious assessments made by Jewish land and settlement experts during the Mandate.

The private candor of men like Menahem Ussishkin, Yehoshua Hankin, Yaakov Thon, Avraham Granovsky, Berl Katznelson, and others who engaged on a daily basis in the Jewish nation-building process in Palestine would have rounded out Miss Peters's interpretation of how Arab tenants and agricultural workers displaced by Jewish land purchase were encouraged through monetary compensation to resettle far from existing or future Jewish settlements.

When Miss Peters does refer to sources in foreign languages she usually states in her footnotes that she is citing a source mentioned by another author. This is an acceptable convention except when done so frequently that one questions whether Miss Peters saw or read the *original* foreign-language source material herself, or merely relied upon another's judgment. Throughout the book, Miss Peters selectively uses data culled by other researchers to support her assertions.

What is astonishing is the number of times in her footnotes Miss Peters uses a primary source in defense of an assertion, and then notes that the original source is cited in a secondary source which she employed. Of the more than 1,800 footnotes, hundreds of Miss Peters's supporting claims are stated as "cited by" or "cited in." There is no reason a writer cannot adopt such a procedure for accumulating information, but secondary sources and the existing body of literature must be utilized judiciously.

Miss Peters even failed to use the most important available English archival and secondary sources. And the ones chosen were used sparingly and selectively. Miss Peters very smartly protects herself against criticism for not using all the necessary source material when she says in her explanatory first footnote of Chapter 13: "The records reproduced in this book . . . are by no means all-inclusive." If the records she used are not all-inclusive, then her findings must be treated in the same tentative manner.

The central British archival documentation for the Mandate period is the Colonial Office (CO) 733 series. This crucial correspondence from 1921 to the end of the Mandate reveals how British policy was made on virtually all matters concerning Palestine and the evolution of the Jewish National Home, particularly on the four major issues of constant tension: Jewish immigration; Jewish land purchase and Arab land sales; the Palestine Arab majority's quest for self-determination; and Britain's desire to maintain its strategic presence in Palestine at the least possible cost in manpower and financial burden to the British taxpayer. Of the more than 1,800 footnotes in *From Time Immemorial*, not more than 2 percent cite the CO 733 series! When Miss Peters does cite the CO 733 series for the 1940's, she does so almost exclusively because another author cited this important record group.

More substance is added to doubt Miss Peters's rigor and familiarity with the source material in her citations of the CO 733 series, which are often incomplete and therefore of no use to anyone who wants to check her assertions and thus her conclusions. For each file in the CO 733 series there is a number which follows CO 733 and then a reference number following that, so that an accurate and precise citation would read CO 733/191/77211, but Miss Peters on pp. 519 (fns. 7, 10, 12, 14) and 547 (fns. 4 and 10) gives us only two of the three components of the citation, such as CO 733/27137. With this information it is impossible to find the source she is citing. Similarly in her use of the Foreign Office Record Group 371 series on Palestine, she repeatedly gives only a partial listing of the files. On pp. 534 and 535 from fn. 45 to fn. 74, only one citation is in its complete form.

It is impossible to check Miss Peters's claims and assertions or to reconstruct the use of her source materials because her footnoting is repeatedly inconsistent, inaccurate, and incomplete. By any standard of measurement, the author's very intermittent use and inexact footnoting of these two sources is unacceptable even for popular literature. To omit or misuse such important source material is most glaring to any serious student of the Mandate period and the history of modern Israel.

There are other examples in the use of English sources where Miss

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Peters could have given a more complete and accurate picture. She underused the important 1931 Census for Palestine; she failed to read thoroughly the Chancellor Papers at Rhodes House at Oxford; and she did not read or understand the important research by Haim Gerber, Ylana Miller, Rachelle Taqqu, Alexander Scholch, and others on population and society in 19th- and 20th-century Palestine.

Miss Peters became too dependent on officially published British sources and insufficiently skeptical of their accuracy. The British, as others have often done, "cooked their statistics" to coincide with a predetermined conclusion for a particular purpose. The Isaacs very carefully point out how Miss Peters failed to read or understand clearly the 1930 Hope Simpson Report. Miss Peters should have been equally skeptical of the data collection and therefore the findings of the Landless Arab Inquiry, the French Reports, the Johnson-Crosbie Report, and the Survey of Palestine which are flawed, but nevertheless used by Miss Peters as benchmark assumptions for her conclusions. Data were repeatedly collected by all sides, sometimes published, sometimes "cleansed" of damaging evidence, and other times just quashed because of their political implications. Ulterior motives prevailed in this earlier period, too, to bolster historical legitimacy, national dominance, and strategic control of Palestine.

In the end, there is little evidence of scholarly fidelity in Miss Peters's method. She does not demonstrate care or diligence in the treatment of official sources. Her book is shoddy both in its workmanship and in its attention to nuance. Miss Peters does not let either all of the available source material or all the facts get in the way of her conclusions. It is particularly troubling to see a research style accepted where chapters are seemingly written by taking carefully chosen chunks of previously accumulated information and then dexterously manipulating them for purposes of authenticity and desired outcome.

The danger that such a book has for scholarship and the enormous body of literature on the origins of the Arab-Israel conflict is that students and others seeking philosophical nourishment will cite her findings as conclusive evidence about the population of Palestine in the period before 1948. Rather than clarifying the complexities of the Arab-Israel conflict's development, this book will add to the layers of meta-truths that already abound in the literature.

From Time Immemorial is not a serious book; its sources and conclusions are tendentious and incomplete. Those who read it should understand that from the outset.

KENNETH W. STEIN
Emory University
Atlanta, Georgia

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Two years ago I was asked by the Jewish Book Council for a joint review of two books with a similar subject, *From Time Immemorial* by Joan Peters and *The Claim of Dispossession* by Arieh Avneri. I wrote that Avneri was a "must read" for anyone interested in the history of Jewish settlement in Palestine. He provided important and intelligible statistics on the migration of Arabs into areas of Jewish settlement. Joan Peters covered the same ground, I wrote, in convoluted, hard-to-follow tables. Her book, I said, was badly written and poorly edited. . . .

Daniel Pipes, who reviewed the Peters book in COMMENTARY, has described it recently as "an appallingly crafted book," marred by "eccentric footnotes and a polemical, somewhat hysterical undertone."

Eccentric footnotes is a polite way of saying that Miss Peters gives us no fewer than 120 pages of footnotes to impress us with her diligent "scholarship" but that many of the minor and most of the major citations, as the Isaacs and other critics have found, simply do not stand up to examination.

Several months after the Jewish Book Council published my critical review, it awarded the Peters book a prize in the Israel category. I was surprised. I asked one of the judges why she hadn't voted for the Avneri book or for one of several other good books on Israel that I had named. All of them had been written by Israelis. I was told that only American authors are eligible for Jewish Book Council awards and that no other book of consequence on an Israeli subject had been published by an American author in 1984. I agreed that there was nothing else worth considering by an American writer. Under the peculiar conditions of the Jewish Book Council, Joan

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Peters received a prize by default.

The Isaacs take me to task for stating that the Peters book is a "Herut polemic." My first hint of the anti-Labor bias of the book was the foolish assertion, repeated several times, that Jewish employers in Mandatory Palestine were forced to hire Arabs because of British restrictions on Jewish immigration. It was the word "forced" that hit me in the gut. I am not an expert on Jewish employment in Palestine, but I was a reporter on the Palestine *Post* from 1934 to 1937 and I have some knowledge of how Jewish employers acted then. There were pockets of Jewish unemployment. The Histadrut tried to find jobs for unemployed Jewish labor by carrying on a struggle for *avodah Ivrit*, the employment of Jews, and not Arabs, in Jewish enterprises. This campaign was sometimes violent and largely unsuccessful.

Those Jewish employers who preferred to hire lower-paid Arabs in order to save a pound or two were the financial backers of the anti-Histadrut parties, the Revisionists and the General Zionists. These parties have evolved into the Herut and the Liberals, now united in the Likud coalition. Miss Peters's assertion that these Jewish employers were forced to hire lower-paid Arabs may be part of what Leon Wieseltier has described in a prize-winning article in the *New Republic* (November 11, 1985) as a Herut campaign to rewrite the history of Jewish settlement, eliminating or distorting the Histadrut's major role.

In all of Miss Peters's seven years of research, she could find no record of the campaign for *avodah Ivrit*, which was a major cause of strife in the *Yishuv* for many years. In her 120 pages of footnotes and her 36 pages of index, the word Histadrut cannot be found.

Miss Peters may have attempted to rewrite history. Two years after her book was fraudulently promoted into best-sellerdom and long after the hard-cover edition has been remaindered, the Isaacs have come along to rewrite Joan Peters. They attribute to her the statement that Jewish settlers in Palestine did not displace native Arabs. All that Miss Peters claims, according to the new interpretation by the Isaacs, is that about 100,000 Arabs (or fewer than 20,000 heads of families) were added to the native Arabs by migration in the Mandatory era. By way of substantiation, the Isaacs point out that Avneri comes to the same conclusion.

One hundred thousand Arab migrants is an insignificant percentage of the number of Arabs in Palestine when the British left in 1948. If that is all Miss Peters claims, what was all the fuss about? How could 100,000 Arab migrants "demonstrate," as Saul Bellow bellows on the book jacket, "that, on the Palestinian issue, [the] experts speak from utter ignorance"? How could the news of Arab migration, first brought to light by the Jewish Agency evidence before the Royal Commission fifty years ago, "reformulate," according to Paul Cowan on the book jacket, "the terms of the debate on the Middle East"? Above all, how could it "change the course of events in the Middle East" —the words of Barbara Tuchman on the book jacket and Martin Peretz elsewhere?

Contrary to what the Isaacs now say, the publisher's blurb inside the jacket and the ads for the book tried to give the uninformed reader the impression that the number of "native" Arabs was negligible and that the Arabs have no legitimate rights in Palestine.

Would it be correct to say that the publishers, Harper & Row, and the galaxy of luminaries they collected for the jacket blurbs and promotional ads, have committed a fraud on the reading public?

The associates of the Isaacs in Americans for a Safe Israel, who vigorously promoted this book, would not agree. Harry Louis Selden, to give just one example, wrote in the Washington *Jewish Week*: "In some 600 pages of diligently researched and meticulously documented narrative [Miss Peters] establishes beyond any doubt that . . . [the Palestinians] are nothing more than parvenu squatters."

Miss Peters cannot escape the blame for Selden's conclusion. She never calls the Arabs "squatters," but this is the impression she tries to leave her readers with.

There are now close to four million Arabs who call themselves Palestinians. Over two million are under the jurisdiction of Israel. To deny them any legitimate rights to the land prohibits any basis for the settlement of the conflict.

Of particular interest to me as chairman of the American Friends of Neve Shalom are the 750,000 Palestinians who are citizens of Israel. Every sixth voter in Israel is a Palestinian Arab. In a few years, according to Israeli demographers, it may be one out of five. They will not be blown away by Joan Peters's rhetoric or Meir Kahane's racism. The Jews and Arabs in Israel must learn to live together in peaceful coexistence. The School for Peace at Neve Shalom, which is about five years old, has done yeoman work in bringing together Israeli Arab and Jewish youth, erasing stereotypes, and instilling the seeds of peaceful coexistence. COMMENTARY would do better to devote an article to a description of this pioneering school, which recently hosted Catholics and Protestants from Northern Ireland who came to Israel to learn about Neve Shalom's innovative methods, than to publish an article on a poor and harmful two-year-old-book.

The Isaacs deny that the book is harmful. They write that despite Miss Peters's egregious errors, her book has performed a valuable service. For a contrary opinion, may I quote Justin McCarthy, chairman of the history department of the University of Louisville? The Kentucky professor attended an academic conference on Palestinian demography at Haifa University in June. Miss Peters was invited, I am told, but did not attend. According to the Jerusalem *Post*, McCarthy said: "Her figures have been cited by American Zionists and now that they are being disproved they will hurt Israel because critics will say 'you lied about this; you probably lie about other things too.' "

I would like to add a personal word to the Isaacs. I witnessed the invasion of Haifa by the Hauranis in the 1930's, which, as Miss Peters points out, was condoned by the British authorities. Unskilled Haurani laborers were welcomed in the Jewish sector, notwithstanding Histadrut opposition, just as unskilled workers from the West Bank and Gaza are the construction workers, dishwashers, and garbage collectors in Israel today. The Hauranis squatted in tin shacks without water, sanitation, or municipal services on public land on the outskirts of Haifa. On a much smaller scale, the Haurani camp resembled Crossroads outside Capetown which the South African authorities keep trying to destroy.

The British finally bulldozed the

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smelly Haurani encampment as a health hazard, but only after the Syrian drought ended and most of the Hauranis went home to plow their fields. Those who remained in Haifa found better accommodations.

Today, over 100,000 Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza cross into Israel daily to find work. Many of them, for instance the waiters and chambermaids in Israeli hotels, have been working in the same place for many years. Some of them even have tenure. But none of them lives in Israel. There are no squatter camps on the outskirts of Israeli cities. Israeli law forbids workers from the territories to stay overnight in Israel. They must commute from their homes daily. The bus trip can add up to four hours to the working day and the fare can be a goodly slice of their wages.

Enemies of Israel have likened this regulation to South Africa's apartheid law on controlled residence. They are wrong and will be wrong so long as Israel does not annex the territories, and the Arabs from the territories remain guest workers with no residence rights.

But annexation of the territories for security and national reasons is the chief plank of Americans for a Safe Israel, of which the Isaacs are leading members. If the territories were annexed, only an actual apartheid regulation could prevent these Arabs from living closer to their jobs. Only an apartheid regulation could prevent the rise of squatter camps of tin and plastic on the outskirts of Israeli cities.

This is the lesson I have learned from the Haurani invasion of the 1930's that Miss Peters makes so much of. I recommend it to the Isaacs.

JESSE ZEL LURIE
Pleasantville, New York

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

"Whose Palestine?" by Erich Isaac and Rael Jean Isaac contains a superb analysis of the carefully crafted campaign of disinformation directed against Joan Peters's *From Time Immemorial* by a small coterie of political zealots led by Noam Chomsky and Edward Said. Dissecting the disingenuousness and speciousness of the smears, the Isaacs conclude, rightly, that Miss Peters's book, with its nearly 2,000 citations, has exploded the myth of the Palestinian Arabs as a nation living on its soil "from time immemorial," and is therefore a profound contribution to the current debate on the Middle East.

Still, one would have hoped that the Isaacs would have highlighted the fact that the screams of the book's detractors and their arithmetical sleight-of-hand were deliberate diversionary tactics to present *From Time Immemorial* as a book only about numbers. By hewing to that numerical frame of reference for so much of their article, the Isaacs—unintentionally, to be sure—dance to the tune set by the smear campaign. Though stating at the outset that several themes of equal importance are set forth in *From Time Immemorial*, the Isaacs then focus on the population study, which constitutes only about one-fourth of the book. They devote an inordinate amount of space to numerical items, most of which make no fundamental difference—a discrepancy of two or three thousand in population, being of such small magnitude, is of no overall significance.

Moreover, before publication Miss Peters checked her demographics with Philip Hauser, one of the world's most eminent demographers. One would have thought the Isaacs would have reported that *From Time Immemorial* contains demographic notes discussing and approving its demographic methodology, prepared and signed by Hauser.

One thing is clear from all the disinformational pieces about *From Time Immemorial* . . . and from the excellent article by the Isaacs: the very truth about what is in the book can be manipulated and altered in much the same way that the myth of the "Palestinians from time immemorial" has itself been propagated.

HERBERT TARR
Brooklyn, New York

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Whether Joan Peters's book is correct in its major theses is totally irrelevant to the peace process in the Middle East. Were a settlement to be decided by some objective judicial body, and if that decision were to be based, at least in part, on claims of prior occupation of the land, the questions addressed by Miss Peters and the Isaacs would be important—perhaps even crucial.

But even the most naive observer must realize that the conflict between Israel and the Arabs is *not* going to be resolved, even in part, by whether there were more Jews or more Arabs in some part of Palestine in 1880 or 1920. It is not going to be resolved, even in part, by how many of the local Arabs had grandfathers who emigrated from some part of Syria in 1934. (How many angels can dance the hora on the tip of a pin?)

The critical *fact* for politicians is that the Arabs living in Palestine believe that they are *Palestinians*. Whether historians determine that their ancestors came from Syria or were born locally is not going to change that belief. Can someone really believe that if it were demonstrated without a doubt that all the Arabs in Palestine are descendants of immigrants from some other place, these Arabs would then give up their claim to be Palestinians and their claim to Palestinian territory?

Let's stop arguing about whether there is, in fact, a Palestinian people . . . and get on with settling the problem rather than arguing about which historian is correct. Political leaders—and commentators—must deal with perceptions as they are, and not as we would like them to be.

ROBERT J. SCHREIBER
Stamford, Connecticut

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Last fall I helped organize a talk by Joan Peters on the campus of the University of Virginia, and was most disappointed when there were no effective responses to later denunciations of her in the national press. This has now been rectified by "Whose Palestine?"

If Yehoshua Porath and others wish to continue to claim that Arab migration to Palestine has been insignificant, the ball is in their court to produce some demographic evidence for this hypothesis, rather than continued *ipse dixit* statements to this effect.

JONATHAN S. MARK
Charlottesville, Virginia

ERICH ISAAC and RAEL JEAN ISAAC write:

Michael Curtis has touched on a vital issue and the letters to COMMENTARY bear out its validity. The major theses of Joan Peters's book have been lost in a welter of charges that have little or nothing to do with what she has written. Given this fact, it is important to

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remember her theme at the outset: as her title, *From Time Immemorial*, underlines, she is seeking to counter the impact of a propaganda campaign which claims that the Arab-speaking people of Palestine are an autochthonous population, a nation that survived innumerable invasions, including that of the biblical Hebrews, until its dispossession first by Zionist settlers and then by the forces of the nascent Jewish state.

To emphasize this is not to deny that *From Time Immemorial* has serious flaws. These (contrary to Yehoshua Porath) we made no attempt to minimize. Indeed, some of the problems we pointed out had eluded Miss Peters's earlier critics.

But the flaws of the book, for all too many of its critics, have become the occasion for the release of hostilities toward Zionism, toward Israel, toward political parties or movements within Israel and world Jewry, in some cases toward Judaism itself. And there is a ferocity in some of the attacks that has little to do with concern for standards of scholarship. In his letter, Norman G. Finkelstein, for example, refers to his unpublished manuscript *Protocols of Joan Peters*. The very title is a cruel defamation, implying that Miss Peters has written a version of the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*. That forgery, widely circulated in the Arab world, continues to be used to legitimize the extermination of the Jews. Mr. Finkelstein, by his use of the title, implies that Miss Peters has written a forgery whose intent is to extinguish Palestinian Arabs. Similarly, the title of his published article (in the far-Left *In These Times*) is "A Spectacular Fraud." Joan Peters, a journalist who undertook a massive scholarly effort involving the techniques of several disciplines, an undertaking that would have daunted highly trained specialists, is not credited with a capacity for mistakes—only with malignant intent to deceive and misrepresent. Yet if inaccuracy bespeaks fraud, what is one to say of the "mistakes" (of which more shortly) in Mr. Finkelstein's own article and letter?

For Mr. Porath, Miss Peters's book provides an excuse for an exercise in revisionist history. American fashions come to Israel late, often only after they are already out of fashion in the land of their birth. Here revisionist history focused on alleged U.S. responsibility for starting the cold war. Now that revisionist history has been discredited in this country, it has begun to flourish in Israel, one of its themes being the alleged primary Jewish responsibility for the Arab exodus in 1948.

If for Mr. Porath Miss Peters's book provides an avenue into revisionist history, for Jesse Zel Lurie it offers an excuse to continue a stale ideological campaign against the Revisionist and General Zionist parties of the pre-state *Yishuv*, and to warn darkly of the consequences should Israel annex territories conquered in 1967, again a subject on which Miss Peters's book is wholly silent.

To COMMENT specifically on individual letters: Norman G. Finkelstein denies our allegation that he has incorrectly added 40,000 Arabs to Miss Peters's demographic projection for her Area IV. But this is precisely what he does. He ignores the fact that nomads were included in the 1893 population figures but separated out in the 1947 figures. Area IV, which included the Negev, had a sizable population of nomads (48,000), which is listed clearly and properly by Miss Peters in separate columns for 1947 on p. 425. It is only by ignoring these nomads that Mr. Finkelstein comes up with an alleged figure of 40,000 Arabs that Miss Peters has not accounted for. (He comes up with 40,000 rather than 48,000—the number of nomads—because he wrongly multiplies by 2.7, rather than by 2.795, the growth factor Miss Peters uses.)

As for the Anglo-American Survey of Palestine, the other illustration we used in our article of Mr. Finkelstein's unfair attack, it is instructive to look at his original comments in *In These Times* on Miss Peters's use of the Survey. He offers quotations from Miss Peters on one side, his own observations on them on the other:

> Peters: What the official Anglo-American Survey of 1945-46 definitely disclosed . . . is that . . . tens of thousands of "Arab illegal immigrants" [were] *recorded* as having been "brought" into . . . Palestine . . . (p. 379, emphasis in original).

> Finkelstein: (a) a good illustration of how Peters handles figures—"3,800" recorded Arab immigrants becomes "tens of thousands"; (b) Peters's falsified presentation (pp. 378-79) of the—for her purposes—crucial section of the Survey in which this quote appears is in a class all its own.

We pointed out that the Survey provided evidence of far more than 3,800 immigrants. And lo and behold, Mr. Finkelstein's letter indicates that he too knows that his original statement was false, for he now talks of the Survey's reference to an additional 4,000 illegal immigrants employed by the War Department and the Royal Air Force. He also now concedes the Survey's references to "considerable numbers" for which "no estimates are available" recruited by private contractors or entering "individually." His quarrel now seems to be with Miss Peters's use of the word "recorded," and the implication he derives from her text that tens of thousands entered "under official arrangements."

Miss Peters can indeed be faulted, here as elsewhere, for overblown rhetoric and a sloppy use of language. But, as the context of her remarks makes clear, her intention was to emphasize that at the very time Britain was barring the gates of Palestine to the Jews of Europe, tens of thousands of Arabs, whether under official or unofficial arrangements, were entering Palestine to fill labor needs resulting from the war. (And indeed the Survey unintentionally highlights Britain's appalling behavior while Hitler enacted his Final Solution. The Survey declares that "His Majesty's Government decided, on grounds of policy, not to facilitate in any way immigration of Jewish or other refugees from Germany or territory occupied by Germany. This was interpreted to mean that no facilities for Palestine were to be granted to any person who left Germany or German-occupied territory after the date of the outbreak of the war.") Ironically, the first persons to be killed by British bullets after the outbreak of World War II were two refugees aboard the *Tiger Hill*, which ran the British blockade of Palestine.

Moreover, our reading of the Survey does indeed support the conclusion that the 10,000 workers constituted a separate group. The Survey puts that number under the heading of "those working for contractors engaged on military . . . or in other civil employment," a category it specifically differentiates

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from "Those employed directly by the War Department and the Royal Air Force," whose numbers it reports separately.

On balance, who then would seem guilty of misrepresentation? Miss Peters, because of her awkward use of language? Or Mr. Finkelstein, who in his original article cites as one of Miss Peters's "crude and shameless falsifications" that the Survey's 3,800 Arab immigrants had become "tens of thousands"?

Mr. Finkelstein makes a major issue out of Joan Peters's Area IV, even seeking to publish an article on the alleged 110,000 "missing migrants" from this region, which, he claims, render her case "trivial." First, as we have seen, Miss Peters is correct in calculating 70,000 potential out-migrants, since Mr. Finkelstein, in his recalculations, ignores the nomads, and her Area IV, which comprised chiefly the Negev and western and central Galilee, had a large number of Bedouin (mainly in the Negev). Even if 70,000 Arabs had migrated from Area IV to Area I and then become refugees, her case would not have been "trivial."

In practice it is most unlikely that this happened. The nomads of the Negev did not become sedentary dwellers in the Mandatory period and thus did not become out-migrants to Area I. There were peasant villages in the northern Negev but these were largely settled by Egyptian fellahin. This area experienced little natural growth, in part because of its misfortune in serving as a frontier zone between the feuding Qaisi and Yamani factions. The Galilee had an important Christian population component, which meant that in practice its natural growth rate was lower than that of purely Muslim areas. Thus it is unlikely that there would have been even 70,000 in-migrants to account for. There were no doubt some refugees who came from Area IV, although, needless to say, this did not necessarily mean they had been living in Palestine "from time immemorial."

Mr. Finkelstein devotes much space in his article to an allegedly sinister plot by Miss Peters to "hide" those 70,000 migrants because she provides a table in which she "forgets" to add the in-migrants from Area IV. But the purpose of that particular table is to show how many Arab in-migrants came into the areas that became Israel, and not where they came from. Since Area IV does not show Arab in-migration it is not included. Mr. Finkelstein's criticism is foolish.

As for Mr. Finkelstein's explanation for the failure of Harper & Row to make changes in subsequent editions of the book as a result of his criticisms, much of the blame is his. It was obvious to anyone that Mr. Finkelstein had no interest in improving the book. The few criticisms that had merit were the more easily ignored because of the vicious tone of the attack and the heavy admixture of false,

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even absurd, charges. Mr. Finkelstein claims that if the errors were corrected nothing would remain of Miss Peters's thesis, and that we admit this when we refer to the many references to the Hope Simpson Report as a "lethal systemic error." Says Mr. Finkelstein: "What does this mean if not that this 'error' goes to the very heart of Miss Peters's argument. . . ?" What we wrote was that by constantly referring back to the Hope Simpson Report, Miss Peters converted a "confined mistake, easily correctable in a later edition of the book," into a lethal systemic error. The error does not go to the heart of her *argument*—this, we tried to show in our article, has ample support. It is only because of Miss Peters's propensity to repeat herself that the error does substantial damage to her text, which would indeed require considerable rewriting.

We scarcely like to dignify Mr. Finkelstein's charges of deliberate deception by rebuttal. He allows that we offer an "ingenious" explanation for Miss Peters's misinterpretation of the passage in Hope Simpson. Actually our explanation was simple: Miss Peters walked into a trap set by Hope Simpson for quite different purposes. Hope Simpson had no sympathy for the Zionist enterprise (at the end of World War II he was still arguing that any Jewish desire for national existence could be amply fulfilled in the Soviet province of Birobizhan) and wanted Jewish immigration stopped. He disposes of the awkward (for him) problem of Arab illegal immigration by an ingenious maneuver: smuggling in two paragraphs under the heading "Evasion of the Frontier Control" in the section on Jewish immigration. It was very easy for Miss Peters to be misled into thinking Hope Simpson is still referring to Arabs when immediately following this he jumps to the case of the pseudo-traveler.

As for the other error which Mr. Finkelstein finds clinching proof of "deliberate deception," no one seeking to "disinform" would refer the reader to a source which would make the mistake painfully obvious.

Mr. Finkelstein says at the outset of his letter that we argue that the central theses of *From Time Immemorial* are "generally sound" and he promises to take this matter up after dealing with the issue of his own scholarship and Miss Peters's alleged "fraud." But when he gets to this (No. 3), Mr. Finkelstein avoids the subject. We are back to Miss Peters's population projections for her Areas I through V. And here Mr. Finkelstein simply fails to comprehend what Miss Peters has done. (In all fairness, Miss Peters's presentation leaves much to be desired.) Mr. Finkelstein argues that Miss Peters's projections almost fully account for Palestine's Arab population in 1947 by natural increase, thus nullifying her argument for substantial immigration. (He finds her figures account for all but 44,520 of the Arabs in Palestine in 1947 by natural increase.)

First of all, there are no missing 44,520 Arabs to be accounted for by immigration. Mr. Finkelstein once again multiplies by 2.7 instead of by 2.795, the growth factor Miss Peters uses.

What Miss Peters does, as Mr. Finkelstein should have realized, is to divide the number of Arabs in western Palestine in 1947 by the number in the same area in 1893—that gives her a value of 2.795 which she calls natural growth. Now the components of population growth are fertility, mortality, in-migration, and out-migration. Change of population over time is the result both of natural increase (the balance between birth and death) and net migration (the balance between in-migration and out-migration). The factor of 2.795 by which the population of 1947 is larger than the Ottoman census population of 1893 does not tell us to what extent the growth was by natural increase and to what extent by migration. To obtain reasonable values for immigration it is necessary to deduct reproductive change values from the growth figures. Though this was presumably done (see Philip Hauser's remarks, pp. 427-28), the method by which relevant birth and death statistics were derived, especially for the pre-Mandate years, is not explained. Here, as in other parts of the book, tighter editorial guidance might have prevented some of the questions raised.

The growth factor of 2.795 corresponds to an annual natural growth rate of 1.95 percent for 1893-1947 (determined either by compounding or exponential growth formulas). This would be an extraordinarily high figure for an undeveloped country in the first half of that period while Palestine was under Turkish rule. To put it in perspective, the average annual growth rate for developing countries in the period from 1850-1900 was 0.53 percent and from 1900-1920 was 0.52 percent, much below the rates for industrialized countries of that time. If we remove from consideration the high growth rate of 1922-47 (the product of government health services, plus effects of Jewish sanitation and health measures, plus immigration), we obtain an average annual growth for the Ottoman period of 1.2 percent. This strongly suggests very high Arab immigration in the 1890's and first decades of this century.

When it comes to the substance of Miss Peters's thesis—high rates of Arab in-migration and immigration into the predominantly Jewish areas—the best Mr. Finkelstein can do is to quote from a report in *Haaretz* about a conference at Haifa University. But while Mr. Finkelstein may have *Haaretz* before him, we have the conference papers before us. And nothing could be further from the truth than to say, as Mr. Finkelstein does, that "virtually all of the participants dismissed Miss Peters's demographic theses." The only conference paper to refer specifically to Miss Peters's book was given by Arnon Soffer, a geographer who heads the Arab-Jewish Center of Haifa University. Far from dismissing Miss Peters's thesis, Soffer confirms it. It is Mr. Porath's demographic thesis that he rejects. Thus, in his concluding remarks Soffer says: "The facts brought forth here as to the scope of the Arab migration to the city of Haifa, the matter of Bedouin penetration into Palestine, and the waves of Egyptian migration all point to a rejection of Yehoshua Porath's arguments concerning the cessation of Bedouin penetration and natural increase as being the decisive factor (at least for the coastal plain)." And this is what he has to say about Joan Peters's thesis: "All these findings underscore the fact that the coastal plain, like the other plains, [was] empty of population on the eve of Zionist settlement. . . . At least as far as this important sector of Palestine, then, Joan Peters is right: the area was empty, the Arab population there is relatively new."

A number of the other conference papers, without referring to Miss Peters, reinforced her argu-

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ment. Thus papers by geography professor David Grossman of Bar Ilan University and anthropologist Gideon Kressel of Ben-Gurion University provided new material on Egyptian immigration to 19th-century Palestine. Daphne Tsimhoni's paper, "Demographic Trends of the Christian Population of Palestine during the Mandatory Period," reinforced Miss Peters's argument by showing that "rather than taking the usual form of migration from villages to towns, the major urbanization trend of Christians during the Mandate manifested itself in migration from the inland, traditional small towns to the expanding economic centers of the coastal towns, Haifa and Jaffa, or to the capital, Jerusalem." There were three papers on Arab migration to Haifa, by Joseph Vachnitz, Yossi Ben-Artzi, and Mahmoud Yazbak, the first of these summing up the reason for this special focus: "Of all towns in Palestine, Haifa absorbed the largest number of Arab migrants—most of them villagers."

Whence then did this total misinterpretation of the conference arise, fostered not only by Messrs. Finkelstein and Lurie (neither of whom was there), but by Arthur Hertzberg (also not there), who brought up the conference in the New York *Times Book Review* as a way of attacking Miss Peters in a review of another, unrelated book? Fred Gottheil of the University of Illinois, who attended the conference, has an explanation. During the informal closing symposium Miss Peters's book was discussed and some participants were critical (this served as the source both of the *Haaretz* article and one in the Jerusalem *Post*), although others, himself included, defended the book.

To understand the reactions of Israeli scholars to the book it is necessary to keep in mind that there are two issues: Miss Peters's thesis and her scholarly performance. There are Israeli scholars who fear that the credibility of the thesis will be undermined by her mistakes. Soffer noted that Miss Peters deserved some of the criticism her book received, but credited it with "renewing the discussion revolving around the demographics of Palestine from the second half of the 19th century on." He also noted that her critics, in trying to produce proof to refute her claims, "fell into a trap on several issues."

Mr. Finkelstein cites Yehoshua Ben Arieh as "the most authoritative scholar in attendance." He has no reason to single him out from the other contributors except that (he might think) Ben Arieh would agree with him about the Peters book. We have not spoken to Ben Arieh, but judging from his paper, which reinforces Miss Peters's thesis of the emptiness of the land settled by Jews, there is little reason to believe he has common ground with Mr. Finkelstein.

Mr. Finkelstein concludes with the claim that Miss Peters asserts there were 92,300 non-Jews in the Jewish-settled areas in 1893 while her own table shows there were 218,000 non-Jews "in the slice of Palestine that became Israel." This is a neat sleight of hand. Miss Peters makes it clear that she is talking about her Area I when she speaks of 92,300 non-Jews, and not all the area that became Israel (which includes her Areas II and IV).

Based on his many errors, we would, were we to follow his own example, raise a cry against Mr. Finkelstein of "fraud," "hoax," and "misrepresentation." But at least in part he seems to be guilty less of deliberate deception than of ignorance. While we are willing to give him the benefit of the doubt, the familiar injunction comes to mind: "Physician, heal thyself."

WITH REGARD to Yehoshua Porath: Mr. Porath now claims that his worries about Miss Peters's book stem from his "Zionism"—her presentation plays into Arab hands. The reason he offers is astonishingly silly. If both Jews and Arabs left their traditional homes "as a result of pressure exerted upon them," says Mr. Porath, "the best solution to their plight would lie in the return of all of them to their original places." But why should this follow? Why should not the best solution lie in each group's being absorbed in its place of refuge? Does Mr. Porath seriously believe that because Hindus and Muslims were both forced from their traditional homes in 1947, the "best solution" is to send 9 million Hindus (and their descendants) from India back to Pakistan and Bangladesh and to send 7.5 million Muslims from Pakistan and 1 million from Bangladesh back to India? Obviously Iraq, Libya, Yemen, etc. have no intention of absorbing large numbers of Israeli Jews, and have no worries that their propaganda ploys will be taken seriously by former Jewish residents in their right minds.

Mr. Porath's ostensible concern for the good name of Zionism becomes even more suspect as we move to his elaboration of the Haganah's "Daled Plan," upon which much of the revisionist history claiming Jewish responsibility for the Arab exodus of 1948 is based. We have here what looks much more like an effort to besmirch Israel's good name than to preserve it. In his original article in the *New York Review of Books* Mr. Porath is careful to say that the existence of the plan did not constitute evidence that it was carried out. But now, in his letter, he goes further and says "an analysis of the actual developments indicates that the plan was indeed carried out," and there were "large-scale" expulsions of Arabs.

Actually the plan was part of the general Haganah effort, before the creation of the state, to secure communications along strategic arteries. Mr. Porath himself admits in his original article that the plan only talked of expelling Arabs where they engaged in violent opposition to the Haganah, and in his letter provides a reasonable account of why it was so important for the nascent state to secure strategic continuity. Nonetheless, historians of Israel's War of Independence are by no means convinced (Mr. Porath was right the first time) that the plan was carried out. The vast majority of the Arabs who left came from Haifa, Jaffa, Tiberias, etc. without reference to Plan Daled. Frightened, demoralized, their leaders having fled early on (not a single member of the Arab Higher Committee was left in Palestine as of March 1948), the Arabs were for the most part eager to leave for areas under the control of fellow-Arabs as the Jews took over. Even in places like Haifa, where there was a strong effort by the Jewish leadership to persuade the Arabs to remain, it was unavailing.

Nataniel Lorch, the military historian and author of *Israel's War of Independence*, points out the obvious—that it is the natural inclination of any sane person, whenever a battle is going on, to be somewhere else. Lorch notes the pressures exerted by Jews seeking to leave Jerusalem when it was un-

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der siege. There were also Jewish refugees as a result of the war: not one Jew stayed behind in territories captured by the Arabs. Lorch asks: "One wonders what role was played by Arab projection of patterns of conduct. Did they expect that their fate under Jewish rule would not be different from that which would have befallen Jews if the situation were reversed?"

But whether or not Plan Daled was carried out, why does Mr. Porath place so much emphasis on it? If we did not talk about Plan Daled, it was not out of embarrassment over its supposed evil essence, as he suggests, but because we failed to see its relevance to Miss Peters's thesis. We still do. In this case, Miss Peters's book has simply provided an occasion for the venting of the idea current in certain Israeli coteries that there was a pristine "pure Zionism" exemplified by one of the forefathers—Ahad Haam is a favorite—before its corruption by those less pure, and above all by the state. The animus that some make no bones about, Mr. Porath feels the need to disguise. And so, when he is through with his talk of the need to recognize that there were large-scale expulsions of Arab civilian populations, he piously announces that "those who began the war are responsible for its consequences."

Moreover, while we are accused of failing to talk about Plan Daled, whose connection to the Peters book is, to put it charitably, tenuous, we wonder why Mr. Porath chose to ignore our discussion of Arieh Avneri's *The Claim of Dispossession*, which in many respects bears out Miss Peters's thesis, and with which we assume he is at least familiar, given Avneri's acknowledgment of his help in the foreword. (Although we have not been taken to task for this, we were wrong in saying that Miss Peters's book antedated Avneri's; this was true of the English, not the Hebrew, edition.) Of course a population can double—or even triple—in thirty years. The question is what happened, not what can happen. And while there is no question the Arab natural growth rate was high during the Mandate, there is a large body of evidence that there was significant Arab immigration into Palestine (as well as some out-migration) during that period.

But the best exposure of Mr. Porath's double game is in Lawrence R. Eno's letter. Although we had noted in our article that Mr. Porath had left the impression that the Ottoman census figures of 1893 for Jews were correct (later denying he believed this), we had failed to follow Mr. Porath's devious path which Mr. Eno so expertly uncovers.

WITH REGARD to Kenneth W. Stein: Most of Mr. Stein's rather pompous criticism involves complaints that Miss Peters did not use (or "underused" or "failed to read thoroughly") all the available source material, did not understand the intricacies of footnoting archival material, did not show equal skepticism for all English reports and collections of data, and did not know the languages of the region.

Yes, it would have been better if a distinguished scholar had undertaken the task that was left by default to an amateur. But when Mr. Stein accuses Miss Peters of misrepresenting the social and political history of 19th- and 20th-century Palestine, we find his reasoning weak. Since most Jews immigrated to Palestine, Mr. Stein argues, one could equally well claim that they had no right to settle there. Surely this is willfully to miss Miss Peters's point. The Jews set out to recreate their ancestral national home in what was at the time a largely depopulated land. After World War I that effort had the international sanction of the League of Nations and was to be carried out under the guidance of the British Mandatory government. To this was added, as Nazism gathered force, what Jabotinsky called the claim of starvation (as against what he called the claims of appetite of the Arab world, with its multiplicity of states). But as the need grew, so did the unwillingness of the British to carry out the terms of the Mandate, and eventually they slammed the doors shut to Jews.

Mr. Stein in his *The Land Question in Palestine, 1917-1939* offers a remarkably muddled interpretation of these events. His focus is on Jewish land purchases and the Arab (and British) effort to stop them. As his letter indicates, he provides exhaustive evidence that virtually all Arab leaders, while declaiming publicly against land sales to Jews, privately persisted in selling land to the Zionist organizations. (His letter fails to mention that his book offers some corroboration of Miss Peters's thesis. He notes, for example, that in 1931 there "was already a noticeable increase of males migrating from the central range to the coastal plain" and that while population density increased 25 percent in the central range from 1922 to 1931, the coastal plain's population density increased 50 percent in the same period.)

Mr. Stein's interpretation of his material is that the Zionists "manipulated the British bureaucracy in Palestine" and "were enormously successful at nullifying attempts to curtail the development of the national home." As for the Arabs, "there was little that a generally poor, unorganized, uneducated, unsophisticated, and splintered Arab community could do to defend itself." All this is from the "conclusions" of the book. Would anyone dream from this that the end result of this "enormously successful" effort was the British White Paper of 1939, the end to land sales and the end to Jewish immigration? While Miss Peters did indeed make errors of interpretation in the course of her book, they are as nothing compared to the massive and amazing misinterpretation that lies at the heart of Mr. Stein's study.

One cannot help feeling there is something else at work here that feeds such extraordinary misperceptions, some sort of fashionable "progressive" ideological filter through which historical events are passed. Zionist organizations made their purchases from landowners (the very term causes delicious shudders of revulsion), not from the tenants who "worked" the soil. (Never mind that those tenants, after the sale, often put forth ludicrous claims and demands extorting additional sums beyond those allocated for their resettlement.) What would the Zionist land-purchasing agents have had to do to satisfy the cranky conscience of modern chroniclers like Mr. Stein? Presumably they should have given up their idea of a national revival and a return of the Jewish masses to Zion. They should have come to Palestine not to satisfy their own needs, not to secure the physical survival of the Jews, but as facilitators for Arab class warfare and "anti-imperialist" struggles.

WITH REGARD to Jesse Zel Lurie: Here we are back to pre-state ideo-

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logical battles wth a vengeance, as Mr. Lurie finds evidence of nefarious intent in Miss Peters's assertion that Jewish employers were "forced" to hire Arab labor (that word "forced" hit him "in the gut"). To imagine that Miss Peters, who can at most be accused here (as elsewhere) of oversimplification, is part and parcel of a "Herut campaign to rewrite the history of Jewish settlement" suggests that Mr. Lurie's obsessions have overcome his common sense. (Incidentally, Mr. Lurie, with his emphasis upon Arab-Israel understanding, could be expected to show greater ambivalence about *"avodah Ivrit."* Whatever its virtues from a Zionist viewpoint, it was the occasion for much tension between Arab and Jewish workers. For Arabs it was a campaign to put them out of work, and their indignation was not eased by the claims of the left wing of Zionist labor leaders that they were being saved from "exploitation.")

Mr. Lurie's "proof" that Miss Peters is part of a campaign to downgrade the Histadrut boils down to his assertion that in all her 120 pages of footnotes and her 36 pages of index, the word Histadrut cannot be found. But inspection of the index shows that neither are "Revisionists," "General Zionists," or even "Religious Parties" mentioned. The only reference to a "Labor party" in the index is to the British Labor party. The pre-state Zionist parties and movements are simply not part of the subject of her book.

Mr. Lurie's view of the book as a "Herut polemic" is the more extraordinary because the theme of Miss Peters's book, as we noted in our article, is more in tune with traditional Labor ideology. The foremost concern of Revisionist Zionism was with achievement of international legitimation for Jewish national rights in Palestine and with using political means toward that end. Labor placed much more emphasis on the settlement of the land and the rights derived therefrom, the theme underlying *From Time Immemorial.*

Although Mr. Lurie starts his letter with strong praise for Arieh Avneri's book, he did not read it carefully. He claims that by using Avneri as confirmation for Miss Peters's thesis we have provided a new interpretation according to which the insignificant number of "100,000 Arabs (or fewer than 20,000 heads of families) were added to the native Arabs by migration in the Mandatory era." But Avneri wrote that "the country absorbed 100,000 legal and illegal Arab immigrants and their offspring." Given the high rate of natural increase that everyone concedes in the Mandate period, and the tendency of young males to migrate in search of work, the numbers would have been very much higher by 1948. This does not include immigration prior to 1920. And Miss Peters focuses equally on "in-migration," the movement from the predominantly Arab part of western Palestine (which became the Jordanian "West Bank" in 1948) to the Jewish-settled area.

Both Messrs. Lurie and Stein profess to find something sinister in the publisher's promotion of the book. Mr. Lurie talks of its being "fraudulently promoted into best-sellerdom." Mr. Stein objects to Miss Peters's reference to authoritative Middle East historians in her acknowledgments and talks of the enthusiastic blurbs on the jacket cover as being "cleverly designed to imply that her findings have a cloak of legitimacy from very reputable individuals." This is absurd. Harper & Row behaved as any publisher would, featuring on the jacket endorsements from people enthusiastic about the book. There would have been fraud only if individuals had been falsely quoted, and no one has ever made any such claim. A number of the book's defects, as both Messrs. Lurie and Stein should be sophisticated enough to realize, may well have contributed to its success. The oversimplification, the repeated highlighting of a few dramatic points, the high-pitched rhetoric—nonfiction best-sellers on complex subjects frequently have these characteristics. Messrs. Lurie and Stein's quarrel is properly with public (and journalistic) taste. One suspects the meticulous scholarly study called for by Mr. Stein would not have been accorded anything like as much attention.

As to the charge that Miss Peters improperly associates distinguished historians with her work by thanking them in her acknowledgments, she makes clear the limitation of their involvement. She thanks Elie Kedourie, for example, for directing her to the locations of certain papers and Martin Gilbert for "reference clues." The usual procedure is to thank people who have been of help in some way while taking upon oneself all blame for the defects in one's work. This pro-forma sentence Miss Peters fails to include, but surely those who have criticized Miss Peters on this score —and, in the pages of the *American Historical Review,* criticized those who were thanked!—are fully aware of the convention.

Mr. Lurie concludes his letter with a series of free associations. Miss Peters is to be held responsible for a review (?) letter (?) published in the Washington *Jewish Week.* We are apparently also to be held responsible for it because it is written by an "associate" in Americans for a Safe Israel, Harry Louis Selden. We know of Mr. Selden's contributions to the emergence of Israel. He figures prominently in Yitshak Ben Ami's *Years of Wrath* as co-chairman, during and immediately following World War II, of the American League for a Free Palestine. However, we have not met Mr. Selden and if he is active in Americans for a Safe Israel, we are not aware of it. He is certainly entitled to his interpretation of Miss Peters's book, but we don't see what his comments regarding it have to do with her or us. If she is responsible for every interpretation of her book, is she to be held responsible for Mr. Finkelstein's interpretation as well? Mr. Lurie's? Mr. Stein's? Edward Said's?

What really seems to bother Mr. Lurie is that he feels Miss Peters's book interferes with finding a settlement of the Arab-Israel conflict. That is also what bothers him about Americans for a Safe Israel. Mr. Lurie seems to feel he has the key to a settlement in the School for Peace at Neve Shalom. While one can sympathize with his hopes, it is difficult to share his view that personal contact, even friendship, along lines where there is communal conflict, will solve that conflict. Such efforts have a very long history, and an equally long history of heartbreaking failure. Alas, one suspects that Neve Shalom will be even worse than useless, perpetuating and encouraging among Jews a species of masochism familiar to us in this country among those groups who find the United States guilty of obstructing peace and justice worldwide.

As far as Mr. Lurie's references to the Hauranis and apartheid are concerned, he apparently believes

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that the addition of the Arabs of Judea and Samaria to the population of Israel would pose more serious problems than would be posed by turning them over to Arab sovereignty. The dilemmas posed by Israel's Arab population for the future of Israel are real, whether within or without the borders of 1949. A variety of approaches was considered long before the Zionists were left with a fraction of the territory promised them, ranging from population transfers (which, incidentally, were advocated by many Zionist Labor intellectuals and became, much to their amazement, a plank in the British Labor party's platform in 1944) to a bi-national state. This is not a topic that can be adequately addressed here, and it has nothing to do with Miss Peters's book. One might, in passing, point out that those who see analogies between Israel and South Africa care little whether the territories are formally annexed or remain under Israeli military rule.

To Herbert Tarr: We focused primarily on Miss Peters's population study because, as we said in our article, that has been seen as its major contribution. As for Philip Hauser's demographic notes, the responsibility for the execution of a research design lies with a book's author.

IN RESPONSE to Robert J. Schreiber: Mr. Schreiber takes the view that questions of historical reality are a form of irrelevant casuistry. What matters is present belief: if the Arabs believe they are Palestinians, it is this perception alone that has practical relevance. While we would certainly not deny that perceptions of reality have political relevance, to treat perceptions as the only reality worth examination is to embark upon a path that we doubt Mr. Schreiber would want to follow very far. To take one example: the sect of Black Hebrews believes they are the original Jewish people and those who call themselves Jews today are usurpers. Is only what they "believe" relevant? To be sure, the Black Hebrews are a small sect, without political clout, so Mr. Schreiber might say that their perceptions do not in fact matter. But let us suppose this sect made massive converts among the blacks of Africa and the U.S. Would the historical validity of their claims then become inconsequential?

The Arabs are aware that history matters. This is why they have developed the myth of a Palestinian people in their land "from time immemorial." Traditionally Jews placed great emphasis on remembering what had passed: in Deuteronomy alone there are repeated injunctions "Remember and forget not" (9:7), "Remember the days of old" (32:7), "Thou shalt well remember" (7:18), "Thou shalt not forget" (5:17). Today, it seems, many Jews have forgotten to remember.

IN RESPONSE to Jonathan S. Mark: *We too believe that the ball now* belongs in the other court.

Anti-Communism

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

I would like to commend David Horowitz ["Nicaragua: A Speech to My Former Comrades on the Left," June] for his intellectual courage in repudiating his earlier pro-Communist views, and for his realization that firm anti-Communism is the only sane position for the Western democracies. In this, Mr. Horowitz is in the tradition of the great anti-Communists of the 20th century, who also underwent profound conversions: Arthur Koestler, Whittaker Chambers, and Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn. . . .

Mr. Horowitz will no doubt be attacked by today's fellow-travelers, but he should nevertheless be proud to embrace his new position, knowing the empirical evidence is on his side.

WILLIAM DOINO, JR.
Weston, Connecticut

Soviet Jewry

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Contrary to what Allan Kagedan maintains in "Gorbachev and the Jews" [May], the decline of Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union was not determined exclusively by internal considerations. . . . The freedom of Soviet Jewry to emigrate was determined largely by the power of the Jewish community in the West to make Soviet fulfillment of human-rights pledges a condition of securing concessions from the West.

During the 70's the Soviets sought the legitimation of their World War II land acquisitions and expanded trade with the U.S. Their efforts culminated in the Helsinki Accords of 1975 in which they achieved these goals in exchange for a commitment to broaden human rights, including the emigration of Jews and others.

Since then, American-Soviet trade has expanded and the U.S. has become as dependent upon Soviet markets to sell American grain as the USSR is upon American products to modernize its industry. But once the U.S. was hooked, and with détente in decline, the Soviets reneged on their Helsinki commitments and smashed the organizations established to monitor the agreements. Jewish refuseniks and other dissidents were imprisoned or exiled. . . .

For several years now, however, the Soviets have been pursuing nuclear arms control with the West. Anticipating a summit conference with President Reagan, the Soviets began early in 1985 to float rumors of the possibility of increased Jewish emigration to Israel in exchange for an end to American Jewish "criticism" of the USSR and for Israeli "flexibility" in negotiations over the Golan Heights. There was the added condition that the emigrants go to Israel rather than the West and the hint that relations between Israel and the Soviets would be renewed.

Of course, the rumored deals were fraudulent. They were simply a ploy to prevent the subject of Jewish emigration from surfacing in the summit negotiations. . . . The American Jewish community swallowed the Soviet bait and the ploy succeeded. Pre-summit American Jewish efforts to raise the subject of Soviet violations of the Helsinki Accords were minimal. . . . The nonsensical Soviet condition that emigrants go to Israel placed responsibility for the prospective deal in the province of USSR-Israel negotiations, so the American Jewish leadership stood aside waiting and hoping for something good to happen. Nothing did, . . . although early the next year world Jewry was rewarded with the release of Anatoly Shcharansky. This was done to maintain Soviet credibility for future "deals." . . .

There was, however, a whisper of sincerity in the Soviet proposals. Having two million Jews with which to sweeten the pot, the Soviets were seeking to deal themselves into the Middle East peacemaking poker game. They were baiting the hook with their proposals, but were prepared to wait until the demand for Soviet Jews

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in Israel would bring them the price they want. The Soviet negotiating principle is the exchange of Soviet Jews—along with "peace"—for Israeli land given to Israel's enemies. . . .

In the meantime, the oppression of Soviet Jews goes on. The Soviets will continue to sell, renege, and resell Jews as often as necessary to placate Western Jewry without frittering away the bulk of their Jewish hostages for anything less than a major voice in the Middle East. They have been successful in recent years because Western Jewry has been fearful of risking its power and position and would rather deal in the back rooms.

Nevertheless, despite a willingness to deal in *Realpolitik* if it must, Israel ought not to be forced to decide between retaining its land, which it can ill afford to give up, and the freedom of Soviet Jewry. Besides, if Israel publicly surrenders to the principle of trading land for Soviet Jews, it will be abandoning the principle of emigration as a human right. The Soviets will then be relieved of their moral obligations under the Helsinki Accords. . . .

Moreover, given Soviet lip-service to human rights and the need for a positive image in the U.S., . . . the principle of emigration as a human right promises to be an even more powerful lever than deals involving the exchange of land. . . . And because it is with the United States that the Soviets are now seeking nuclear arms control, it is the American Jew who has more leverage vis-à-vis the Soviets than does Israel. . . .

For these reasons, American Jewry must assume responsibility for freeing Soviet Jewry. . . . Instead of allowing the Soviets to use the promise of freeing Soviet Jews as leverage to silence Western Jews, Americans must use Soviet failure to live up to treaty obligations as leverage to secure freedom for Soviet Jews. . . .

JEROME GREEN
Los Angeles, California

ALLAN KAGEDAN writes:

Nowhere in "Gorbachev and the Jews" did I say or imply that the rate of Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union is determined exclusively by internal considerations. I focused on these concerns, however, because I believe they play a vital role, which has been largely neglected by Western commentators, in the making of Soviet emigration policy. Like such commentators, Jerome Green provides a scenario for Soviet decisions on emigration that is devoid of any reference to domestic concerns.

While few would deny that East Germany's emigration policy—illustrated most visibly by the Berlin Wall—relates to internal political control, or that domestic economic conditions affect Canada's immigration policy, somehow, when it comes to Soviet emigration policy regarding Jews, only foreign policy is said to count. Not only is this inaccurate, it has negative consequences for the campaign on behalf of Soviet Jews. For example, if one believes that a negotiated deal is an ever-present possibility, requiring only diplomatic finesse to be consummated, then it is easy to fall victim to wishful thinking each time a high-level U.S.-Soviet meeting is convened. Mr. Green gives one illustration of this kind of thinking when he states (exaggeratedly) that American Jews were misled by rumors in 1985 of a "deal" regarding Soviet Jewish emigration.

A second danger inherent in such a misreading of Soviet thinking is that, if the USSR is held to be always, or often, amenable to serious negotiation, then it is natural to look for a party to blame when little progress occurs. Mr. Green points a finger at American Jews and their leaders who, he claims, not only "swallowed the bait" of Soviet-inspired rumors but "stood aside" before the 1985 Geneva summit "waiting and hoping for something good to happen." He also asserts that American Jews have generally confined themselves to advocating the Soviet Jewish cause "in the back rooms." To the contrary, however: through a plethora of organizations, American Jews can be fairly said to have tried the back room, the front room, and indeed the sidewalk in their efforts to assist Soviet Jews, before, during, and after the Geneva summit. This does not mean that more should not be done, but Mr. Green's blaming of American Jews for the USSR's continued cut-off of Jewish emigration is unconvincing.

There is still a third hazard in dismissing Soviet internal conditions as a key factor in the Kremlin's emigration decisions: it leads to the demoralization of Western supporters of Soviet Jewry when no deals are struck for long periods of time. And from the Soviet perspective, nothing could be better than a decline in Western devotion to steady, patient work on behalf of Soviet Jews. Such work should include raising the credibility issue, as Mr. Green mentions, and, I would add, tying trade to emigration.

As for USSR-Israel relations, Mr. Green refers to reported Soviet proposals as "fraudulent," but then finds in them "a whisper of sincerity." This apparent contradiction can be explained if one takes into account internal Soviet concerns regarding emigration. The meetings between Soviet and Israeli diplomats Mr. Green refers to were, it seems, exploratory. That is, a wide range of issues was discussed, with the Soviet diplomats empowered neither to pledge nor to deliver on emigration. In fact, the Soviet Union would like nothing better—Arab reaction permitting—than to construct a relationship with Israel from which discussion of emigration is excluded. Israel sees things differently. This assessment has since been confirmed by the meeting of Soviet and Israeli diplomats held in Helsinki last August.

Of course, as Mr. Green suggests, for Israel to compromise on issues basic to its security in the service of virtually any cause, including the Soviet Jewish one, would be self-destructive. Yet there may be other areas of give-and-take. Among them could be the reported Soviet wish to send prospective Jewish emigrants directly to Israel, a condition Mr. Green describes as "nonsensical." If by this Mr. Green means unfair, unrealistic, or Machiavellian, I agree. But, as I pointed out in my article, for reasons of Marxist/Leninist ideology and because of the wish to limit the impact that any future Jewish emigration might have on Soviet society at large, Soviet motives for making such a proposal are clear.

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Team B: The Reality Behind the Myth

Richard Pipes

FOUR years ago, the Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger, in answer to a question whether the United States expected to emerge victorious from a nuclear war, responded that anyone in his position who did not prepare to prevail in a war deserved to be impeached. This statement did not attract a great deal of attention, for it seemed obvious, although in fact it repudiated the doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) that had dominated U.S. policy since the late 1950's. To understand this evolution in American strategic thinking it is worthwhile recalling the episode of "Team B" which occurred ten years ago as a result of the decision of the-then Director of Central Intelligence, George Bush, to commission alternative assessments of the Soviet strategic threat.

When the United States dropped atomic bombs on Japan, the military effect of these new weapons escaped no one, but their impact on future strategy was only dimly understood and a subject of controversy. The consensus of the scientific community, which had designed the new weapons, held that by virtue of their unprecedented destructiveness as well as their imperviousness to defenses, they had fundamentally and permanently altered the nature of warfare. Once other countries had acquired the ability to manufacture similar weapons—and the scientists correctly predicted that this was bound to occur before long—they would become unusable. With more than one power disposing of nuclear weapons, they could not be employed with impunity, as they had been by the U.S. against Japan: hence they would have only one conceivable function and that would be to deter others. Since victory in nuclear war was out of the question, nuclear weapons could not be rationally put to offensive purposes.

This outlook, championed in the pages of the *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists* and, later, *Scientific American*, did not gain immediate ascendancy. Presidents Truman and Eisenhower, confronting Communist aggression in Europe and Asia and unable—because of fiscal restraints—to stop Soviet expansion with conventional forces, had no choice but to rely on the threat of nuclear response. That this threat could be effectively used, Eisenhower demonstrated in 1953 when he compelled the North Koreans to accept an armistice. Later he and his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, coined the slogan of "massive retaliation" with which they hoped to contain the Soviet Union and its clients at minimum cost and without resort to the unpopular military draft.

Such nuclear blackmail, of course, was possible only as long as the United States retained a monopoly on the manufacture of nuclear weapons and the vehicles (bombers) able to deliver them to other continents. This monopoly eroded faster than expected. The Soviet explosion of a fission bomb in 1949 and fusion (hydrogen) bomb four years later shocked the United States, but it did not yet force it to abandon the strategy of "massive retaliation" because the Russians lacked adequate means of delivering these explosive devices against the United States. These means they acquired in 1957 when Sputnik demonstrated their ability to launch intercontinental missiles. Since there existed at the time no effective means of intercepting such missiles, certain to be armed with nuclear charges, the United States faced, for the first time in its history, a direct threat to its national survival.

This prospect traumatized President Eisenhower, forcing him radically to alter U.S. strategic doctrine. Unable to resort to the threat of nuclear annihilation to contain the Soviet Union, he decided henceforth to seek security through accords with Moscow. Such a course had been urged by many leading scientists. Within weeks after Moscow had sent Sputnik into space, Eisenhower moved the Science Advisory Committee chaired by the provost of MIT, James Killian, to the White House to give him guidance in these matters. This step marked a break in the U.S. defense planning because it involved, for the first time, civilian experts in the formulation of military strategy. Henceforth the scientific community, working through the Advisory Committee as well as other channels, acquired a dominant voice in

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the formulation of U.S. nuclear strategy. The scientists used this voice to lead U.S. strategy away from traditional ways of military thinking and toward arms-control negotiations. They were to retain this voice for nearly a quarter of a century, until the advent of the Reagan administration.

II

THE growing influence of scientific modes of thinking on all aspects of life is probably the most outstanding feature of modern Western culture. It began in the 16th century with the revolution in astronomy and then spread into other realms of thought, including the humanities and social studies. Properly speaking, science is not content but method—a strictly empirical way of dealing with phenomena which assumes that whatever cannot be observed and measured does not exist.

Applied to human affairs, this method has produced the "science of man" or sociology. Conceived in France in the early years of the 19th century, sociology and its theoretical underpinning, positivism, deprecate national culture and history as factors that shape human behavior in favor of abstract conceptions of man, isolated from time and space. In the words of Leszek Kolakowski:

> Contemporary positivism is an attempt to overcome historicism once and for all . . . it . . . frees us from the need to study history, which—since any philosophy worthy of the name must be cumulative in character—must appear to those professing this doctrine as a succession of barren, futile efforts, basically unintelligible as to results, and only very occasionally illuminated by a ray of common sense.

Scientists are by schooling and experience committed positivists. They are impatient with everything that they regard as "irrational," that is, outside the reach of scientific observation. F.A. Hayek has explained well the *déformation professionelle* of the scientist when confronted with the messy world of living human beings:

> What men know or think about the external world or about themselves, their concepts and even the subjective qualities of their sense perception are to Science never ultimate reality, data to be accepted. Its concern is not what men think about the world and how they consequently behave, but what they ought to think.

When they run into what they regard as "irrational" ideas or forms of behavior, scientists turn into educators who instruct wayward mortals what to think. It is psychologically as well as intellectually impossible for most of them, and especially for the most gifted, to accept the irrational as real. So persuaded are many scientists of the incontrovertible and universal validity of their method that in their public capacity they readily succumb to a fanaticism that is quite impervious to both argument and experience. They are no more prepared to take seriously the proposition that nuclear weapons might be effective instruments of warfare than to waste time proving that the earth is not flat.

Of course, there is no iron necessity that a scientifically trained person must think and act in this manner: Andrei Sakharov and Edward Teller are proof that great scientists can entertain a variety of points of view on human affairs. But it takes a great deal of civic courage to stand up to a consensus of one's peers, especially if it is reinforced with political influence and access to funding. Experience shows that most people will more readily face enemy bullets than what Samuel Johnson called the hiss of the world.

HAVING been brought into the process of decision-making and given political influence never before enjoyed by members of their profession, American scientists quickly formulated a body of opinion that brooked no opposition. Alternative views were silenced, their advocates ostracized. The scientists were divided among themselves on certain issues but they were united in the belief that the only rational function of nuclear weapons was to deter.

One group, which soon came to dominate the debate, called for deterrence through agreement. Its advocates, among whom Hans Bethe was one of the most visible, believed that nuclear weapons were so destructive that they could deter at a low level. Instead of building more weapons of this kind (especially the hydrogen bomb, which they opposed), the U.S. should intensify efforts to reach arms-control agreements with the Soviet Union. A second group, led by Edward Teller, advocated deterrence through strength. It wanted to neutralize the Soviet threat with still more potent and accurate bombs on the ground that in a world of sovereign states international accords provided inadequate guarantees of national security. The first group urged avoiding an arms race with Moscow in favor of "educating" the Russians to its futility and striving, through bilateral agreements and even, if need be, unilateral concessions, for mutual reductions. The second group wanted, if necessary, to match and surpass the Soviet effort. How intolerant scientists can be when vested with political power they demonstrated in 1957 by excluding Teller and all who thought like him from the influential Science Advisory Board. In this way, through exclusion, they achieved a consensus that allowed them to offer Presidents advice with singular authority.

The strategic policy imposed by scientists and adopted by the U.S. government in the 1960's may be summarized as follows: the only scientifically sound strategy is Mutual Assured Destruction. This means that once both superpowers have acquired a certain level of retaliatory power, should

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either of them dare to attack the other, it would be struck with so devastating a blow that it would suffer as much as its victim. As defined by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, MAD demanded that the United States, after absorbing a Soviet surprise first strike, be capable of responding with a retaliatory strike that would wipe out between one-fifth and one-third of the Soviet Union's population and between one-half and three-quarters of its industrial capacity. Anything beyond this arbitrarily established standard of "unacceptable damage" was redundant and "destabilizing." McNamara decided that a force of 1,000 ICBM's, 41 submarines, and 600 bombers would ensure the U.S. of the ability to inflict such damage on the Soviet Union even under the "worst-case" scenario.

This strategy regarded defenses of any sort as unsettling the balance because they raised the prospect that either country, using them as a shield, could launch a preemptive strike with relative impunity. For MAD to work, both sides had to be vulnerable to destruction. One of the earliest advocates of this doctrine, Arnold Wolfers, formulated what must surely be the most bizarre doctrine in the history of military thought when he argued that for the United States to feel secure from the Soviet Union it had to make certain that the Soviet Union possessed the ability totally to destroy it.

The public at large was not initiated into the complexities of Mutual Assured Destruction. It was told simply that there was "overkill," that nuclear build-ups beyond the figures set by McNamara constituted "madness," and that henceforth security lay not in unilaterally arming but in mutually disarming. These propositions became dogma.

Since scientists tend to endow people, as they do inanimate objects, with an innate logic, they entertained no doubt that nuclear weapons could have but one "rational" use. The Soviet Union could no more produce a Communist nuclear strategy than a Communist science of physics. This reasoning led to the inescapable conclusion that the Soviet Union had either already adopted MAD or would do so in time, in deference to the immutable laws of nuclear reality. That the USSR was indeed moving in this direction, the scientists had an opportunity to persuade themselves in the course of arms-control negotiations, in which they played an important role, as well as from contacts with Soviet scientists at various private conferences which proliferated in the 1960's. Totally ignorant of Communist politics and not particularly interested in them, these scientists turned strategists and diplomats allowed themselves to be persuaded by their Soviet counterparts that the latter enjoyed the same influence in Moscow that they themselves had in Washington, and were also working to restrain their own "hawks" and their own "military-industrial complex."

Thus it happened that for two-and-one-half decades arms control rather than arms build-up became the centerpiece of U.S. defense policy: a situation without historic precedent and testimony to the success of American scientists in persuading the country that the atomic bomb had completely altered the conduct of international affairs, creating an environment in which, as in Alice's Looking Glass world, everything was topsy-turvy.

THE scientists in charge of U.S. strategy, confirming Hayek's observation, blandly ignored that human affairs are subject to different rules and that in a century-and-a-half of strenuous efforts sociologists have failed to come up with universal laws of human conduct remotely resembling those of the exact sciences. They seem to have been unaware of the distinction between the value-free ("objective") natural sciences and the value-determined ("subjective") social sciences which philosophers like Heinrich Rickert and Nicholas Mikhailovsky had demonstrated already in the 19th century. Their ignorance of history blinded them even to the possibility that the Soviet leadership, steeped as it was in a radically different political culture and pursuing different objectives, could also view nuclear weapons differently.

The Soviet *nomenklatura* (the ruling elite of the Communist party), very experienced in taking advantage of the weaknesses of its victims, brilliantly exploited the political innocence of American scientists (as well as the vanity which is perhaps the most vulnerable trait of intellectuals) to persuade them of a spurious identity of views and interests between East and West. At Pugwash, Dartmouth, and countless other formal and informal meetings held now in the U.S. and now in the Soviet Union, they told the Americans just what the Americans wanted to hear: that MAD was indeed the only strategic doctrine that made sense, that parity was all their country wanted, and that arms control, not arms build-up, was the way to assure both national and international security. The time had come for scientists of all countries to take power away from politicians and generals.

When more skeptical American scientists raised awkward questions, their Soviet counterparts had ready answers. The Soviet civil- and military-defense effort? That was against China, of course. Continuing quantitative and qualitative improvements in Soviet missiles? The Russian tradition, shaped by centuries of foreign invasions, calls for overinsurance. The refusal to furnish figures on the Soviet nuclear arsenal or to allow on-site inspection? Unfortunately, Russians have always been a secretive nation. By pretending (in private only) to hold their people and some of its leaders in low esteem, they created an atmosphere of make-believe mutual trust that dissolved such misgivings as American scientists might still have had.

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Had U.S. scientists not relied so much on private confidences but taken the trouble to read Soviet military literature and to look, without preconceptions, at ongoing Soviet strategic programs, they would have had to realize that something was terribly wrong with their assumptions. Soviet military publications, which are subject to the most rigid censorship imaginable and therefore always speak with an official voice, made no secret of the fact that Moscow had decided nuclear weapons could be used not only to deter but also to overpower. From the early 1960's on, Soviet strategists argued that nuclear weapons were the decisive weapons of modern warfare and the key to victory, for which reason the Strategic Rocket Forces had become the mainstay of Soviet armed might.

Had Soviet strategists done nothing more than assert this thesis, one could have dimissed such talk as pap for the generals. But they also provided a rationale. They argued that nuclear charges and intercontinental missiles had revolutionized warfare by making it possible to launch preemptive strikes, which, in contrast to conventional war, allowed a country to gain a strategic decision at once rather than slowly, from a patient accumulation of tactical victories. When speaking to each other in the pages of Soviet military journals, Soviet experts simply ignored the doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction which Soviet disinformation agents were ladling out at their convivial encounters to science professors from Harvard, MIT, and Stanford. Nor did Soviet experts pay more than marginal attention to arms control, so central to U.S. strategic thinking. Soviet professional literature, such as the journal *Voennaia mysl'* (*Military Thought*), concerned itself exclusively with the question that has stood at the center of military thinking since the dawn of history: how to win wars.

It is especially baffling that American strategic amateurs ignored even the warnings of Andrei Sakharov, a fellow scientist and a member of the Soviet defense establishment, whose moral integrity and expertise were beyond question. In 1975, this creator of the Soviet hydrogen bomb stated in a book published in English in the United States, as if it were a self-evident truth, that the introduction of missiles with multiple and independent warheads (MIRV's) would make it attractive for a potential aggressor to attack:

> The fact that the Vladivostok agreement seemed to legitimize multiple, independently targetable warheads is . . . alarming. . . . Put quite simply, it would become *strategically advantageous, and relatively safe,* for either side to deliver a preemptive strike with nuclear missiles.*

And if such "soft" evidence did not convince, then the "hard" data on Soviet deployments should have provided food for thought. When McNamara served as Secretary of Defense, the U.S., accepting his notion of what was required to inflict "unacceptable damage," unilaterally froze its strategic arsenal. By this restraint it enabled the Soviet Union to catch up and thereby create the "stability" posited by MAD. The only subsequent upgrading of U.S. strategic forces was the introduction of MIRV's intended to give the U.S. retaliatory force the ability to respond effectively after much of it had been lost to a Soviet first strike.

The Soviet Union took advantage of this restraint to gain strategic parity by 1969. Then, instead of freezing its arsenal as well, it merrily proceeded to deploy a fourth generation of MIRVed missiles with throwweights and accuracies that could have no other conceivable mission than the elimination of the U.S. deterrent in time of war. Concurrently, it carried out an ambitious program of strategic defenses which had no counterpart on the U.S. side: air defense, anti-satellite systems, civil defense, and an anti-ballistic-missile defense system around its capital city. These measures alone should have alerted the American scientific community that the Soviet Union did not subscribe to MAD, since they contradicted its fundamental principle that each country had to remain a willing hostage to the other.

But all the evidence which did not accord with the hallowed MAD doctrine was ignored. The American scientific community, soon joined by bevies of political scientists, economists, philosophers, and even lawyers, physicians, and psychiatrists, came to regard strategy not as a theory of conflict but as an intellectual game. And since in intellectual circles the highest honors go to individuals who produce the most innovative ideas, whatever their relationship to reality, if any, the greatest fame and influence went to those who formulated the most original and elegant ideas. Soviet views were ignored precisely because they fell far short of these standards.

And indeed, the strategic theories formulated by American natural and social scientists were entirely fresh: they demonstrated how wrong it is to say that there are no new ideas under the sun. Among these were such propositions as "the task of the military is not to win wars but to prevent them," "offense good, defense bad," and "killing cities is right, killing missiles is wrong." All such propositions would qualify for what Ivan Turgenev used to call "reverse commonplaces."

III

THE task of collecting and analyzing data on Soviet strategic deployments falls on the U.S. intelligence community, headed by the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), who also serves as Director of the Central Intelligence

* *My Country and the World* (Knopf, 1975), p. 71, emphasis added.

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Agency (CIA). It consists of a number of bureaus of which the most important are the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the National Security Agency (NSA). In producing its estimates, the intelligence community relies almost exclusively on satellite and electronic surveillance because the Soviet Union has consistently refused not only to allow on-site inspection but even to provide comprehensive figures on its nuclear arsenal.

Possibly the single most important product of the intelligence community is the National Intelligence Estimate on Soviet Strategic Objectives, known as NIE 11-3/8. Prepared annually, toward the end of the year, in time for the new defense budget, it is released to a select body of officials who have the "need to know." This NIE summarizes the information available on Soviet strategic capabilities, projects them into the future, and assesses their probable missions. The personnel assigned the task of drafting this document under the National Intelligence Officer for the Soviet Union are to ignore U.S. capabilities and avoid balance-of-power estimates ("net assessments"). The function of NIE 11-3/8 is simply to inform the decision-maker: as best as we can determine, the Soviet Union is developing such and such strategic capabilities; it is up to you to decide what these developments portend for U.S. security and how to respond to them.

Although the bulk of such data is gathered by mechanical devices that are free of value judgments, they must be interpreted by human beings who are never without them. In practice it is not possible completely to divorce an assessment of capabilities from the judgment of intention: the significance of a person's purchasing a knife is different if he is a professional chef or the leader of a street gang, although the technical "capability" which the knife provides is the same in each case. In one way or another, more often unconsciously than not, the analyst who studies Soviet nuclear capabilities injects into his analysis subjective opinions as to their purpose, which, in turn, derive from his view of why the Soviet Union builds a nuclear arsenal in the first place. Even the most technical assessment of "capabilities," therefore, entails some view of the motives of the opposite party.

Now he who speculates on the motives of others can proceed in one of two ways. He can ask himself: (1) given what I know of these people, what can be on their mind?; or (2) if I were in their shoes, why would I do what I observe them doing? Clearly, the first of these approaches is preferable. It is also the more difficult because it requires knowledge of alien cultures and psychologies, not to speak of an effort of the imagination. If we add to this difficulty the fact that the scientists and engineers entrusted with responsibility for preparing these estimates tend to belittle the influence of cultural factors on human behavior, it is hardly surprising that the U.S. intelligence community, in assessing Soviet strategic programs, has relied heavily on the second approach, popularly known as "mirror-imaging." This practice attributes to others one's own motives and intentions on the unspoken assumption that these alone are "normal" or "rational." "Mirror-imaging" is the very antithesis of the scientific method which seeks to eliminate personal and subjective factors from the process of observation and analysis. Yet, paradoxically, it is precisely how scientists are likely to proceed once they leave the realm of the exact sciences.

A NATION'S intelligence community reflects the habits of thought of its educated elite from whose ranks it is recruited and on whom it depends for intellectual sustenance. The CIA is no exception. Its analytic staff, filled with American Ph.D.'s in the natural and social sciences along with engineers, inevitably shares the outlook of U.S. academe, with its penchant for philosophical positivism, cultural agnosticism, and political liberalism. The special knowledge which it derives from classified sources is mainly technical; the rest of its knowledge, as well as the intellectual equipment which it brings to bear on the evidence, comes from academia.

In the 1970's, collating and analyzing the evidence on Soviet strategic programs, the U.S. intelligence community (with some exceptions, notably the DIA) tended to reason in terms of conventional wisdom. It took for granted the universal validity of MAD and interpreted the data on Soviet strategic programs to mean that whatever the USSR constructed had to serve deterrent purposes exclusively. It ignored Soviet pronouncements to the contrary, partly because they appeared scientifically absurd, partly because it felt uncomfortable with "soft" data. On these grounds, it implicitly minimized the Soviet strategic threat.

The intellectual predispositions which led to such conclusions were reinforced by political pressures from the Nixon White House. Having staked their political careers on détente, Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger disliked intelligence estimates that stressed the Soviet threat to the United States and showed the USSR moving beyond deterrence. Persons who at the time worked in the intelligence community assert that in 1969-70 the White House began to intervene in the estimating process. It did so not by demanding that the estimates come up with politically acceptable conclusions, but that they concentrate exclusively on the technical data or hardware, avoiding what Kissinger called "talmudic" estimates. This had the same effect because by eliminating informed, conscious, and overt political judgment from the estimates, it led to the injection of surreptitious political judgments disguised as hardware analyses.

Thus, paradoxically, as satellite surveillance enhanced the ability of the U.S. to monitor Soviet

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nuclear deployments, its ability to interpret them declined. The intelligence community expressed no alarm at the unanticipated build-up of Soviet strategic capabilities in the 1970's, the decade when the United States virtually froze its nuclear arsenal in the expectation that Moscow would do likewise. The fact that in the 1970's the USSR deployed eleven new strategic systems as against one deployed by the U.S. was brushed aside with arguments that made sense only in terms of the MAD doctrine.

Some individuals in and out of government, however, grew uneasy about the assurances issued by the CIA and began to urge an independent review of its data base to determine whether a second reading of the evidence would not yield different results.

Overseeing the performance of the intelligence community on behalf of the Executive is the responsibility of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB), composed of prominent business executives and other public figures, engineers, and scientists. The group meets several times a year to review intelligence reports, raise questions, serve as devil's advocate, and make recommendations to the President and the Director of Central Intelligence. In the summer of 1976, PFIAB had fourteen members. Four of them were chief executive officers of high-technology corporations: William O. Baker of Bell Telephone Laboratories, John S. Foster, Jr. of TRW, Robert W. Galvin of Motorola, and Edwin H. Land of Polaroid. Two—Admiral George W. Anderson, former Chief of Naval Operations, and General Lyman L. Lemnitzer—were professional soldiers. Edward Teller was the sole scientist. The remaining seven figured prominently in public life: John B. Connally (former Governor of Texas), Gordon Gray (one-time Secretary of the Army), Clare Booth Luce (the writer and former Ambassador to Rome), Robert D. Murphy (a retired diplomat), George P. Shultz (then ex-Secretary of the Treasury), and Edward Bennett Williams (a well-known Washington attorney). Leo Cherne, an economist and director of Freedom House, chaired the group. The composition of PFIAB was weighted in favor of realists who viewed with varying degrees of skepticism the doctrines of soft-line scientists and professional arms controllers.

Early in 1975 PFIAB began to feel uneasy over the performance of the CIA in estimating the trend of Soviet strategic forces. Several factors contributed to this anxiety. In 1974, Albert Wohlstetter, a leading specialist on nuclear weapons, had published evidence to show that although the public, remembering the "missile-gap" fiasco, considered the intelligence community guilty of exaggerating the Soviet nuclear threat, in fact it had persistently underestimated it. It so happened that at about the same time, on the basis of fresh data, the CIA upgraded its estimate of Soviet defense expenditures from 6-8 percent of GNP (which was only slightly higher than the American figure) to 11-13 percent. This radically revised estimate not only made the Soviet threat loom much greater, but cast fresh doubts on the quality of intelligence assessments. Quite independently, John Collins of the Congressional Research Service, on the basis of open sources, published in January 1976 a study of the Soviet military effort which painted a much grimmer picture than that proffered by intelligence: an updated edition, completed later that year, proved so disturbing and so much at odds with the government's policy that the study's sponsor, the Senate Armed Services Committee, saw fit to suppress it.

Reports of such contrary opinions worried PFIAB, which approached President Nixon at the beginning of 1975 with the suggestion that he appoint an independent body of experts to look into the intelligence data. Nixon showed no interest in this suggestion, the more so since William Colby, his Director of Central Intelligence, strongly objected to outsiders "second-guessing" the staff of his agency.

When Gerald Ford replaced Nixon as President, PFIAB restated its concerns. In August 1975, its chairman, Admiral Anderson, proposed a "competitive analysis," to be carried out under the direction of the White House through its National Security Council, that would pit a team of outside experts against the CIA, to determine whether the two groups, using the same data, would or would not reach the same assessment of the Soviet strategic threat. Ford liked the idea but Colby remained adamantly opposed. To appease the critics, Colby now proposed to conduct an in-house review of the Agency's "track record" in regard to the three most controversial aspects of the Soviet strategic effort: air defense, missile accuracy, and strategic objectives. For this project, he selected active and recently retired personnel of the CIA. According to Lionel Olmer, who was PFIAB's executive secretary at the time:

> The CIA produced a "track record" study about 75 pages long. It was so astonishing that Bush (Colby was gone by then) had absolutely no option but to accept the A-B Team proposal. The study was so condemnatory of the performance of the community over a period of ten years on those three issues that it left no room for argument that something ought to be done.*

In late 1975 George Bush took over a battered and demoralized CIA: he was so troubled by its condition that soon after assuming office he commissioned the consulting firm Arthur D. Little to look into its problems. Bush was much more

* "Watchdogging Intelligence," in *Seminar on Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence* (Incidental paper, Center for Information Policy Research, Harvard University, 1980), pp. 179-80.

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receptive to PFIAB's proposal, and in June 1976 agreed with its new chairman, the ebullient Leo Cherne, to carry out an experiment in "competitive analysis," but under his own auspices rather than those of the National Security Adviser. Three outside teams were to be selected to look into Soviet air defenses, missile accuracies, and strategic objectives. The CIA's group, charged with drafting the current (1977) NIE 11-3/8 would be known as "A Team." "B Teams" would consist of independent outside experts: they were to work with the same raw data that the Agency supplied to its A Team. The analyses were to be completed by November 1976, in time to permit revisions in the forthcoming NIE, due in December, if such were deemed necessary. The experiment required complete secrecy in order to prevent the leakage of sensitive intelligence material and to keep the findings from being exploited for partisan political purposes.

The rules having been agreed upon, the CIA (rather than PFIAB, as is often erroneously asserted) began the search for outside experts to man the three B teams. It encountered little difficulty in staffing the groups investigating missile accuracies and air defenses, for their tasks were narrowly technical. Staffing Team B on Soviet strategic objectives proved more difficult because its task called not only for technical expertise but also for political judgment. As I was to learn later, the Agency approached unsuccessfully two individuals to chair this team. One, on active government service, was refused leave by his superior, Secretary of State Kissinger, to take on the assignment. The other declined for personal reasons. On the recommendation of his National Intelligence Office staff, and in agreement with William Hyland of the National Security Council, Bush then selected me for the post.*

MY WIFE and I were spending the summer of 1976 in London where I was working in the British Museum Library on the Russian Civil War. I knew, of course, nothing of the negotiations between PFIAB and the CIA over competitive analyses of National Intelligence Estimates. By profession and preference a historian, I had had only limited political experience, owing mainly to the interest which Senator Henry Jackson and his assistant, Dorothy Fosdick, had shown in my criticism of détente. In 1973, Richard B. Foster, head of the Strategic Studies Center in Washington, a branch of the Stanford Research Institute (SRI), had invited me to join his Center as a consultant, in which capacity I directed several studies of Soviet foreign policy. Even so, I was in no sense a member of the establishment of defense experts; since the purpose of Team B was to take a fresh look at the Soviet nuclear effort, however, my being an outsider, without a vested interest in the consensus, was an advantage.

In mid-July 1976 Foster called me in London to say that I had been offered, through SRI, an interesting and important assignment connected with Soviet strategy. Since I intended to return to the United States soon, we agreed that he would give me the details when we next met in Washington.

I returned home on July 22, and the following day saw Foster as well as a representative of the CIA, John Paisley, who outlined to me the purpose and scope of the undertaking. I then spoke with E. Henry Knoche, the Agency's Deputy Director, and Howard Stoertz, the National Intelligence Officer responsible for drafting NIE 11-3/8, whose counterpart I was to become. To these officials I posed the principal questions on my mind. Our mandate: how far-reaching an inquiry did they envisage? I also wanted to know whether we were expected to act as a panel of judges, adjudicating between contending points of view, or advocates of an alternative point of view to that found in the official estimates. The answer I received to the first question sounded vague, from which I concluded that the team I was being asked to chair could cast its nets as widely and deeply as it thought necessary. In view of the complaints repeatedly voiced later that our team had "exceeded its mandate," it needs to be stressed that all the officials to whom I spoke before and after accepting the assignment left it up to us to determine what we needed to do to answer the question: what are Soviet strategic objectives? The response to the second question was: make as strong a case as you can if you disagree with the official estimate.

The task looked challenging and important. If, nevertheless, I hesitated at first to take it on, it was because of fear that I lacked the necessary expertise in the scientific and engineering issues involved in the designing, testing, deploying, and targeting of nuclear missiles. Foster dispelled these doubts by arguing that the whole subject had too long been analyzed in narrowly technical terms, as if the strategic competition involved impersonal weapons systems rather than the human beings who controlled them. As for the technical expertise, this could be assured by appointing to the group professional missile specialists.

Inasmuch as the work required access to highly classified sources, I had to undergo a series of intensive security clearances that included an encounter with the polygraph. These and other preliminaries were completed by the middle of August, at which time I began work. The Agency assigned to me as liaison John Paisley. Paisley had retired two years earlier as Deputy Director of the CIA's Office of Strategic Research, in which

* For the sake of brevity, I shall henceforth apply the term "Team B" to the group charged with analyzing Soviet strategic objectives, but it must be borne in mind that there were two other B Teams.

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capacity he had participated in the drafting of NIE's. This soft-spoken man with a perpetually worried face, who was to die a mysterious death two years later, rendered my Team B essential services. But he also had an additional task, which was to keep an eye on Team B on behalf of the Agency: in this second capacity he was later to behave in a quite unsavory manner.

Paisley presented me with a list, drawn up by the Agency, of candidates for membership on my team: as far as I recall, it consisted mostly of military officers and defense scientists. From this list I selected only two names: Lieutenant General John W. Vogt, Jr., the recently retired commander of the U.S. Air Forces in Europe, and the missile specialist, Brigadier General Jasper A. Welch, Jr., then still on active service.

For the other members of the team, I preferred to go outside the ranks of technical specialists in the narrow sense of the term. I acted on the premise (which I still believe correct) that Soviet leaders, in contrast to those of the West, neither draw a sharp distinction between nuclear and conventional weapons nor divorce military objectives from political ones. Soviet strategy claims to be and indeed is "grand strategy" which avails itself of a wide range of instrumentalities, military force very much included, to pursue what, in the end, are always political ends. Seen from this perspective, Soviet strategic forces can have no independent mission as determined by the alleged properties of nuclear weapons: in Soviet practice, military missions are driven by political missions, not the other way around. This view is axiomatic in Soviet military writings: "The organic unity of military strategy and policy with the determining role of the latter," in the words of one Soviet general writing in a publication "for official use only," "signifies that military strategy proceeds from policy, is determined by policy, is totally dependent on policy, and accomplishes its specific tasks only within the framework of policy."* Nothing could be more emphatic. Clearly, to understand the task of Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces one has to combine knowledge of Soviet nuclear capabilities with an understanding of the policy in which it is embedded.

With these criteria in mind, I recommended to the DCI nine additional names. They were: Paul Nitze, a one-time Deputy Secretary of Defense and probably the country's leading expert on arms control; Lieutenant General Daniel O. Graham, who had retired earlier that year as Director of the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency, an institution which had consistently taken a more somber view of Soviet capabilities and intentions than the CIA; Professor William van Cleave, a strategic expert from the University of Southern California and one-time member of the SALT I delegation; Foy Kohler, an ex-Ambassador to Moscow; Paul Wolfowitz, a young specialist from the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; Thomas Wolfe of RAND, the author of several works on Soviet military doctrine; and Seymour Weiss, then Ambassador to the Bahamas, recently retired as Director of the Bureau of Political and Military Affairs in the Department of State. These names received approval. The CIA turned down two additional candidates I proposed, one on the grounds that he lacked the necessary security clearances, the other for reasons which it did not care to spell out.

IV

TEAM B held its first meeting on August 25 in quarters assigned to it in Arlington, Virginia. The group promptly agreed on the structure of its report: it would not be an alternative NIE 11-3/8 but a broad and in-depth survey of Soviet strategic policies and programs. We had to work on an exceedingly tight schedule because to be of use to the CIA our report had to be in hand early in November. We agreed to have a preliminary draft ready on October 14: a deadline which proved unrealistic and had to be extended. The report was to consist of three parts. Part One would analyze the methodology used by the CIA in arriving at its estimates: I assumed responsibility for this task. Part Two would have several studies of specific Soviet strategic programs each of which would lay out the nature of the available evidence, the interpretation given this evidence by the CIA, and possible alternative interpretations. Responsibility for this, the longest segment of the report, was distributed among members of the team in accord with their special expertise and personal preferences. Part Three, to be drafted collectively, was to provide a general political-military assessment of the Soviet strategic build-up. (Later on, we added an Appendix with recommendations for improving the NIE process.)

We set to work at once. Paisley and his assistant, Don Suda, supplied us with the intelligence data used by Team A to prepare the current NIE 11-3/8, and such additional information as we requested. Some of this material was so sensitive that the Agency would not let it out of its Langley headquarters and made us read it on the premises. I found the personnel at Langley correct but suspicious and hostile: they seemed to look on our undertaking as yet another assault on their Agency which was still reeling from recent congressional investigations.

Team B met in its full complement a dozen times. At these meetings we heard from the rapporteurs and went over their drafts. Opinion was far from unanimous and as the work progressed some heated exchanges took place. Part Three proved to be especially contentious. It had to be

* Colonel General A. Maiorov in *Voennaia mysl'*, No. 1, January 1975.

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edited over and over again to produce a consensus. For a while it looked as if it would require separate majority and minority statements, but in the end this proved unnecessary.

Paisley, who attended most of our meetings as an observer, seems to have sent Langley alarmed reports that Team B was going beyond its mandate: instead of focusing exclusively on current intentions of the Soviet Union, it was also delving into the reasons why the Agency had in the past misinterpreted these intentions. Not long after our work had gotten under way, I received through him a request from Langley that we not engage in "recriminations" over the CIA's track record.

We decided not to follow this advice and this on grounds that can best be explained in connection with the recent space-shuttle accident. The commission appointed to study the causes of the *Challenger*'s explosion could have confined itself strictly to technical matters, namely, the reasons for the failure of the booster mechanism. If NASA had been in charge of the inquiry, this almost certainly would have been its preference. But NASA's mistakes are not shielded by walls of secrecy as are those of the intelligence community. The commission President Reagan appointed wisely chose to broaden its investigation to include questions of management and decision-making at NASA. It did so not to engage in "recriminations" and find scapegoats but to identify the human failures behind the mechanical ones. The inquiry quickly ascertained serious managerial failings that had caused the catastrophe and recommended changes in personnel and procedures.

Team B felt, on similar grounds, that if the Agency had for years turned out faulty estimates—and, in common with Colby's in-house review, we believed that this had been the case—then it would be of little value to provide merely an alternative estimate. Our group, after all, was an *ad-hoc* body, destined to dissolve in a couple of months. If the CIA reverted to its old ways after the experiment was over and continued to provide flawed estimates, then our whole effort would have been in vain. On this reasoning we felt it necessary to broaden our inquiry to include methodological as well as procedural factors responsible for the faulty estimates so that they could be corrected. Robert Galvin, whom PFIAB had designated to deal with our team, agreed with this reasoning during my only encounter with him early in September.

TEAM B's report remains highly classified. Its classification is so restrictive as to grant access to it only to a very small number of persons among the many who have a professional interest in it. I cannot help feeling that such extreme restrictiveness has less to do with the sensitivity of its material than with the political embarrassment that it has caused the CIA. It should certainly be possible to remove from it references to the classified data and to release publicly a sanitized version.

Be that as it may, it is not possible at this time to reveal the contents of Team B's report, and one can refer to it only in the most general terms. The report charged that in estimating Soviet strategic objectives the CIA had consistently engaged in "mirror-imaging," including insertions of unproven assumptions about Soviet behavior, as well as surreptitious "net assessments." The products of such faulty methodology had served to buttress the apparent belief of the Agency's analysts that the Soviet Union, like the United States, accepted the Mutual Assured Destruction doctrine and built its strategic arsenal for strictly defensive (retaliatory) purposes. Without actually proving the point with reference to U.S. capabilities (which they were enjoined from doing), CIA analysts had conveyed the impression that the Soviet strategic build-up presented no threat to U.S. security.

The political implications of such an assessment happened to favor détente and to place the main burden for its success on the United States, to the extent that Soviet deviations from MAD were ascribed to Russian paranoia that America alone could assuage. Although the Agency's analysts had a great deal of both "hard" (technical) and "soft" (verbal) evidence to demonstrate if not necessarily the validity then at least the feasibility of another interpretation, they chose to ignore it. Their approach indicated neither knowledge of Russia and Communism nor concern with these subjects: they treated the Soviet threat as if it derived from inanimate objects, not from the people who stood behind them.

We, on our part, concluded that the evidence indicated beyond reasonable doubt that the Soviet leadership did not subscribe to MAD but regarded nuclear weapons as tools of war whose proper employment, in offensive as well as defensive modes, promised victory. Soviet nuclear strategy had to be seen in the context of "grand strategy." We also suggested procedures for the preparation of NIE's that would ensure that such faults as we had identified would not recur: they essentially boiled down to the proposition that Soviet nuclear programs be interpreted in Soviet, not American, terms.

DURING the first two months of their work, Team A and Team B did not communicate. Then, toward the end of October, as prearranged, the two teams exchanged drafts. The Team A document which we were given did not differ much from previous NIE 11-3/8's either in premises or in conclusions. It continued to interpret Soviet behavior in American terms: here and there, for purposes of self-protection, the analysts inserted cautionary statements to the effect that perhaps, after all, the USSR did not have exclusively defensive objectives in mind.

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On November 5, at 1 P.M., the two teams confronted each other at Langley to criticize their respective drafts. The news of what was certain to be a lively encounter spread quickly in the intelligence community and admission to the crowded room was said to have been at a premium. In this highly charged atmosphere, Teams A and B took seats on opposite sides of a long table. Howard Stoertz, the head of Team A, chose to sit in the back, entrusting the opening skirmish to his junior staff.

As subsequently reported in the press, the meeting proved a "disaster" for Team A. This outcome was at least in some measure due to the Agency's unwise decision to field against senior outside experts a troop of young analysts, some of them barely out of graduate school, who, even if they had had a better case to make, could not help feeling intimidated by senior government officials, general officers, and university professors. The champion for Team A had barely begun his criticism of Team B's effort, delivered in a condescending tone, when a member of Team B fired a question that reduced him to a state of catatonic immobility: we stared in embarrassment as he sat for what seemed an interminable time with an open mouth, unable to utter a sound. Later Stoertz came to the rescue, but he did not save the Agency and his office from emerging badly mauled.

I do not know what happened within the Agency immediately after this encounter, but I strongly suspect that George Bush intervened to have Team A substantially revise its draft to allow for Team B's criticism. On December 2, the chairmen of both teams presented their findings to PFIAB. Bush attended the meeting but did not speak. I listened with mounting disbelief as Team A advanced an estimate that in all essential points agreed with Team B's position. Then my turn came to deliver a summary of our findings. It was slightly disconcerting to have no reaction from PFIAB, for the few questions which followed were quite perfunctory. At the time I did not know what to make of it but I was later told that the panel's silence was due to its being "thunderstruck" at hearing what many of its members regarded as the first realistic assessment of Soviet strategic intentions to come before it.

Team B met for the last time on the morning of December 21 at Langley. Here, in a large auditorium filled with personnel from various branches of the intelligence community, the A team and the three B teams presented summaries of their findings. George Bush thanked us for our efforts and invited us to lunch: I could not help noticing that no member of my Team B was asked to sit at his table. Bush's position was delicate in the extreme, given the sweeping criticism of his Agency by a group which he had brought into being, and he may not have wished to identify openly with it. He had shown great courage in allowing an external review of the work for which he bore ultimate responsibility. Later on, during congressional hearings, he stated that he strongly favored competitive analyses and would recommend to his successor that he continue them. That day he signed the revised NIE 11-3/8 that was to set a new standard.

Four years later, when I joined the staff of the National Security Council, I had a chance to convince myself that the post-1976 strategic estimates in every respect excelled those which we had read and criticized. And these new estimates, of course, exerted influence on U.S. defense policies, in a limited way under President Carter and in a major one under President Reagan.

V

THERE was one respect in which the experiment in competitive analysis did not succeed and that was in maintaining secrecy. While our work was still in progress, Paisley told me that he had received a call from David Binder of the New York *Times*. He managed to put Binder off for the time being but the secret clearly was out and, given its explosive nature, the press was certain soon to be in hot pursuit. Indeed, on October 20, 1976, the Boston *Globe* carried an article by William Beecher, one of Washington's outstanding defense reporters, with a brief description of Team B's work and a partial list of its members. Other media ignored this news, as they did Beecher's account on December 17, which concluded that "well-placed sources familiar with the story say [Team B's report] is the most devastating indictment ever made of the CIA's Board of Intelligence Estimates." Who had leaked to Binder and Beecher I have never found out. In view of these leaks it occurred to me that it might be advisable for the DCI and PFIAB to release a brief official statement. The powers that be, however, rejected this suggestion: its only effect was to make me a prime suspect in the leaks.

Then the New York *Times* once again demonstrated that in the United States an event is news only when its editors designate it as such. On Sunday, December 26, the *Times* carried on its front page an article by Binder headlined "New CIA Estimate Finds Soviet Seeks Superiority in Arms." This item stimulated an avalanche of public inquiries, and for the next several weeks Team B was constantly in newspaper headlines and on prime-time television.

Binder (who had been a tutee of mine at Harvard in the 1950's) called me a few days prior to the appearance of his article to request an interview. I refused but promised to reconsider when he told me that he had already spoken with George Bush and Richard Lehman, a high CIA official. I called Lehman to verify Binder's account. He confirmed it and encouraged me to talk to Binder as well. I saw Binder subsequently at Washing-

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ton's National Airport and gave him a hurried interview on the Team A-Team B experiment, in broad outline, avoiding particulars.

Binder confused some of the facts, but in its essentials his account was correct. The TV networks at once seized on the news and deluged me with requests for appearances, all of which I turned down. I did, however, give some additional newspaper interviews and published rejoinders in the *Times* and the Washington *Post*.

The story broke at the very time the Ford administration was about to vacate the White House. Although as its whole previous history indicates, the experiment in competitive analysis had nothing whatever to do with this transition, which was as unanticipated as it was irrelevant to its task, journalists and, following them, some legislators hastened to interpret Team B as nothing but a crude political ploy. President-elect Carter had pledged to pursue SALT II negotiations and to cut back the defense budget by $5 billion. If, at the very moment he was assuming office, the intelligence community, acting under alleged external pressure, had altered its estimate to make the Soviet threat appear more menacing, the effect pointed to the motive: to wreck SALT II and compel Carter to increase the defense budget. To make this argument it was necessary to impugn the integrity of Team B and PFIAB.

The initial reaction of the Carter administration—whether out of ignorance or for purposes of obfuscation, it is difficult to tell—was to pretend that Team B had questioned the U.S.'s ability to meet the Soviet military threat. On January 1, 1977 President Carter stated: "We're still by far stronger than they are in most means of measuring military strength." He repeated this assurance in his State of the Union Address later that month. The Secretary of State designate, Cyrus Vance, during his confirmation hearings showed more caution but was equally far off the mark when he voiced confidence that there existed "general parity" between the two superpowers. When pressed, he conceded that he had neither read the Team B report nor received a "thorough briefing" on it.

The outgoing Secretary of State also rushed into the fray. When the experiment was taking place Kissinger seems to have raised no objections to it, possibly because it began during the presidential campaign when he had other things on his mind and ended when he was about to leave office. But he realized that the thesis of the Team B report struck at the very heart of his Soviet policy, which had posited that the nuclear competition should not prevent the two sides from reaching accords on a broad range of issues because they both subscribed to MAD. On January 10, 1977, at a farewell gathering at the National Press Club, he disposed of the whole exercise as nothing more than an effort to "sabotage SALT II." He went on to assure his audience "that no American President would ever allow the Soviet Union to gain superiority over the United States." In the next breath, he added that "the concept of 'supremacy' makes no sense in the nuclear age." Sober heads among his listeners must have wondered why, if supremacy no longer made sense, a President of the United States should work so hard to deny it to the Soviet Union.

It may be added as a postscript that two years later, in a complete about-face, Kissinger told the London *Economist* that he had erred in adhering to the MAD doctrine: nuclear supremacy did, indeed, matter very much. Why he had once held the one view and now its opposite, and what had made him change his mind, he did not explain.

PROMINENT legislators also rushed into the fray. One of them was Senator William Proxmire, who lost no time declaring that Team B's supposed allegations—that the Soviet Union had "already achieved military superiority over the U.S." and was "not only aiming at superiority but preparing for war"—could only be explained by the tendency of the "military establishment . . . to cry wolf at budget time." Even a cursory reading of press reports should have told the Senator that Team B neither made such claims nor worked for the military establishment. Proxmire cited the opinion of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General George Brown, who said that while he believed the Soviet Union did not as yet enjoy military superiority, "the available evidence indicates that the USSR is engaged in a program" to achieve such superiority. This, of course, was exactly the conclusion of Team B: the "available evidence" to which the General referred could only have been its report and the revised NIE. Yet Proxmire praised General Brown for his "courageous statement," although he did nothing but echo Team B which Proxmire himself had accused of "crying wolf."

I clipped and filed the press notices, which were almost uniformly hostile. The editorial writers and columnists of the New York *Times*, the Washington *Post*, and the Washington *Star* concurred that the Team A-Team B exercise had been misbegotten and that its primary purpose had been not to reach an objective judgment but to derail the "orderly process of intelligence evaluation" for purely political ends. The British press, taking its cue from the U.S., fell into step. So did *Red Star*, the organ of the Soviet military, and *Pravda*, which cited Western opinions to argue that Team B was yet another effort of American "hawks" to scuttle détente and raise defense expenditures. Brezhnev professed to be bored by the whole affair. "Frankly speaking," he declared in mid-January, "this noisy and idle talk has become quite tiresome. The allegations that the Soviet Union is going beyond what is sufficient for its defense, that it is striving for superiority in armaments with the aim of delivering a first strike are absurd and totally unfounded." For good

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measure Brezhnev added that his country "will never take the path of aggression, and will never raise a sword against other nations." This was going a bit far perhaps, but at least Brezhnev showed that unlike the incumbent U.S. President and his Secretary of State, much of Congress, and most of the Western media, he at least knew what Team B was about: not Soviet capabilities but Soviet intentions.

Among the self-styled "experts" on Team B who proliferated at this time, the most voluble was a certain Arthur Macy Cox. Cox had long ago worked for the CIA, which lent him an air of authority in matters concerning intelligence. By the time the Team B story broke, he was among the most extreme advocates of détente: a reviewer of a book Cox published in 1976 said that the author believed the "arms race will end when the United States decides to end it." Cox had never seen the Team B report even from a distance, but this did not inhibit him from declaring categorically in the *New York Review of Books* that "all its conclusions are either wrong, or distorted, or based on misinterpretation of the facts."

And finally, there was the scientific community. Team B challenged its most cherished political convictions as well as its political interests. If Team B's conclusions became U.S. policy, then the hold which the scientists of the "deterrence-through-agreement" school had had on U.S. strategic planning and weapons programs for twenty years would be broken. The scientists reacted, therefore, with understandable anger. I did not follow their pronouncements on the subject closely, but I see no reason to think that the reaction of two prominent scientists from Cambridge, Massachusetts in an interview with the *Harvard Crimson* was an isolated example. Bernard Feld, an MIT physicist, dismissed Team B's findings on the grounds that the group consisted of "well-known spokesmen for the American Right." The Harvard chemist, George Kistiakowsky, labeled the undertaking "one of those red-herring stories." Neither gentleman was familiar with the contents of Team B's report, and neither responded to its findings as reported in the press. Their reaction was strictly *ad hominem*, a kind of pseudo-argument that always betrays the absence of ideas.

THE shower of confused and ignorant abuse was, of course, unpleasant. But it was even more disturbing. It revealed that the intellectual elite of the United States, which had arrogated to itself the right to determine U.S. defense strategy, was unable, intellectually as well as psychologically, to cope with alternative points of view.

Having spent my entire adult life in scholarship, I took it for granted that a statement of fact, provided it is not meaningless, can only be either correct or false—it cannot be "good" or "bad," "moral" or "immoral." He who makes a factual statement can be faulted on no other grounds than wrong perception of the facts or faulty inference from them. His motives in making it are as irrelevant to its veracity as are its implications. This much seems obvious. No one in his right mind would accuse a physician who diagnoses a patient as suffering from terminal illness of harboring ill will toward the patient and his family: at most one would question his judgment and seek another opinion. But in politics, as I was to learn in the winter of 1976-77, other rules prevail. Here the first, and often the last, question asked is not: is the proposition true?, but: why has it been made and what are its practical consequences?

In all the discussions of Team B the one question that mattered the most was never raised: was the Soviet Union really seeking nuclear superiority? So preoccupied were the politicians, journalists, and left-wing intellectuals with what they presumed to have been the motives of Team B and the potential political fallout from its findings that they never bothered to inquire whether its principal conclusion was correct. In any event, in my extensive collection of newspaper clippings there is not one which addresses itself to this central issue. In this respect, the writers for the New York *Times*, Washingon *Post*, London *Sunday Times*, *Red Star*, and *Pravda* differed only in their journalistic manners, not in the quality of their thinking.

It was also disconcerting to learn that those who had claimed the final say on nuclear strategy could not distinguish the discrete elements that go into security estimates. Soviet nuclear capabilities and intentions were hopelessly mixed up with each other and with the separate question of the overall military balance. The proposition that "the Soviet Union strives for nuclear superiority" was confounded with the question of whether the Soviet Union intended imminently to attack the United States. In the end, the reaction boiled itself down to the juvenile boast, "I am stronger than you," supplemented with the MAD qualifier, "But even if I am not, it does not matter because there can be no fighting." It is not difficult to imagine with what amusement Soviet professional strategists must have followed this particular "national debate."

Regrettably, the same confusion was to attend subsequent U.S. public discussions of arms control, nuclear programs, and strategic defenses.

VI

ON JANUARY 7 and 8, 1977, the press announced that no fewer than three congressional committees were undertaking to investigate the Team A-Team B affair. The most important of these was the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence whose Subcommittee on Collection, Production, and Quality of Intelligence,

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chaired by Adlai Stevenson, was to determine whether any improper pressure had been brought to bear on the Agency to have it "slant" its estimate. It gives some idea of the spirit in which these inquiries were carried out that neither I nor any other member of Team B was invited to testify before these committees. Their source of information was the CIA, which thus enjoyed the enviable position of appearing as both plaintiff and sole witness.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee held a closed hearing on January 18, at which George Bush testified. Although the Washington *Post* headlined its report " 'Worst-Case' Intelligence Hit," every Senator who spoke to its correspondent after the hearing praised the Team A-Team B experiment. Hubert Humphrey, Clifford Case, and Jacob Javits commended the Agency for organizing the competition and incorporating Team B's findings into its estimate. Case declared that "political considerations" had not altered the official estimates. Humphrey expressed the opinion that the U.S. still enjoyed a nuclear "edge," but that it was "questionable whether we can maintain that edge" into the 1980's. Charles Percy thought that to alert the Russians to American concerns, the new findings should be made public, but he failed to convince Bush.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee held "hearings," a format which permits diverse opinions to be heard and enables the Senators to take part in the inquiry. The Senate Intelligence Committee, however, chose a different and much less satisfactory route of preparing a "report." This procedure requires no witnesses to be called. It is a research effort in which busy Senators do not participate personally but rely on their staffs: at best the Senators read the finished product before affixing their signatures to it and contribute a personal statement. In such an exercise, the quality of the staff is critical. The Intelligence Committee assigned the task of drafting its report on Team A-Team B to two staff members who had strong ideological and personal biases against Team B and everything it stood for. The staff director of the Committee, William G. Miller, had drafted the Cooper-Church Amendment that cut off aid to Vietnam and, as Senator Cooper's assistant, had actively fought the ballistic-missile defense program (ABM). It was presumably his responsibility to select the person in charge of the Team A-Team B report. His choice fell on Harold Ford, a recently retired employee of the CIA (which he subsequently rejoined). By virtue of his entire background, Ford could hardly have been expected to sit in impartial judgment on a case so painful to his colleagues in the Agency. The two men worked assiduously and quietly, with the assistance of the CIA. So it happened that the Team A-Team B inquiry was conducted by active and retired CIA personnel—that is, essentially by Team A. Ford briefly interviewed some members of Team B, but he relied mainly on testimony by Paisley who provided a highly partisan account.

I FIRST learned of these developments in July 1977 when I received a letter from General Graham in which he wrote that he had heard through the "grapevine" that the Intelligence Committee had drafted, in utter secrecy, a biased and denigrating report on Team B. I immediately wrote Senator Stevenson requesting permission to see this document. I argued that if the intelligence community had been given the opportunity to present its side, then Team B should at least be allowed to read and comment on the Committee's product. Senator Stevenson must have been unaware of what Messrs. Miller and Ford had been doing on his Subcommittee's behalf, for he immediately agreed that Nitze, Graham, and myself should be given access to the classified report.

The document I saw was an indictment of Team B, filled with slanderous accusations. As I now learned, it had been completed as early as May but had not yet received the approval of the Committee, which gave us an opportunity to correct its misstatements and slurs. Its most offensive feature was its questioning of the personal integrity of PFIAB and Team B, whose members stood accused of conniving to carry out, in the guise of intelligence estimating, a political operation. It charged Team B with exceeding its original mandate; of ignoring the "raw data" supplied to it by the Agency; of conspiring with PFIAB in the selection of personnel as well as the formulation of conclusions; of reaching conclusions before it had seen the evidence; and of leaking to the press. The principal source of these accusations was Paisley.* These charges notwithstanding, the report found many of the criticisms which Team B had made, and many of its recommendations, to be sound and worthwhile. It did not explain how a group of such low integrity, using such flawed procedures, could produce anything of value, but this contradiction could not be avoided since the authors of the report, while condemning Team B, had to explain why the Agency had allowed itself to be so strongly influenced by it.

Appended to the report was a personal statement by Senator Gary Hart which summarized this whole indictment. "The [Intelligence] Com-

* Except for some minor matters connected with Team B finances, this was my last contact with Paisley. On October 1, 1978, his badly decomposed body was found floating in Chesapeake Bay. There was a bullet wound in his head and diver's belts were wound around his waist. The circumstances of his death have not been cleared up to this day (the CIA conducted an investigation but did not release its findings). The most likely verdict is suicide but murder cannot be precluded. Some journalists have claimed that at the time of his disappearance Paisley had materials on Team B on his sailboat. See the New York *Times Magazine*, January 7, 1979.

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mittee report and the information from other sources," Hart wrote, "has convinced me that 'competitive analysis' and use of selected outside experts was little more than a camouflage for a political effort to force the National Intelligence Estimates to take a more bleak view of the Soviet strategic threat." Whether he realized it or not (for such senatorial statements are usually prepared by staff), Senator Hart was accusing the fourteen members of PFIAB and the ten members of Team B of placing their personal political objectives ahead of the nation's interest.

I submitted to Senator Stevenson a point-by-point rebuttal. (So did, separately, Nitze and Graham.) I asserted that we could not have "exceeded our mandate" since no responsible person in the Agency had restricted the scope of our inquiry. As for our alleged disregard of the "raw data," I observed that the Committee could arrive at such a conclusion only by ignoring Part Two of our report, which almost entirely relied on them. I stated that prior to joining Team B, I had not met a single member of PFIAB (I later learned that PFIAB had been equally ignorant of my existence) and hence that no "collusion" could have taken place even if it had been on anyone's mind. I had talked only once to Robert Galvin, and then in Paisley's presence. I, not PFIAB, had personally selected all the members of Team B, and my choices had the approval of the Director of Central Intelligence who had picked me to be chairman. The charge that Team B had reached its conclusions before analyzing the CIA material could be disproven with reference to its work schedule, which I provided. The Committee report furnished no evidence to substantiate its charge that members of Team B had had unauthorized communication with the media. As for Senator Hart's accusations, I found them contemptible slander: the best that could be said in his favor was that he did not realize what he was saying when he accused ex-Secretaries of the Treasury and the Army, an ex-Deputy Secretary of Defense, a one-time Chief of Naval Operations, and presidents of major corporations of deliberately misleading their government on a matter of the greatest importance to national security.

THESE rejoinders fortunately did attract the attention of the Committee, because it held up approval until the report could be revised to allow for our corrections. The staffs of Senators Malcolm Wallop and Daniel Patrick Moynihan greatly contributed to this editorial work. The Committee finally approved the revised text on February 16, 1978. I have not seen the full, classified text but the public version showed considerable improvement.* The verdict remained negative. While it commended Team B for having made "some valid criticisms" and "some useful recommendations," the Committee thought that the experiment proved less valuable than it might have been because Team B was too one-sided in its composition and had exceeded its mandate. Press leaks had further reduced its value. Still—in the public version, at any rate—the personal attacks on members of PFIAB and Team B were omitted. The Committee report also accepted one of the basic premises of Team B, that "strategic" should be interpreted "in the context of Soviet interests and policies."

Appended to the Committee's public report, alongside Senator Hart's statement, were "separate views" by Senators Moynihan and Wallop which appraised positively the work of Team B and refuted some of the criticisms by the Committee's majority. Moynihan disposed of the complaint that the undertaking had been carried out in an "adversarial" manner because of the "one-sided" composition of Team B:

> Given the B Team's purpose, it is hardly surprising that its members' view reflected "only one segment of the spectrum of opinion." Inasmuch as the main purpose of the experiment was to determine why previous estimates had produced such misleading pictures of Soviet strategic developments, it was reasonable to pick team members whose views of Soviet strategy differed from those of the official estimators, just as a similar experiment, had one been conducted in 1962, might have called for a "B Team" composed of strategic analysts who had been skeptical of the "missile gap."

Senator Wallop criticized the preoccupation of the Committee's report with procedures. The Intelligence Committee, in common with the media, had refused to address itself to the central issue, namely, the soundness of Team B's findings, preferring to concentrate on the procedures it had used. This was a strange self-imposed limitation for a group charged with overseeing the quality of intelligence. Conceding that the revised report improved on the original, Wallop nevertheless thought it "still fundamentally flawed, because,

> *in the words of the [Committee] report, it* "makes no attempt to judge which group's estimates concerning the USSR are correct." Therefore the report's "findings and recommendations for improving the quality of future NIE's on Soviet capabilities and objectives are primarily directed at procedural issues." But it is logically impossible to determine the *quality* of opposing arguments without reference to the *substance* of those arguments. After all, the *quality* of an estimate depends above all upon its *accuracy*. In order to make judgments concerning quality, never mind suggesting improvements, one must judge where the truth lies against which the estimate's accuracy is to be measured.

* *The National Intelligence Estimates—A-B Team Episode Concerning Soviet Strategic Capability and Objectives*, released by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on February 16, 1978.

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By the time this report was released, Team B had faded from memory, and it attracted little attention. The original draft, however, even though eventually discarded, managed to inflict serious harm on the intelligence process. In May 1977, when Harold Ford completed his draft, PFIAB, which it cast as the chief culprit, was peremptorily abolished. Leo Cherne, its chairman, received, along with his letter of dismissal, an application for unemployment insurance. The timing may have been coincidental; but it is more likely that the new DCI, Admiral Stansfield Turner, used the initial draft of the report to rid himself of the group charged with overseeing his Agency.*

VII

THE subject which remains to be discussed is Team B's influence on the attitudes of the U.S. government and public opinion toward the Soviet nuclear threat. Such matters are inherently difficult to appraise. Team B did not so much come up with fresh revelations as articulate and justify doubts about Soviet intentions which had been gaining ground among political and military experts for some time. Such impact as it exerted resulted from the fact that it stated what many were thinking but did not dare to say. This is confirmed by the speed with which the views of Team B, once the spell of conformity had been broken, spread in and out of government. Proponents of MAD found themselves for the first time confronted with an articulate and well-informed opposition: their monopoly on opinion fell apart. Barely a year after the event, in his appendix to the Intelligence Committee's report, Senator Moynihan wrote that Team B's "notion that the Soviets intend to surpass the United States in strategic arms and are in the process of doing so, has gone from hearsay to respectability, if not orthodoxy." Ideas spread this rapidly only when they have already germinated in many minds.

Within the government, as I have noted, the views advanced by Team B initially affected thinking through the revised 1977 NIE and its successors. In the years that followed, the Agency's analysts ceased to "mirror-image": this fact alone gives the lie to the charge that Team B had "pressured" the Agency to alter its 1977 estimate. In fact, miniature Team B's had existed all along inside the intelligence community, the CIA included, but they were silenced by the official consensus and confined to cautionary remarks and dissenting footnotes. Team B gave these minority views such strong and persuasive support that they emerged on top. Team B through its recommendations also had a lasting effect on the manner in which estimates were henceforth prepared. According to Herbert Meyer, who recently retired from the National Intelligence Council of the CIA, "We have put a major emphasis on competitive analysis. The estimates now routinely include dissenting opinion."†

The responsibilities of office quickly cured the Carter administration of its glib and uninformed opinions of Team B. On assuming his duties, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter's National Security Adviser, commissioned a number of studies on the Soviet strategic threat and potential U.S. responses. This work, carried out quietly to avoid the kind of public controversy that had followed the A-B Team experiment, promptly led to the conclusion that Team B had been correct in its assessments: the Soviet Union was indeed developing a first-strike capability. In 1980, probably in an effort to refute candidate Ronald Reagan's criticism of their administration's nuclear policy, Carter's officials began to leak these findings to the press. Once again, the redoubtable William Beecher of the Boston *Globe* broke the news. On July 27, 1980, he published an article headlined "U.S. Reshaping N-Strategy Against the Soviets," in which he reported that a new statement was being drafted in the National Security Council on U.S. nuclear strategy. It would reject Mutual Assured Destruction and the targeting doctrine based on it, which called for the retaliatory strike to concentrate on civilian targets, in favor of one directed principally at political and military targets. The purpose of the new strategy was to ensure that even if attacked in a first strike, the U.S. would have the ability to wage a protracted war. The new strategic doctrine, formulated in the summer of 1980 in a Presidential Directive (PD 59), marked the beginning of a radical shift in U.S. strategic policy.

No less important were parallel shifts in public opinion. Here a major contribution was made by the Committee on the Present Danger (CPD), a bipartisan body of prominent public figures founded in Washington in the summer of 1976. (To prevent exploitation of its findings for campaign purposes, the founders of CPD postponed formal announcement until after the presidential election of that year.) Paul Nitze, a member of Team B, was one of the Committee's founders. Its other leaders —among them, Eugene V. Rostow, Dean Rusk, Lane Kirkland, Max Kampelman, Richard Allen, David Packard, and Henry H. Fowler—felt appre-

* President Reagan reinstituted PFIAB shortly after assuming office.

† *Insight*, June 23, 1986, p. 15. People well informed about the NIE process say that the current "competitive analyses" are in-house undertakings, much more limited in scope than Team B had been. Recently the CIA has let the press know that it once again takes a "less grim" view of Soviet military preparations than the Pentagon, and maintains its "independence" from the Reagan administration's "more conservative direction." As an illustration of "past political pressures," its spokesmen referred to the A-Team/B-Team experiment. This may be a sign of the changing political climate. See Michael R. Gordon in the New York *Times*, July 16, 1986.

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hensive about the strategic balance and dedicated themselves to alerting the public to the decline in U.S. military capabilities.

Early in 1977 I was invited to join CPD's Executive Committee and wrote two programmatic statements for it, one on Soviet global strategy ("What Is the Soviet Union Up To?"), the other on Soviet arms-control policies ("Why the Soviet Union Wants SALT II").* Under the skilled direction of Charles Tyroler, CPD conducted press conferences, commissioned opinion polls, and released facts and figures on the strategic balance. In the propitious atmosphere created by the Team B controversy, public interest was keen. CPD had much influence on public perceptions of the Soviet threat, with the result that voters soon took a more favorable view of increased defense expenditures and a more critical one of SALT II, which CPD selected as its particular target. My article, "Why the Soviet Union Thinks it Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War," published in the July 1977 issue of COMMENTARY, explained how and why politicized scientists and uncritical devotees of arms control had misconstrued the Soviet strategic threat.

By the time President Reagan took office, the views of Team B and CPD were unmistakably in the ascendant. A remarkable shift in public opinion had taken place, which helped the new administration to proceed with its ambitious program of defense procurements. Several commentators, seeking to define President Reagan's views on foreign and defense policies, found their source in Team B.† It did not escape them, either, that nearly thirty of the officials whom Reagan—himself a member of CPD—chose for high posts in the first weeks of his administration belonged to the Committee on the Present Danger, an organization that saw eye-to-eye with Team B. President Reagan's distaste for arms control as a political tool, his insistence on building up first offensive nuclear forces and then anti-nuclear defenses, all rested on the premise that the USSR held a different view of the utility of nuclear weapons from the United States, regarding them as guarantors not of peace but of victory. From this premise it followed that if the U.S. deterrent were to prove effective it had to be constructed in terms that were credible to the Soviet General Staff, even if they held no appeal for American civilian strategists.

Thus the United States government at last came to terms with the military implications of a weapon that it was the first to develop and employ but for a long time refused to acknowledge as a reality in the international balance of power. The opponents of this realistic view have had to retreat. They have regrouped and returned to the fray in President Reagan's second term, bringing to bear powerful pressures from such diverse sources as the Department of State, much of Congress, and the European allies. President Reagan is once again told that national security is best assured not by the construction of offensive and defensive weapons but by accords with the Soviet Union. The battle is far from won. But at least the arms-control lobby no longer has a monopoly on opinion: it obstructs but it does not dictate U.S. defense policies.

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* These documents, along with others released by the Committee, are reproduced in Charles Tyroler II, ed., *Alerting America* (Committee on the Present Danger, 1984), pp. 10-15 and 166-69.

† See, for example, Hedrick Smith in the New York *Times*, May 25, 1980 and Godfrey Hodgson in the *New Statesman*, September 5, 1980. Hodgson wrote that "Reagan's foreign policy is rooted in the world view of Team B." Jim Klurfield concluded, in what is one of the best journalistic accounts of Team B (*Newsday*, June 14-15, 1981), that "on November 4, 1980, Team B, in essence, became Team A."

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The Tenured Left

Stephen H. Balch and Herbert I. London

Like ionized particles transiting a cloud chamber, two quite different campus projects involving tiny fractions of the collegiate population have recently succeeded in precipitating reactions of surprising scope and visibility. While the resulting trails move in very different directions, their vectors reveal much about the dubious atmosphere of American higher education in the 1980's.

The first of these two passages has been that of the divestiture movement, with its demand for the liquidation of university investments in firms with holdings in South Africa. An effort under way for several years, the movement accelerated greatly with the spreading violence in South Africa during 1985. At one level it sought to free the academy of any taint of involvement with apartheid; at another, to intensify economic pressures on the Pretoria government; and at a third, to further that government's progressive delegitimization. Finally, many of its organizers, through an exercise in guerrilla theater, hoped to recover some measure of that radical consciousness which prevailed on campuses during the late 1960's.

In a variety of ways the divestiture movement is a classic embodiment of the ethos of campus protest born during that decade. For one thing, it assumes that students (or at least an activist fringe) are equipped with the moral and political perception necessary to judge the policies of the institutions entrusted with their education. For another, it understands the imperatives of its cause as conferring a license willfully to disregard university regulations, to seize or obstruct university property, and to be sharply uncivil toward university officials offering resistance. The tactics of the movement have in fact created confrontations and threats of disorder not experienced on most American campuses since the Vietnam war.

Though it might wish to disavow the honor, Accuracy in Academia (AIA), the second recent campus "movement," also bears the stamp of the 60's in its assumptions and *modus operandi*. Fathered by Reed Irvine at the beginning of the 1985 fall semester as a counterpart to Accuracy in Media, Accuracy in Academia is essentially a "Naderite" enterprise with a conservative twist. Instead of criticizing the corporate world for deceptive advertising and shoddy merchandise, it levels similar charges at the intellectual products of the academy, which it sees as tainted by a tendentious radicalism. Its informants are not dissatisfied automobile owners or disgruntled nuclear engineers but unhappy academic consumers (that is to say, students).

In both its virtues and shortcomings Accuracy in Academia has much in common with other contemporary ventures in grassroots muckraking. Among its virtues is a flare for instant controversy, designed to draw attention to the chosen target; among its shortcomings, a certain surreptitiousness invariably associated with "whistle-blowing" enterprises. But whatever may be said of its tact, the efforts of Accuracy in Academia, unlike those of the divestiture campaign, have been wholly confined to the realm of public criticism, neither fomenting disruption, nor toying with the possibilities of violent confrontation, nor obliging university administrators or faculty members to adopt an institutional stand.

In light of this rather fundamental difference, the response of the educational establishment to each of these two projects might strike an observer unfamiliar with the vagaries of academic life as somewhat surprising. For while the divestiture protests have often encountered an embarrassed resistance on the part of presidents and trustees worried about the value of institutional portfolios, or doubtful about the most effective way of combating apartheid, almost nowhere have they been seen (for the record, at least) as seriously threatening those norms of reasoned discourse, or that climate of intellectual tolerance, so often cited as constituting the university's special claim to grace. Quite the contrary: on campus after campus they have been accorded the indulgence reserved for activities whose transcendent moral status immunizes them against the ordinary quibbles of law.

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Thus, at Harvard, eleven students who conducted an all-day sit-in at the offices of the university's board of governors received only a "formal admonition," the mildest penalty possible and one mitigated still further by a statement complimenting the students for having maintained a "constructive level of civility." (Another group of Harvard students, who had physically blockaded a South African diplomat on his way to address a conservative campus group, had their more severe penalties suspended.) At Cornell, the university dropped charges pending as a result of 1,200 arrests between April and December 1985, on the ostensible ground that the installation of a new disciplinary code required that the old slate be swept clean. At Yale, a decision to remove demonstrators blocking campus buildings produced an anguished petition signed by 156 faculty members deploring the university's "use of force." This was shortly followed by a ruling from a faculty disciplinary committee, slapping the defendants on the wrist and allowing the reconstruction of their shanties.

By contrast, there has been very little uncertainty about the menace to the climate of freedom posed by Accuracy in Academia, and no hesitancy at all in denouncing it in the strongest possible terms. The Committee on Academic Freedom and Tenure of the American Association of University Professors (AAUP), for example, predicted that "the proposed program of AIA, if undertaken and accepted seriously, [would] lead toward the deadening of discourse and the stultification of learning." Dr. Bruce Mason, chairman of the faculty senate of Arizona State University (one of whose professors had been an early object of AIA criticism), declared that the organization had "poisoned the faculty-student relationship," making "students' innocent questions" seem like "devious attempts to make trouble." Chancellor Joseph S. Murphy of the City University of New York likened AIA's methods to those of a "corps of thought police," and characterized the group as posing a "grave . . . menace to the free exchange of ideas." And falling back on the inevitable comparison, Dr. John W. Chandler, president of the Association of American Colleges, opined that while "two generations of college professors [had] escaped the battles of McCarthyism," the academy would now have to "gird [itself] to resist another round."

Perhaps the greatest irony in the reaction to AIA has to do with the strong defense it has provoked of established procedures of university self-governance. Such a defense stood at the center of a statement issued by the AAUP and eight other higher-education associations in November 1985, intended to constitute their definitive rejoinder to AIA. "We believe," the statement ran, that "the quality of academic performance is best judged through peer evaluation by skilled professionals. Chief executive officers and governing boards are responsible for ensuring both accountability and academic integrity while safeguarding the university from undue outside influence. We encourage colleges and universities to resist this assault on institutional integrity by reaffirming established practices for insuring professional responsibility and academic freedom. . . ." Brave words, no doubt, but one may wonder where this determination to protect the prerogatives of "executive officers and governing boards" and to resist assaults on "institutional integrity" fled when it came to dealing with the disruption and intimidation practiced by proponents of divestiture.

The disparity in the reception accorded anti-apartheid demonstrators and the minions of AIA has much less to do with the respective threat each poses to the life of the academic mind than with that mind's most seasoned prejudices. As an enterprise of the Left, the divestiture movement is guaranteed the automatic sympathy of the vast majority of politically conscious faculty and administrators. As an organization of self-confessed conservatives, AIA provokes the instant wrath of this very same group. To be sure, a decent case can be made for the goals, and against the methods, of each of these ventures, but with some honorable exceptions (largely among conservative intellectuals outside the academy) few observers have seemed able to get beyond a fixation on ideological provenance.

The moral of this tale is not that the academy is a bastion of liberalism, a fact which most would take to be indisputable, but that the liberalism of the academy, like much of that beyond its walls, is now hard pressed to recognize its own principles, and even less capable of defending them when they come under attack from the Left. "No enemies on the Left," once the rallying cry of the Popular Front, has become a veritable shibboleth for the majority of the American professoriate, at least when dealing with campus radicalism.

As a pervasive intellectual reflex, this attitude is between twenty and thirty years old. Its origins may be found in the backlash against McCarthyism, its consolidation in the "cultural revolution" of the 60's. Historically, the development of this reflex coincided with an era of unprecedented institutional expansion within the world of higher education, in which the number of jobs, and the influence of the university on American life, greatly increased. This conjunction created a peculiar opportunity for American radicalism, partially compensating for its failure to establish any sizable foothold within the general population. Deprived of a strong institutional base among elected officials or in the labor movement comparable to that of radical movements elsewhere, the Left in America sought sanctuary in the academy. Given the skewed sensibilities of its

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liberal guardians, and given, too, the intellectual proclivities and gentrified tastes of many 60's radicals, the academy provided a safe, even pleasant, haven for ideological rest, recuperation, and regrouping.

Thus it has come about that, despite the sincere desire of most university people to see themselves as exemplars of democratic idealism, the American campus is now the nesting place for a significant population of political extremists. Indeed, with the waning of the more traditional forms of racist and nativist ideologies, the campus has probably become American extremism's principal address.

II

It is difficult to measure with precision the magnitude of the radical presence within the academy, though enough data exist to allow estimates. In 1984, for example, the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching conducted a survey of the entire professoriate, sampling 5,000 faculty members at 310 2-year, 4-year, and graduate institutions. Respondents were asked to choose which of five labels best described their political orientation, with designations ranging from "Left," "liberal," and "middle-of-the-road" to "moderately conservative" and "strongly conservative." Reading from "Left" to "Right," the aggregated results disclosed percentages of 5.8, 33.8, 26.6, 29.6, and 4.2 in each of the categories. If "Left" is taken as a synonym for "radical," then the first percentage would translate into something in the neighborhood of 35,000 radical faculty, out of a total academic population thought to number about 600,000. (The inevitable rejoinder that the 5.8 percent on the "Left" is almost balanced by the 4.2 percent calling themselves "strongly conservative" will impress only those who equate the outlook of Herbert Stein with that of Herbert Marcuse.) As with most similar polls, the Carnegie study found the proportion of leftist faculty to be higher at institutions of greater prestige and influence. Thus, while only 3.9 percent of the respondents at 2-year colleges designated themselves as on the "Left," the figure rose to 6.3 percent for faculty at "research universities" and to 6.7 percent for those at 4-year liberal-arts colleges.

The Carnegie survey covers all segments of the professoriate, including faculties teaching in business and professional programs, mathematics and the natural sciences, physical education, home economics, and other fields generally distant from political controversy. When consideration is limited to only those disciplines which set out to analyze and evaluate social and political phenomena, even the semblance of ideological balance vanishes. Needless to say, the largest bloc of academics within nearly all these disciplines describe themselves as "liberal" rather than "leftist," but with the exception of economics, every field within the humanities and social sciences contains a substantial cohort of radicals, dwarfing anything found at the opposite end of the scale. For example, among the philosophy faculty surveyed at 4-year institutions, a full 21.7 percent designated themselves as "Left" and none at all as "strongly conservative"; for the sociologists, the percentages were 37.0 percent versus 0.9 percent; for the political scientists, 19.8 percent to 4.8 percent; for the historians, 12.8 percent to 3.0 percent; and for professors of English literature, 10.2 percent to 2.4 percent.

Except among sociologists, where the Left has grown substantially, these patterns have remained fairly constant since the late 1960's. What has changed decidedly over the last two decades is the extent to which leftist radicalism has managed to institutionalize itself within the academic world. Whereas twenty years ago the campus Left was largely confined to registering its presence through vocal demonstrations and protest, today it is more comfortably ensconced within a network of journals and professional organizations, university departments and academic programs.

Take journals, for example. Before the 1960's one would have been hard pressed to find more than two or three leftist journals with any claim to scholarly standing. Since then, over thirty such journals have appeared (a few to fall by the wayside) in areas as diverse as anthropology (*Dialectical Anthropology*), art criticism (*Praxis*), criminology (*Crime and Social Justice*), economics (*Review of Radical Economics*), geography (*Antipode*), history (*Radical History Review*), and literary criticism (*Diacritics*). And one could easily add to these about a dozen feminist journals (most operating out of a specific discipline) which share the same insurgent perspective.

The journals vary a good deal in style, intellectual quality, and activist commitment, from the sedate, almost antiquarian *New German Critique*, which devotes considerable space to publishing the translated texts of deceased theorists of the Frankfurt School, through more gritty and polemical publications like *New Political Science*, with its topical preoccupations and discussions of movement strategy, to such outlandish periodicals as *Trivia*, a feminist "journal of ideas" whose overall tone of lesbian mysticism is best conveyed in the explanation of its title, a derivation of "*trivium* (crossroads), . . . one of the names of the Triple Goddess" . . . describing "the matrix of our creative power, the gathering of wise women in which our ideas originate and continue to live."

Were it not that they are accompanied by a measure of academic respectability, the mere existence of these journals would mean little. None has become a major organ in its discipline, but many have achieved respectable circulations and, symbolically more important, institutional affiliation and support. *Praxis*, for example, is published with the assistance of the College of Fine Arts, the

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Graduate Student Association, the Division of Graduate Studies, and the College of Letters and Sciences of UCLA. The *Insurgent Sociologist* is produced by an "editorial collective" housed in the department of sociology of the University of Oregon. *Trivia* has been regularly funded from the proceeds of a feminist lecture series co-sponsored by the Women's Resource Center at Smith College. (The Winter 1986 issue, which features articles on lesbian economics, the spiritual legacy of the ancient Amazons, and the five-billion-year-long racial memory of womankind, broke with this pattern of feminist support. It was subsidized by a grant from the National Endowment for the Arts.)

THESE journals play an important role in facilitating communication and maintaining a fortifying sense of intellectual community among the constituencies they serve. But anyone familiar with the nature of contemporary college life will also quickly recognize their practical significance in sustaining the careers of radical professors. In the increasingly bureaucratized process by which academic personnel decisions are made, tenure or promotion frequently turns on rather crude and readily quantifiable measures of achievement. Paramount among these are the number of a candidate's scholarly publications, with each citation representing another point on the scoreboard. By providing respectable scholarly venues for articles too pointedly political, or fantastic, for most mainstream publications, the radical journals help contributors to advance their careers without abandoning their activist vocations.

This is not to say that articles of a radical bent find any particular difficulty getting into mainstream publications. Marxist and feminist scholarship is quite commonplace in most established journals, particularly in fields like sociology, anthropology, and history. Of course, some of these articles, despite their ideological orientation, have real merit and deserve publication. Nonetheless, occasions arise which call into question the capacity of mainstream academics to maintain even an elementary standard of critical judgment when evaluating the work of the Left.

A case in point is the lead article in the December 1985 issue of the *American Sociological Review*, the official journal of the American Sociological Association. Entitled "Mythologies of Work: A Comparison of Firms in State Socialism and Advanced Capitalism," the article seeks to assess the reliability of eight widely-held Western "stereotypes" concerning the relative inefficiency of firms in socialist economies. The method employed is that of the case study, in which the researchers immerse themselves in the lives of two comparable manufacturing firms, one in the United States and one in Hungary, and then describe their impressions. The result, as it turns out, stands in sharp contradiction to the conventional wisdom. Whether one is looking at the motivational level of the workforce, the capacity for innovation, the influence of workers in organizing production, the degree of bureaucratic rigidity, or at any of the other operational characteristics analyzed, the Hungarian firm emerges as at least the equal, and often the superior, of the American one. This finding leads the investigators to conclude that a socialist firm can indeed be more efficient than a capitalist one, provided it is shielded from direct state control by an intervening level of corporate structure. They also take pains to indicate that it is just in this direction that the Hungarian economy has recently been evolving.

Food for thought, certainly, and all the more so since the premier publication in sociology attests to the authors' credentials. But who are they? One is Michael Burawoy, a widely published Marxist sociologist from the University of California at Berkeley, and, parenthetically, an associate editor of the review. Nothing indefensible here: everyone has biases, and it is appropriate for academic editors to credit a scholar of established reputation with the ability to keep his under control, assuming he is in a position to do so. Unfortunately, however, not all the world's social scientists are in this position. One who may well not be is Burawoy's collaborator, János Lukács, research fellow of the Institute of Sociology, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, and the person largely responsible for the case study of the socialist firm.

Now, the credibility of any piece of purportedly scientific research requires that the investigator be free either to substantiate or to falsify the hypotheses he is exploring, as the evidence dictates. Therefore, to accept "Mythologies of Work" as a serious scientific study, the editors of the *American Sociological Review* had to believe that a Hungarian academician could put his name to a study of a Hungarian firm, for publication in a prestigious foreign journal, which would *confirm* eight negative Western stereotypes about the efficiency of socialism. To say the least, this is rather doubtful. Ironically, in recent years the social sciences have experienced several acrimonious controversies about the extent to which the sponsorship of research by agencies of the American government taints the work of those who participate in it, or damages the reputation of entire disciplines. Judging from "Mythologies of Work," involvement with a Communist regime may not be as troubling.

III

MAX WEBER once wrote that the teacher "will beware of imposing from the platform any political positions upon the student, whether it is expressed or suggested. . . . [T]he prophet and the demagogue do not belong on the academic platform." While this caution may be

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honored more in the breach than in the practice, it expresses the standard by which most professors would be willing to be judged. What distinguishes the majority of radical academics from their colleagues is the view that scholarship and teaching are preeminently, and unavoidably, extensions of politics. For the most extreme, the distinction between teaching and indoctrination altogether evaporates.

When pressed as to whether the purpose of his teaching is to convert students to socialism, Bertell Ollman, the doyen of Marxist scholars at New York University, answers that "a correct understanding of Marxism (or any body of scientific truth) leads automatically to its acceptance." (One wonders about the fate of the dull or intransigent student who cannot grasp the "scientific truth.") Michael Parenti, a Marxist political scientist at Brooklyn College, and a former fellow of the Institute for Policy Studies, defines the mission of the radical academic even more baldly. "Our job in academia," he states, "is not only to reach out to working people but also to remind our students that they're workers . . . that their struggle is also a labor struggle, [and] that labor struggle is the most profound democratic struggle in our society."*

Such statements imply that the university, and the values traditionally associated with it, are regarded as adversaries, albeit adversaries that provide the radical academic with influence, status, and income. And so, to the question, "What does Marxism have to offer the bourgeois university?," Harvard biologist Richard Lewontin replies, in a paper published in *New Political Science*, "preferably, nothing." He explains:

> That is, Marxism can do nothing *for* the university; the real question is what can Marxists do *to* and *in* the university. . . . For the natural and social scientist the answer is very clear. The university is a factory that makes weapons —ideological weapons—for class struggle, for class warfare, and trains people in their use. It has no other leading and important function in the social organization. [Emphasis in original.]

Lewontin specifies three separate ways in which the expertise and academic status of the revolutionary scholar can be used: first, "to demystify and destroy the obfuscation which is part of the ruling-class ideological weaponry"; second, "to create weapons that can be used on our side"; third, to bring about the "delegitimation of the authority of bourgeois ideologues," an activity which must involve "writing, speaking on radio, on television, in schools, in newspapers and magazines." Finally, Lewontin observes, the Marxist professor must create in his workplace "a situation that intensifies contradiction, . . . that intensifies the class struggle, and . . . must engage in revolutionizing practice in the day-to-day relations on the job."

Recognizing that present circumstances are not those most propitious for overt revolutionary struggle, many radical academics see their function as laying the intellectual groundwork for that time when, in the words of Frederic Jameson (then a professor of French literature at Yale), "merely abstract doctrine will come back into [students'] minds as a solution to urgent problems." Jameson continues:

> At that point, retrospectively, the things we all taught them, in apparently imperceptible accretions that left no trace, will come back and be activated for the first time. That is, it seems to me, no negligible function for us to play, even if it offers very little immediate personal satisfaction. But I think I have to give an even broader historical characterization of the moment in which American Marxists find themselves and in which our pedagogical work takes its significance. Lenin said that the two necessary [but not sufficient] preconditions for social revolution are a class-conscious proletariat and a revolutionary intelligentsia. If, as intellectuals, we can necessarily play only a marginal role in the development of the former, the task of creating the latter is clearly our fundamental one. To create a Marxist culture in this country, to make Marxism an unavoidable presence and a distinct, original, and unmistakable voice in American social, cultural, and intellectual life, in short to form a Marxist intelligentsia for the struggles of the future—this seems to me the supreme mission of a Marxist pedagogy and a radical intellectual life today.

WHILE these Marxist professors do not dominate opinion in their disciplines, it would be a mistake to underestimate their influence or the influence of Marxist studies. According to Bertell Ollman and Edward Vernoff, the editors of *The Left Academy* (1983), four Marxist-inspired textbooks in American government were published between 1970 and 1982. Before this period there were none. During the same period three of the most prestigious university publishers, Cambridge, Oxford, and Princeton, issued books on Marx and Marxism, "almost all of them quite sympathetic." Whereas in the 1960's only a handful of courses in Marxist philosophy were being taught, today there are well over 400 such courses offered on American campuses.

When Secretary of Education William J. Bennett recently expressed the belief that "a significant body of opinion" has developed on college campuses which "openly rejects the democratic ethic," his comment was greeted with mocking skepticism. One academic, John Chandler, replied that "The situation [Bennett] describes was a much more pronounced problem in the late 60's

* According to figures provided by the publisher, since 1980 there have been 85 college adoptions of Parenti's textbook, *Democracy for the Few*. This is a relatively small number compared, say, with Paul Samuelson's textbooks in economics, but it is considered quite respectable by standards within the book publishing industry.

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and early 70's than it is today." Chandler was thinking of revolutionary displays by students. What he ignored was the extent to which the practitioners of academic agitprop have vacated the quadrangles for more decorous and strategic roosts behind the lectern. In this sense, Secretary Bennett's concern over radicals at war with society is more pertinent now than it would have been in the turbulent 60's.

IV

THE decentralized character of academic governance offers numerous opportunities for faculty intent on politicizing teaching and scholarship. What goes on in the classroom is almost totally under the control of the professor in charge. Faculty members with a special sense of intellectual purpose can usually have a disproportionate impact on course and program development. Even the policies of professional academic associations can be strongly influenced by determined and organized minorities. Consequently, in many institutions, while radicals have not become the dominant force, they have made a deeper mark than their numbers alone would suggest. Their principal effect has been to introduce into academic life a shrill and persistent tendentiousness which frequently succeeds in structuring the agenda of academic discourse while simultaneously cheapening it.

One measure of this effect is the increase in the number of one-sided, question-begging, or highly partisan course descriptions now to be found in college catalogues. Take, for instance, the description of *Black Studies 145: Capitalism and Colonialism in Contemporary America* found in the catalogue of the City College of New York:

> White America is described as capitalist and colonialist. Efforts will be made to comprehend the relative importance of the two phenomena for strategies of liberation depending upon who and what is the American and America.

Or take the following account of *Economics 380a. Comparative Economic Systems: The Third World* drawn from the Vassar College catalogue:

> The course will compare capitalism and socialism as alternative strategies of development of Third World countries. The first part of the course will address the central theoretical issues in the literature on the possibilities of capitalist development, socialist development, and autarky. In the second part, we will discuss how different socialist countries in the Third World have dealt with a variety of problems, including government ownership of productive enterprises, agrarian transformations, technological development, population growth, and the status of women. Depending on student interest the course will cover the following countries: China, Cuba, Nicaragua, Chile under Allende, Jamaica under Manley, Tanzania, Angola, Zimbabwe, North Korea, and Cambodia.

Lest it be thought that these examples are uniquely egregious, one might contemplate the lecture series, "America After 1984," organized last year at Bard College by Stanley Diamond, then the occupant of its Alger Hiss Chair in Culture, Society, and the Humanities. Topics in this series have included: "The Underside of Justice in the United States"; "American Cultural Imperialism"; "Anti-Communism in America: Its History and Functions"; "The Origins and Continuity of the American Crisis: A Native American View"; "Radical Ecologists: The Environmental Crisis Heats Up"; "The Gathering Crisis in Public Education"; "Private Education in Crisis"; "The Media Crisis in America"; and "Race and Gender in America."

At the University of Massachusetts in Boston, a Marxist Studies program offers twenty-six courses, including "Food: Politics and Policy," about which the catalogue states, *inter alia:* "[T]he development of a world network of food trade, aid, and finance has created a world food system in which the U.S.'s farm policies, and federal deficits and bank interest rates, fundamentally affect whether Indian farmers will grow more wheat or African peasants will starve."

Descriptions like these tend to parody themselves. More commonplace is the gratuitous introduction of political material into conventionally designed courses—or, worse yet, the use of the vocabulary and apparatus of scholarship to mask an appropriation of a broad swath of the curriculum by a political movement.

The rapid growth of black-studies programs in the late 60's and early 70's was the first manifestation of this phenomenon. The essentially political character of black studies, which was regarded by its champions as a means of consciousness-raising and by most college administrators as a way of avoiding trouble, has always been an open secret on the campus. While black studies seems to have undergone a contraction from its heyday in the 70's, it is still represented by some 350 college programs, including 141 leading to a baccalaureate, and it is imitated by smaller clusters of programs in areas like Chicano and "Native-American" studies.

Women's studies comprised the second wave, sweeping through the already breached ramparts of academic integrity. As Michael Levin has written, "At a time when black militants were developing black studies, it was possible for other groups to demand a 'study' of their own on grounds of equality. . . . The women's-studies courses introduced during the 1960's and 1970's did not originate in significant discoveries as did courses in molecular biology or the 'higher criticism' of biblical texts. . . . Nor did women's studies undergo the scrutiny that normally attends even the most modest academic innovation. The very speed with which these courses proliferated suggests that they were perceived as en-

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titled, by historical and political necessity, to a place in academe." As of 1984, there were 476 women's-studies programs, of which 125 led to baccalaureates, and the number continues to grow.

THE latest variation on this theme has been the rapid diffusion of "peace-studies" programs, which at last count had a place in the curriculum at well over 200 institutions of higher learning. The emotionally loaded and propagandistic qualities of similar programs at the primary and secondary school level have already been explored in the pages of COMMENTARY*; needless to say, they are often duplicated at the college level. What has received less attention is that in many of these college programs, the study of conflict is but the camel's nose of a comprehensive effort at radical indoctrination, justified by the purported power of sweeping social change to eliminate the scourge of war. What is more, many of the leaders in this "field" do not view their programs as merely one more academic major but as the kernel of a new type of professional school, designed to train and accredit new generations of movement activists.

The Peace and Social Justice Program established at Tufts University in 1983, and often referred to as a model for others, provides a case in point. Upon opening its bulletin one does, to be sure, encounter a few perfunctory nods toward the ideal of "open intellectual inquiry" and the need to avoid "predetermined ideological perspectives" when dealing with a subject that requires "considerable effort and reflection." But one has hardly read two pages before it becomes clear that peace-and-justice theorists have already made some remarkable scientific strides toward firm and final conclusions. Indeed, within the space of a single paragraph they are able to lay to rest what might be regarded as the most intractable issue of their discipline, namely, the causes of war. Citing the best of all possible authorities, they confidently inform us that "history shows" that war arises from "greed, competition, and profit . . . [from] underdevelopment and economic deprivation, from institutional violence, from inequalities and powerlessness, and the denial of human rights . . . [as well as from] unchecked growth and resource depletion, particularly at the initiation of the developed world."

Perhaps the reason for so quickly stripping away the veil of mystery is to spare the curious student the inconvenience of paying any further attention to the program. Alas, no. Its sponsors wish not only to lure students in, but also to visit their desperately needed wisdom on those obdurately remaining without. In fact, as the faculty members describe their objectives, it becomes clear that the inauguration of a Peace and Social Justice Program is meant to be nothing less than the occasion for a reconsideration of the aims of higher education all across the curriculum. As they write:

> The university is not only well equipped to consider and solve human problems, it has a historical imperative to do so. And few of its activities are as intrinsically important as pursuing the specific goals of peace and justice. That the traditions of liberal-arts education imply these objectives is, however, rarely discussed. . . . For example, universities traditionally consider their major responsibility to be providing information and theories about the world. We would further ask how our education can prepare students to *change* conditions in that world rather than merely accept it as it is. Further, how can our education instill in students the desire to act, the antidotes for personal despair, and a sense of personal responsibility for improving our world? . . . If we desire peace we must teach peace and do it now. This will necessitate a new set of priorities and educational aims. [Emphasis in original.]

With such broad ambitions it is not surprising that the program's coordinators imagine themselves spending as much time lobbying colleagues as teaching students. They will seek to build a new sense of "purpose, cooperation, community, and social responsibility that will revitalize the university." Because the goals of peace and social justice require challenging "competitiveness and individualism" and promoting "cooperation and interdependence," this effort will necessarily focus on "personal as well as global change." More specifically, each department at Tufts is to be invited to develop several of the forty-five proposed courses (mostly culled from the catalogues of other universities) which the peace theorists consider necessary for their grand design. The engineering department, for instance, can offer "Appropriate Technology and Community Control"; mathematics, "The Ethics of Mathematic Modeling for Military Use"; American studies, "Racism and Sexism in American Society"; economics, "Introduction to Third World Poverty"; music, "Singing the Blues: Music and Social Injustice"; and so on. Yet even this will not suffice, for peace education should be integrated "as a process, and not merely as a discrete subject . . . throughout the curricula and into university life generally." Consequently "every Tufts professor" will be challenged "to interject, if they have not already done so, some peace and justice component into *all* their courses" (emphasis in the original). Finally, to ensure that the mind will never have a moment to wander, the whole campus is to be immersed in a swirl of films, conferences, lectures, seminars, and teach-ins, all sponsored by the program.

* See "Terrorizing Children," by Joseph Adelson and Chester E. Finn, Jr., April 1985, and "The Scandal of Peace Education," by André Ryerson, June 1986.

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Here, then, is a plan for turning Tufts into a new, radical bastion of orthodoxy. Appropriately enough, there are also companion projects designed to use the program as an active center for the support of missionary training and proselytism. Thus, the program bills itself as providing skills "that will specifically attract a variety of governmental and non-governmental employers, including organizations in law, peace, education, human services and rights, dispute resolution, community development, international relations." Among its special features are an internship, bestowing college credit for student work with organizations in "broad areas of peace and justice, both on the local and global levels," and an "Alternative Careers Conference" fashioned to "stimulate further ideas for peace and justice careers." Departing from normal academic practice, the Peace and Social Justice Program also throws its core courses open to members of the general public, and conducts off-campus ventures which include "community training projects on peace, justice, and nonviolence."

Most peace-studies programs are not so hellbent on intellectual hegemony as the one at Tufts (though quite a few in women's studies could probably match it in this respect). Nor are most quite so intent on explicitly linking the pursuit of peace to the total realization of the Left's agenda. (Most leave the word "justice" out of their formal titles.) Nonetheless, the great majority share in its basic assumptions about the roots of war, the requirements of social justice, classroom advocacy, and the propriety of academic subsidies for political activism.

V

Scholarly associations, like universities, have usually been conceived of as forums for the exchange of ideas or debate on the merit of rival theories. Their ability to perform these intellectual services has been predicated on an understanding that as institutions they themselves take no position on the matters being discussed. Among those fields regarded as "sciences" there has been the further notion that knowledge is always tentative, subject to falsification through the acquisition of new evidence, and never to be cloaked in the garb of definitive pronouncements. As a result, within many academic associations an ongoing struggle has taken place between those committed to these liberal conceptions and those desirous of turning the organizations into platforms for agitation.

It is one thing ideologically to capture a department, program, or even an entire college, but quite another to leave one's impress on a national association with many thousands of members. Still, politics is rich in examples of relatively small groups controlling large organizations by virtue of their energy, discipline, and sense of purpose. Accordingly, while some scholarly associations in the humanities and the social sciences have successfully defended their traditional roles, each has witnessed its struggles, and a few have been seriously compromised.

Almost invariably the attempts to politicize the associations have come from the Left. The size of the leftist component, its organizational base, and the nature of its efforts have, however, varied from discipline to discipline. In the case of economics, for instance, the Left is relatively small and somewhat intellectually isolated. On the other hand, it is fairly well organized, possessing its own association, the Union for Radical Political Economics, which operates both within and alongside the American Economic Association (AEA), and a journal, the *Review of Radical Political Economics,* which reaches an audience about a tenth that of the *American Economic Review*. While the radical economists have managed to achieve a certain respectability, and have seen a few of their leading lights gain AEA office, their room for overt political maneuver has been comparatively limited. One factor in this is a provision in the AEA constitution which forbids the association from taking positions on public issues. Nonetheless the Union did manage a small breakthrough at the 1985 AEA business meeting by helping to push through a divestiture resolution, over the opposition of the AEA executive committee.

Among political scientists the fortunes of the radicals, organized in the Caucus for a New Political Science, have waxed and waned. In 1972 when the Caucus still contained members of both the "soft" and "hard" Left, it missed by a hairsbreadth electing one of its leaders, Peter Bachrach, president of the American Political Science Association (APSA). Two years later, James MacGregor Burns, another of the Caucus's members, was elected president with the endorsement of the APSA nominating committee. Simultaneously, Caucus-endorsed candidates won nine out of the fourteen seats at stake on the APSA's governing council. These events, followed by an annual convention whose scholarly agenda was strongly colored by Marxism, prompted counter-organization on the part of centrist political scientists, and a split within the Caucus over the importance of winning APSA elections. The resulting victory of the Marxist faction of the Caucus led to a partial withdrawal from APSA politics, the launching of a journal, and a renewed emphasis on organizing local chapters, recruiting graduate students, and working with "community groups." At present the internal life of the APSA has something of a Center-Right tilt, despite the continued presence of a sizable radical cohort. In fact, prominent centrists or neoconservatives such as Seymour Martin Lipset and Aaron Wildavsky have recently served as APSA presidents.

A very different situation prevails among his-

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torians, sociologists, and anthropologists. The Organization of American Historians has elected several leftists to its presidency in recent years, including Eugene Genovese in 1978, William Appleman Williams in 1980, Gerda Lerner in 1981, and Leo Litwack in 1986. This year the American Historical Association elected its first woman president, Natalie Zemon Davis, editorial associate of *Radical History Review*. Writing in the *Nation* (May 24), the historian Jon Wiener has approvingly described the growing gap between the political sensibilities of the Reagan era and the intellectual life of his field. Wiener reports that at the last meeting of the Organization of American Historians in April, "fourteen past and present officers drew up a petition opposing aid to the *contras*. The signers included the current president and two past presidents. . . ." Straining to provide some scholarly justification for this naked excursion into politics, the petition pretended to deplore "President Reagan's distortion of history for political purposes in describing the Nicaraguan *contras*, whose systematic abuse of human rights has been documented by independent observers, as the 'moral equivalent' of the founding fathers. . . ."

BOTH the American Sociological Association (ASA) and the American Anthropological Association (AAA) also regularly elect radical scholars to top leadership posts, habitually endorse leftist political positions, and in a variety of other ways consistently display radicalized ideological sensibilities. Recent business meetings of the American Sociological Association, for example, have approved the passage of resolutions submitted by the association's Marxist section condemning American foreign policy and endorsing the "sanctuary" movement. Somewhat more officially, the ASA's elected council has, over the past several years, endorsed motions supporting "gay-rights" legislation, defending *Roe* v. *Wade*, and calling upon the United States government to respect the "civil liberties and sovereignty" of the people of Central America. (The council did manage briefly to break stride and condemn the "violations of academic rights" in the Soviet Union as well.) Worse yet was the decision in 1984 of the criminology section of the ASA to present its first Latin America Scholar Award to Vilma Nunez de Escoria, vice-president of the Nicaraguan Supreme Court and a former member of the Sandinista National Liberation Front, who was then traveling through the United States on a speaking tour organized by a group named United States Out Of Central America. Following the awards presentation, which singled out her work in human rights, she was feted as a guest of honor at a reception hosted by then-ASA president Kai Erikson.

Yet this pales in comparison with what can go on when anthropologists assemble in national convention. Then, in the words of one participant, "late at night, after the reactionaries [have gone] off exhausted," an atmosphere can develop that would be hard to duplicate at any major gathering in North America outside the bounds of Turtle Bay. A typical cascade of denunciation, the product of the December 5, 1982 meeting, included adoption of the following: a motion urging anthropologists not to undertake work for the CIA or the U.S. military, both described as supporting regimes "engaged in overt repression of indigenous peoples . . . [and] genocidal policies"; a motion condemning U.S. immigration policy for "excluding people from capitalist regimes and nonwhite peoples in general"; a motion condemning a video game called "Custer's Revenge" for its celebration of "the historical oppression of Native Americans by the U.S. government"; and a motion calling upon the U.S. government to "freeze the development, production, and deployment of nuclear weapons" and "dismantle its existing arsenal" (an amendment to include the Soviet Union, and urging a bilateral and verifiable freeze, was defeated). To make this ideological *Walpurgisnacht* complete there were two resolutions denouncing Israel, the first for "the systematic and deliberate destruction of Palestinian and Lebanese peoples and cultures" (passed after an hour of debate and the defeat of several amendments to broaden the focus of the resolution); and the second for restricting research and suppressing academic freedom in the occupied West Bank (passed without debate).

In reaction to such excesses, a resolution approved in 1984 required motions passed at business meetings to be submitted to the AAA's membership via a mailed ballot. Given the apparent proclivities of most anthropologists, this has proved only a partial remedy. When the 1984 business meeting passed a resolution declaring that "mass opposition and resistance to war preparations must achieve new heights," and calling upon "all its members to take part in diverse events across the country expressing this opposition and resistance," it was approved by 82 percent of the membership bothering to vote. (This year, the referendum procedure is itself under challenge in a referendum.)

It is tempting to dismiss all this as meaningless bombast that simply discredits those associated with it. (The same thing has been said about the resolutions passed by the UN.) But while most sociologists or anthropologists may keep their distance from such antics, it would be unwise to assume that they are unaffected by them. At the very least these maneuvers represent a continuous endorsement of the advocacy style in social science, and, by lending legitimacy to extreme postures, gradually shift the spectrum of respectable opinion further and further to the Left. They also confer some scholarly respecta-

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bility on the use of vituperative and emotional language, and, even worse, on hack formulations lifted from Soviet propaganda. Finally, they discomfort those who disagree, as constant reiteration works symbolically to redefine membership in the social-science community along ideological rather than professional lines, threatening dissenters with the status of moral pariahs. Thus, though these motions may heat up the deliberations of a good many conferences, their approval inevitably has a chilling effect.

VI

Ortega y Gasset remarked more than fifty years ago that "the simple process of preserving our present civilization is supremely complex and demands incalculably subtle powers." There is nothing subtle, however, in the intent of the zealots now so amply represented within the ranks of academe, nor much in their doings that would work to strengthen the foundations of civilized life.

In its traditional liberal vision the university perpetuated the ideals of Western civilization in two separate but related ways. First, it imparted a sense of intellectual method which rejected dogmatic, monistic, and conspiratorial formulations in favor of a broadminded empiricism and a regard for the world's complexity. Second, it conveyed an appreciation for the underlying values of free societies, most notably a respect for the moral worth of the individual and for the ideals of personal liberty and constitutional democracy which emanated from it. As a result the university experience had a dual character, in part a process of intellectual training and in part a process of socialization.

At a deeper level, however, method and values reflected and reinforced one another. Operating within such a system, academics were able to illustrate what was just and admirable about Western civilization simply by adhering to the canons of their own fields of scholarship. Or, taking the other tack, they could promote intellectual openness and tolerance through an honest reading of the West's achievements. A study of ancient Greece was a study of life, not a preachment or conversion; but the highest ideals of that civilization carry their own persuasiveness, and are the precursors of our own.

All this is quite alien to the spirit of what aspires to become the new, radicalized academy. Armed with a variety of totalistic visions and millennial expectations, its partisans have little sympathy either with open discourse or with analytic procedures that fail to guarantee desired conclusions. It is not a coincidence that the epistemological relativism prominent in the early writings of Marx is also a common feature of the theories of contemporary academic radicals, be they feminists, deconstructionists, or Marxists. After all, if one wishes to reach a rather improbable goal without undue let or hindrance, the fewer the methodological constraints the better. As Howard Zinn, professor of history at Boston University, once put it, "In a world where justice is maldistributed, there is no such thing as a 'neutral' or representative recapitulation of the facts." In such a view, objective truth is only what the present dictates or what the future requires.

The organizing principle of radical scholarship inheres in its purpose rather than in its methods or theories. And its purpose is unremitting attack on existing cultural traditions and political and economic institutions. Thus, Paul Attewell, in a friendly survey of the work of radical economists, can locate "a major goal of most Left theorizing" in "the *dual accomplishment* of a political-economic analysis and a moral critique in which the economic analysis shows that an 'evil' is systematically and necessarily produced by capitalism" (emphasis in the original). Of course, a scholarship which sets out to prove that which it already knows, and whose underlying conviction is the necessary and systematic relation of the universe of evils to the structure of a free society, is no scholarship at all. What this statement describes is something quite different: a campaign of defamation.

Perhaps the most ominous aspect of this campaign is the use of the classroom for the cultivation of ethnic and class resentments, particularly among minority students entering into higher education for the first time. Until recently the university served as an important means of integrating the future leadership of American society and assimilating the upwardly mobile. A significant part of it now strives to do precisely the reverse, by fostering political estrangement and cultural segmentation. And even where, as is generally the case, the result falls short of instilling hatred, the atmosphere so created sours the country's image for many of those emerging into active citizenship.

At the very least, the rise of adversarial education has deprived many students of an adequate opportunity to be exposed to what is best in their own cultural tradition. (And given the decline of American secondary instruction, colleges are frequently the only place where such material can be absorbed.) In its search for opportunities to investigate the underside of American life, the Left has littered college catalogues with all sorts of marginalia. Some of these novel courses may have limited academic relevance. Unfortunately, however, time spent studying "Chicano Theater" or "Sex and Violence in the American Family" is time lost from the study of classics of political theory or world literature. The result is often a college graduate with as little sense of the deposited wisdom of his civilization as that of a troglodyte who never opened a book.

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To an astonishing degree the relative acceptance of radical ideas at our universities has been accompanied by changed ground rules for teaching, scholarship, and peer review. In the process, academic freedom, which is the foundation on which teaching and learning prosper, has been transformed. As a principle it was meant to shield the academy from external pressure and manipulation, but, like most other freedoms, it simultaneously conferred a responsibility, involving a willingness to uphold basic standards of inquiry and to render judgment on the quality of colleagues' ideas.

The zealots who now threaten the academy do so out of the certainty and urgency with which they embrace their favored truths. But milder men also threaten it when they cease to believe in any truths at all, or lack the courage to bring their beliefs to bear on professional decisions. What follows is a careless latitudinarianism that parcels out portions of the academic terrain among every group too large, too vocal, or too assertive to be comfortably ignored, whatever the intellectual merit of its positions. The *reductio ad absurdum* of this appeasing attitude, a kind of ideological affirmative action, is nicely captured in Professor William Van Alstyne's recent complaint at an AAUP meeting that Marxists are underrepresented in college classrooms since, in contrast to the academy, "two-thirds of the globe is persuaded by Marxism writ large."

In the last analysis, it is less the academy's radical minority and more its liberal majority that is at the heart of the problem. Since the mid-60's a diminished belief in American society has left that majority unable effectively to counter the genuinely impassioned forces of the Left. Accordingly, it is a revival of that robust and clear-sighted liberalism, once so cognizant of extremist dangers in all their forms, which constitutes the essential condition for restoring a healthier campus climate. The future of higher education hinges on how the internal crisis of American liberalism is eventually resolved.

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Shcharansky's Secret

Edward Alexander

To the memory of Jonathan Shulewitz

ON THE Ides of March 1977, Anatoly Shcharansky, while in the company of two friends and two Western correspondents, was seized by agents of the KGB, the Soviet secret police, and taken to Lefortovo Prison in Moscow to be investigated for "crimes against the state." Although the young mathematician and computer scientist had been active in the dissident movement on behalf of human rights, as well as in the Jewish movement for the right to emigrate to Israel, no one doubted that he had been arrested and accused of treason as a Jewish leader.

In his biography of Shcharansky* Martin Gilbert points out that not a single non-Jewish member of the Helsinki monitoring group to which Shcharansky belonged was interrogated in his case. The arrest, accusations, and trial were an attack upon the Jewish activists, still more upon the Jews of the Soviet Union. "Today," said Ida Nudel (subsequently exiled to Siberia for hanging a small banner displaying a Star of David from her balcony), "we . . . are accused of espionage, for the single reason that the accusation of killing Christian babies would sound ridiculous in this country of atheists." The Soviet leaders have lost their ancestors' belief in Christ, but not their ancestors' belief that the Jews killed him.

That such atavistic impulses could survive the 1917 Revolution seems not to have occurred at the time to the countless Jews in Russia who helped to bring it about. Chaim Weizmann recalled how "the arrogant Trotsky" sneered with contempt at any fellow Jew moved by the fate of his own people, and how hundreds of thousands of young Jews in early 20th-century Russia were convinced revolutionaries "offering themselves for sacrifice as though seized by a fever." Even long after the bliss of the red dawn had faded, Soviet Jewish writers could offer sycophantic songs of praise to the Russian Pharaoh: "When I mention Stalin—I mean beauty,/I mean eternal happiness,/I mean nevermore to know, / Nevermore to know of pain." But even such verses could not save their author, Itzik Feffer, from being murdered in 1952 along with other Yiddish writers like Peretz Markish, David Bergelson, and David Hofstein. In his "Elegy for the Soviet Yiddish Writers," the late Chaim Grade imagined himself visited by the ghost of Bergelson, who suffered eternally from regret precisely over "what we hoped for—the New Enlightened Man!" and of *der Nister*† who, almost alone, had the prescience to warn his fellow Jews: "Children, beware, run away!"

But the surprise occasioned in the Yiddish writers by the ability of anti-Semitism to survive the Revolution and even to flourish as a result of it would have been as nothing compared with the surprise, could they have lived to feel it, occasioned by the revival of Jewish life, Jewish identity, Jewish will, even Jewish religion, in the Soviet Union. If ever there was a valley of dry bones from which new life seemed unlikely to spring, it was Jewish life under Bolshevism. Its enemies, like the Jewish Communist Izzi Charik, boasted that "We will trample and forget you,/ Like rotted straw." Even its friends, like Isaac Babel in certain moods, could see no more in Jewish life than "the rotted Talmuds of my childhood . . . the dense melancholy of memories . . . a little of that pensioned-off God."

Once they had lost their illusions about the "New Enlightened Man," the Soviet Jewish writers could envision a generation of Jews eager to "run away" from socialism; and it was indeed partly for his desire to run away, and to help other Jews run away, that Shcharansky was arrested, tried, and sentenced. But what made his offense and his courage to give offense all the greater was that he had something to run to, something for which he longed, something he preferred to socialism and to the Soviet Union. When, shortly after his arrest, Shcharansky's mother (who was not allowed to see him during the sixteen-month period that elapsed between his

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* *Shcharansky: Hero of Our Time*, Viking, 467 pp., $24.95.
† The Hidden One, pen name of Pinhas Kahanovich.

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arrest and trial in July 1978), was asked to say something about her son, she pointed to a map of Israel and said: "Photograph the state of Israel and say, in the name of Anatoly, that his heart is there."

If for his mother and, now, for Jews generally, Shcharansky is a brand plucked out of the fire, part of a precious returned remnant barely saved from destruction, for his persecutors he represented a particularly brazen and articulate repudiation of the USSR for Israel, of atheism for religious obscurantism, of socialism for Zionism. Formally, Shcharansky was tried for treason (Article 64 of the Criminal Code) in collusion with the CIA,* and for anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda (Article 70). The prosecutor and his witnesses further alleged that "He studied Hebrew . . . he did not participate in socially useful labor. . . . [He] was slovenly and morally unstable." But what the prosecution returned to repeatedly, almost obsessively, during the trial was that Shcharansky had, in preferring Israel, "denied our superiority." The USSR, the prosecutor reiterated at various times in the trial, had a more democratic religious system than Israel (even Muhammad Ali had confirmed this), better doctors (especially psychiatrists), above all, better prison camps, whose edifying influence upon their inmates had even won the praise of certain American criminologists. The public prosecutor's obsession with the rivalry between the USSR and Israel, a country that a cooler legal head might adroitly have dismissed as a poor thing but the Jews' own, seemed to express the Soviet belief that, as Radio Minsk put it, Judaism is "contrary to our Communist morality, the aims of our society, and the progress of modern life."†

SHCHARANSKY, conducting his own defense in a trial that prohibited any reference by him to the testimony of witnesses or to the documents alleging espionage, addressed a hostile courtroom that included hecklers who showered him with such epithets as "spider" and "*agent provocateur*," and demanded that he be hanged. The only break in the solid wall of antipathy that he faced was his brother Leonid, sequestered in the back row. His address was informed by the conviction that, even when there are few or no witnesses, the truth must be told, the moral gesture must be made, because this is what justice requires, and the intrinsic value of justice, the power that it holds from the Maker of men and of things, remains forever the same, however much its extrinsic value may fluctuate. Eventually, of course, the story of Shcharansky's trial, like that of Alfred Dreyfus, reached the whole world. The Dreyfus trial, many claim, gave birth to the Zionist movement; the Shcharansky trial and its aftermath, many hope, will bring the rebirth of the Zionist movement.

The content of the address was Jewish history. People who had met Shcharansky in the early 70's were astounded by his spiritual hunger for a Judaism of which he had been largely ignorant. "He had no Jewish tradition behind him," reported one acquaintance. "Everything he reached, he reached by himself." It was not Soviet anti-Semitism but this spiritual yearning, unsatisfied by secular enlightenment and scientific socialism, that drew Shcharansky toward the land, the people, and the God of Israel. But now, at his trial, he felt upon his pulses what it meant to enter a community of suffering, to be united with all those Jews who had gone before him, who had resisted the countless Hamans of Jewish history.

Shcharansky spoke of the Jewish exile, of the Zionist movement, of the large Jewish role in the Bolshevik Revolution, of Stalin's campaign against the Jews, of the emigration movement, of the Jewish determination not to disappear as a people, and of his pride in being a part of the modern Jewish renaissance. He told of how he had declined the invitation of the authorities to betray the Jewish movement in exchange for a visa to Israel and reunion with his wife Avital, who had been forced to leave him a day after their marriage in 1974, just before her emigration visa was to expire.

His concluding words perfectly illustrate Shcharansky's great distinction, that precisely by speaking as a Jew and not as an indiscriminate part of universal humanity, he has become a universal symbol of freedom, dignity, and self-respect. This is how he spoke:

> Five years ago I submitted my application for exit to Israel. Now I am further than ever from my dream. It would seem to be cause for regret. But it is absolutely otherwise. I am happy. I am happy that I lived honestly, in peace with my conscience. I never compromised my soul, even under the threat of death. . . . For more than 2000 years the Jewish people, my people, have been dispersed. But wherever they are, wherever Jews are found, each year they have repeated, "Next year in Jerusalem." Now, when I am further than ever from my people, from Avital, facing many arduous years of imprisonment, I say, turning to my people, my Avital: *Next year in Jerusalem!* And I turn to you, the court, who were required to confirm a predetermined sentence: to you I have nothing to say.

Neither the eloquence of his speech nor the greater eloquence of his silence could save Shcharansky from being found guilty as charged and sentenced to thirteen years of imprisonment. During

* By "CIA" the Soviets mean Western correspondents. Two of the 51 volumes of "evidence" consisted of clippings from the Western press.

† The present author, interrogated by Soviet authorities in December 1976 for carrying Jewish books into the USSR, was told that "these Jewish craps [*sic*] subvert the Soviet way of life."

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the long years at Chistopol and Perm, years of isolation greater than other prisoners endured, of severe illness, of frequent solitary confinement, of hunger strikes to protest denial of visits and letters ("two letters a year in a good year") from family, of 403 days in punishment cells four meters square, Shcharansky continued to demonstrate, and was partly sustained by, those qualities that had distinguished his public career: courage, resilience, disinterested devotion to virtue, humor, and ironic wit. If the authorities placed him in an isolation cell to break his will, he would sing aloud during his days there every Hebrew song he had ever memorized. If they told him it was futile to write letters of protest on behalf of mistreated fellow-prisoners, he would continue to do so because "the prisoner who writes such a letter may not save his neighbor in the next cell, but he saves his own soul." With mock nostalgia, he writes to his mother of childhood days "when the priority of Russian serfs in science and technique was a favored topic." With mock solemnity, he tells her of his recent instruction in "the law [that] the use of humor is also undesirable." When his jailers prevent him from sending his mother a lock of his hair, he commends them for discouraging "superstition, prejudice, and remnants of the past among certain undeveloped citizens." Even under the censor's watchful eye, Shcharansky's irony was (to use Lionel Trilling's valuable distinction) an irony of comprehension and engagement rather than of detachment. He thought of wit and humor as instruments of self-defense because they enabled him to prove to himself that "freedom can neither be given nor taken away, since man *is* freedom."

YET it is clear from the evidence of Shcharansky's prison correspondence, abundantly supplied (along with many other previously unpublished documents) in Gilbert's indispensable biography, that even he could not have survived the nine years in prisons and labor camps without "outside help." Upon his release in February of this year, he declared that "without religion I could not have withstood all that I suffered." He also stressed that by religion he did not mean something that could be subsumed under Jewish history or culture or Zionism, important as all these had been, and still were, to him. "I am a Jew. Our religion is not only part of our culture."

Shcharansky's Judaism had originated in what Proust used to call the indescribable bond of metaphor, the recognition that we stand where our ancestors stood because we were potentially present in their imaginations. He was captivated by the words: "In every generation a man should see himself as if he personally came out of Egypt." Six months after his bride had left for Israel, and he began to sense that their separation might be a long one, he wrote to Avital that seeing their life through the Bible could make things easier, and reminded her that "Jacob worked seven years for Rachel but in his eyes they were like a few days because of his love for her." During his imprisonment Shcharansky journeyed through time and space toward sympathetic identification with his Jewish forebears, from Dreyfus to Rabbi Akiva.

Unlike his countrymen among the originators of Zionism who had sought to liberate themselves from the culture of the *shtetl* and ghetto to embrace enlightenment, modernity, and "normality," Shcharansky conceived of his future in Zion through images of the Jewish past. In one letter he even exhorts himself to go "forward, to the past!" But the weight and momentum of the collective experience of the Jewish people, its power to act as "gear wheels that move . . . our individual lives," could not be explained only in a historical dimension. That is why Shcharansky's quest for the past, a quest carried out in the intense loneliness of a Bolshevik prison, led him ultimately back to the ancient biblical statement (Deuteronomy 5:3) that all Jews, including those not yet born, were present to receive the covenant at Sinai.

Shcharansky's cherished book in prison was the Book of Psalms. He had been punished with 130 days in solitary confinement for a hunger strike protesting its confiscation. Upon his release from captivity on February 10 of this year, he flung himself into the snow and refused to move until his guards restored the book they again tried to confiscate. "I said I would not leave the country without the Psalms, which helped me so much." He had begun to study them in Hebrew after learning of his father's death in January 1980. At first they provided consolation ("a memorial stone in my heart") and a sense of unity with his family and with the Jews in Israel. But they did more than this. The Psalms address those who, "encircled by mortal enemies," patiently await deliverance from "those who seek my life." Specifically they refer to David, who, rescued from his enemies and from Saul, thanks the Lord who "brought me out to freedom." Shcharansky too was eventually brought out to freedom. But first he gained freedom from what Spinoza called human bondage, from the emotions that place man at the mercy of fortune.

Shcharansky came to understand as fully as any man can hope to do why Spinoza urged that "no virtue can be conceived as prior to this virtue of endeavoring to preserve oneself." The freedom he gained through the Psalms was freedom "from the slave concealed deep within" each of us, and, in consequence, from fear of human beings and their instruments of oppression. At first he thought the Psalmist's expression, "fear of the Lord," meant fear of God's retribution for trans-

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gressions. But once he recognized that this "fear" referred to man's awareness of the distance separating his will from God's essence, he acquired spiritual endurance and the saving knowledge that "fear of God is the one factor capable of conquering human fear." To achieve this conquest was to stand with those who stood at Sinai: "The counsel of the Lord is for those who fear Him;/ to them He makes known His Covenant."

IN September 1983, on the Jewish New Year, Shcharansky, having already been imprisoned for over six years, wrote that he faced the future "keeping the past in a knapsack, and I cross raging rivers and high mountains toward my present with Natalia [Avital]." Now that Shcharansky has crossed those rivers and mountains, we know that what he carried in that knapsack to Israel was a Zionism leavened by suffering and permeated by religion, potentially a rich heritage for the children of Israel. And what will the children of Israel, in the Diaspora and in the land of Israel, now make of that heritage?

It is too soon to answer such a question or even to pose it precisely, especially since Shcharansky has not yet told his own story.* Who can say how many of the 300,000 people who came to pay tribute to Shcharansky when he visited New York in May reflected deeply on the implications of his story or on the fact that he tended to withhold his support from Jewish cultural and educational efforts in the Soviet Union that were not subservient to the goal of emigration to Israel? The story of how much Shcharansky suffered to achieve that goal may yet have results in the Diaspora, but results that are incalculably diffusive and not readily visible.

It is in the land of Israel itself, where the remarkable story of Shcharansky continues, that the issue of his heroic spirit may be more concentrated and visible; but this is by no means certain. No sooner had he arrived in Zion than he was bombarded by a fusillade of inane questions. Would Shcharansky wear a skullcap? Why didn't he kiss the ground after his plane landed? Did he obey all 613 commandments? How would he get on with his wife, who had during their twelve years of separation become notoriously "Jewish" in the Holy Land? Would he favor retention of the administered territories, or did his study of Arabic encourage leftist hopes that he would join Peace Now? Shcharansky, having wrestled with God as well as with the KGB, must have soon begun to feel as Gulliver did when, after he had saved himself from drowning, the Lilliputians demanded to know whether he broke his eggs at the little end or the big one.

Those who wish to pursue the Shcharansky saga beyond the confines of Gilbert's book, which concludes with his arrival in Jerusalem and expression of the wish that "as many Jews as possible" will join him there, will, for the time being, have to resort to the penultimate section of *Anatoly and Avital Shcharansky: The Journey Home,* a book produced by a "team" of Jerusalem *Post* reporters.† Although they admit, in their preface, that "with two exceptions, those of us who worked on this book had never been even slightly interested in Soviet Jewry," it is not the authors' past lack of commitment but their present lack of sense and tact that requires an apology. Their narrative of Shcharansky's reception in Israel is not to be approached without a generous supply of antiseptic soap at the ready. In addition to asking, incessantly, the mindless questions mentioned above, they present the warm welcome given Shcharansky at Ben-Gurion Airport by his wife's long-time supporters in the religious nationalist movement as a sinister conspiracy to capture this hero of the "human-rights" movement for the alien ideology of "right-wing" Zionism espoused by his wife. (The journalists' animosity toward Avital Shcharansky for her "acquired religiosity" and her "carping" for twelve years to gain her husband's release mixes uneasily with their prurient inquisitiveness about her "self-denied sensuality" and their gossip columnists' allusions to her inferior cooking and home-decorating.)

If we are to believe the *Post* reporters, Shcharansky had barely entered the airport when his old friends and supporters began busily telling everybody who would listen that they feared Shcharansky's commitment to human rights would be swallowed up by the Gush Emunim politics of his wife and the "xenophobia" of the religious, whose pressure on him, according to an unidentified leftist source, will be harder to resist than that of the KGB. When one of the religious welcoming party admitted to the *Post*'s inquiring reporter that he was ignorant of Shcharansky's efforts in the USSR on behalf of persecuted Christians, the reporter quickly concluded that "Such ecumenicism would be frowned upon by these people." The only religious person at the airport who gets good marks from the *Post* team is the "religious politician" Avraham Burg, a Peace Now activist (apparently the only one at the airport), who was assigned by Prime Minister Peres to drive the Shcharanskys to Jerusalem. His particular merit is that, when he reached the entrance to Jerusalem, where admirers of the Shcharanskys had gathered in front of what the journalists call "Merkaz Harav Yeshiva" to greet the couple, he "sped past without stopping."

The full name of the yeshiva in question is

* Publication of his memoir is planned for fall 1987.

† Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 320 pp., $15.95. The section on the Shcharanskys in Israel was composed by Abraham Rabinovich, Douglas Davis, Robert Rosenberg, and Louis Rapoport.

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Merkaz Harav Kook. The name lopped off by the secularist zeal of the Jerusalem *Post* team is that of Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook, first chief rabbi of Palestine after the British Mandate. Kook's special distinction among the formative thinkers of Zionism was his insistence that Jewish nationalism, however secular in outward appearance, was inwardly an expression of the religious impulse, that the national and religious elements in Judaism are an indivisible entity, and that it is "therefore pointless to wage a bitter and ill-conceived war against those who are loyal to only one aspect of the Jewish character." Kook addressed this admonition to the religiously Orthodox, many of whom are still greatly in need of such counsel. The lively interest taken in Kook's teachings today derives from the spreading recognition that his is the kind of voice required to still the noisy conflict of half-truths that threatens to sunder Israeli society. If the authors of this narrative had been more respectful of Kook and less of the egregious "speculation in the Israeli press about [Avital's] religious beliefs and [Anatoly's] secular views," they might have attained a glimpse of the promise which Shcharansky's story carries within itself for a fruitful compromise between "secular" and "religious" in the land of Israel.

In his remarks to the National Press Club in May, Shcharansky repudiated the label "secular Jew," declared that a "spiritual factor" was at work in everything happening to Soviet Jewry, and said that all the alleged conflicts between himself and his wife about religion "disappear the moment I stop reading the press." When one of his old friends from Moscow who, having already fallen prey to the bad intellectual habits of his new country, asked Shcharansky, "Have you become religious?," he replied: "I'm Jewish."

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Sodomy and the Supreme Court

David Robinson, Jr.

UNTIL 1961, sodomy—which takes its name from the biblical report of the city of Sodom, destroyed by fire and brimstone because of the wickedness of its men—was a crime in every American state and in the District of Columbia. Nevertheless, the influential American Law Institute had recommended that state legislatures decriminalize what it called "deviate sexual intercourse" between consenting adults, largely on the grounds that such behavior did not appear to harm the secular interests of others. Over the past twenty-five years, about half of the states have followed this suggestion, although a repeal effort in the District of Columbia was overwhelmingly rejected by Congress.

Meanwhile, American society was witnessing a rising openness and assertiveness among homosexuals and groups representing them, accompanied by attempts to gain and use political power. Politicians responded to this newly-visible, articulate, and politically significant group of voters by appearing at meetings and rallies of homosexual organizations and undertaking to support their goals. In its 1980 and 1984 platforms, the Democratic party pledged itself to support homosexual rights. Obvious targets of the efforts of homosexual groups were the sodomy statutes and other similar proscriptions of criminal law. They also mounted a successful campaign against medical stigmatization. Following a number of demonstrations and disruptions at the annual meetings of the American Psychiatric Association, for instance, a majority of the members voted in 1974 to declassify homosexuality as a mental disorder; in the absence of a desire by the individual to become heterosexual, homosexual behavior was henceforth to be regarded as simply a manifestation of a preference, not as mad or bad.

The United States Supreme Court, during this same period of time, had begun to develop a constitutional right of privacy—although that word is not mentioned in the text of the Constitution. The first step was the invalidation of a Connecticut prohibition on the use of contraceptives by married persons. Then the new principle was expanded to strike down limitations on the furnishing of contraceptives to unmarried persons, as well as some qualifications of the right to marry and divorce. Most famously, in 1973, in *Roe* v. *Wade*, the Court extended the new privacy doctrine to invalidate state statutes which prohibited abortions during the first two trimesters of pregnancy.

Once the right of pregnant women to privacy was found to override the interest of a state legislature in protecting fetal life, it seemed to follow that private homosexual acts should also be protected against the largely moral, religious, and aesthetic values which underlay the sodomy laws. Yet in 1976 an effort to declare a Virginia sodomy statute unconstitutional on these grounds was summarily rejected by the United States Supreme Court. In 1980, however, New York's highest court held that a similar statute violated the federal constitutional right to privacy, explaining "there has been no showing of any threat, either to participants or the public in general, in consequence of the voluntary engagement by adults in private, discreet, sodomous conduct."

But while these social, political, and legal processes were taking place, another element entered the picture. In 1981, a group of Los Angeles physicians reported the diagnosis of a rare form of pneumonia in a group of previously healthy homosexual men. Their immune systems had also become weakened. Soon additional reports were received of uncommon infections and cancers among homosexual men, as well as among intravenous drug abusers and recipients of blood transfusions. The diagnostic term AIDS (an acronym for "acquired immune deficiency syndrome") was applied before the infectious agent which was the underlying cause of the illness was discovered.

Much has been learned in the relatively brief period of time since the initial reports. AIDS is now viewed as a terminal stage in a viral infection which initially produces an asymptomatic carrier state (in which the individual is infected and presumptively infectious to others but is not clinically ill); this may then progress to AIDS-related complex (ARC), characterized by non-lethal illness from the infection, and/or to AIDS itself. Currently it is estimated that between one and two million Americans are infected with the

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virus, a number which may be increasing at the rate of one- to two-thousand people per day. More than 23,000 people have experienced full AIDS, and over half of these have already died. The Public Health Service predicts that by 1991 there will be a cumulative total of 270,000 AIDS cases in the United States and 179,000 deaths. These projections may well be underestimated.

The statistical profile of the infected population in the United States has remained remarkably constant, with homosexual men constituting almost three-fourths of the victims. This appears to be related to relatively common male homosexual practices, particularly anal intercourse and multiple sexual partners. Although heterosexual transmissions are much less common, they too are beginning to rise significantly, and casual sexual contacts between men and women are likely to become increasingly risky.

For a variety of reasons, including the proclivity of the AIDS virus to mutate rapidly and its ability to cross the blood-brain barrier to attack the brain, the prognosis is poor for effective vaccines or therapy in the near future. What will happen over the longer term cannot be predicted with assurance, but the tasks of scientific development and testing are extraordinarily formidable ones. In the meantime, the main hope for curbing AIDS would seem to lie in a reduction of behavior associated with the transfer of the infection.

ALL of this is related to a case, *Bowers* v. *Hardwick*, recently decided by the Supreme Court. The case developed as follows.

On August 3, 1982, an Atlanta, Georgia policeman went to the home of one Michael Hardwick to serve a court warrant for his arrest in connection with a minor liquor offense. A house guest invited the policeman in, whereupon the officer unexpectedly observed Hardwick having sexual relations with a third man. Although sodomy is a crime in Georgia, the District Attorney's office declined to prosecute. Hardwick himself, however, took action: he filed a civil lawsuit in federal court, alleging that he was a "practicing homosexual, who regularly engages in private homosexual acts and would do so in the future," and requesting that the Georgia sodomy statute be declared unconstitutional.

The District Court dismissed the action as inconsistent with United States Supreme Court precedent in the 1976 case referred to above. But the United States Court of Appeals reversed this ruling. The majority held that the constitutional right of privacy did apply to sodomous homosexual behavior, and that, to prevail, the state of Georgia would be required to prove both that it had a compelling interest in regulating such behavior and that the statute was the most narrowly drawn means of doing so. While the Court of Appeals did not explicitly declare the Georgia statute invalid, the burden placed on its defenders was a heavy one. Only rarely has a statute survived such a challenge.

Michael Bowers, the Attorney General of Georgia, petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court to review the decision of the Court of Appeals. Last November his request was granted. At that time I was engaged in a study of what the legal system might do to assist in responding to the AIDS crisis. I felt that this catastrophe provided an extraordinary justification for not extending constitutional protection to sodomous behavior, but I was unsure whether the issue would even be raised in the Hardwick case. To find out, I telephoned Bowers's office and spoke to the Assistant Attorney General who was handling the case, one Michael Hobbs. Hobbs informed me that he did not intend to raise the AIDS issue before the Supreme Court. He also mentioned that Hardwick would be represented by Laurence Tribe. Tribe is the Tyler Professor of Constitutional Law at Harvard Law School, the author of an important book, *American Constitutional Law*, and probably the most celebrated of the advocates who have frequently presented cases before the U.S. Supreme Court in recent years. Michael Hobbs, his prospective adversary, would be making his first appearance before the Supreme Court.

I then wrote to the U.S. Solicitor General, Charles Fried, in part as follows:

> I have noted with great interest that the Supreme Court has decided to review the decision in *Hardwick* v. *Bowers*, placing in question the continued validity of a Georgia sex-neutral sodomy statute. My concern is primarily with the public-health aspects of the decision, which clearly strongly impact on many federal programs such as research efforts of the National Institutes of Health and the Centers for Disease Control, Medicare, Medicaid, military personnel policies, et cetera. Obviously such statutes can be directly enforced not in situations of truly private conduct, but in situations such as sexual activity-facilitating bathhouses and bars where the risk of rapid contagion is at its highest. It would be tragic if public-health measures were impeded by a Supreme Court decision which did not give adequate consideration to the health issues which are inevitably involved. . . . I pray that you will file an *amicus* brief raising the public-health concerns. . . . Every case prevented will save a human life.

Fried responded by letter, stating that as a matter of policy he would await the recommendation of a federal division or agency before filing a brief; he suggested that the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) might be interested. I telephoned the office of the general counsel of HHS and was informed that they were in the process of changing leadership. While a subordinate of the new general counsel expressed considerable interest in the problem, nothing could be committed. It was apparent that the lim-

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ited time available for filing *amicus* briefs in favor of the petitioner would soon be over. Convinced of the importance of assembling the relevant epidemiological material for the Court's consideration, I decided to file on behalf of myself, which I did. In addition to my own effort, Georgia was supported by several other *amicus* briefs, primarily by religious organizations.

It was now time for supporters of Hardwick to file their briefs. I was surprised to hear that the American Public Health Association (APHA), the nation's largest organization of public-health physicians, nurses, educators, and other health professionals, was likely to join the American Psychological Association (APA) in support of Hardwick. To determine if this was correct I telephoned the APHA and was referred to Katherine McCarter, associate executive director. She confirmed the fact, adding that she felt the Georgia statute was *discriminatory*. (I was later told by physicians that this sort of approach is not atypical of APHA.) Miss McCarter also cited for my information an APHA statement of general policy—which antedated by nine years the first reports of AIDS. She did, however, agree to look at my brief, and I enclosed it in a letter in which I said that although I could understand how an organization dedicated to placing the highest value on civil liberties, irrespective of the cost in terms of health, might well support a constitutional right to engage in sodomous behavior, I could not understand how an organization dedicated to safeguarding the nation's health could do so.

I was unsuccessful. The APHA, in its brief with the American Psychological Association, supported Hardwick. They wrote: "The sexual conduct prohibited by [the Georgia statute] is not pathological; that is, it is not detrimental to the individual's happiness or functioning. . . . Indeed, *repression* of desires for such expression can lead to dysfunction and pathology." And elsewhere (in a portion written by the APA), the brief states: "As noted, oral and anal intercourse are not harmful or pathological. In fact, they substantially benefit many people, both heterosexuals and homosexuals, and many relationships." The two organizations also specifically attacked my brief, stating that "consensual sodomy laws deter at most a negligible amount of overt homosexual behavior. As a result, even with respect to that subset of sexual conduct prohibited by the statute that does pose a risk of spreading AIDS, the statute has no beneficial public-health effect."

In other words, (a) insofar as the Georgia statute discourages some homosexual activity, it jeopardizes health; and (b) the statute is dysfunctional because it does not discourage homosexual activity!

Hardwick was also supported by the Attorneys General of California and New York. California has no sodomy statute. New York's sodomy statute, although declared unconstitutional by the New York Court of Appeals in the 1980 case, has never been repealed; in effect, *Bowers* v. *Hardwick* presented an opportunity for U.S. Supreme Court review of that ruling. Normally, in the Anglo-American adversary system, attorneys consider it their duty to support the position of their clients, rather than volunteer their own judgment as to how a case should be decided. In supporting Hardwick, however, the New York Attorney General, Robert Abrams, in effect gratuitously attacked his client (New York State), whose policy on the issue had been determined by its legislature. (In Texas, too, where a similar sodomy statute was being constitutionally challenged in the federal courts, Jim Mattox, the Attorney General of the state, not only refused to defend the statute before the intermediate appellate court, he also attacked the authority of a district attorney who did successfully defend it.)

In addition to the briefs of the Attorneys General of California and New York, the APA, and the APHA, Hardwick was supported by an army of homosexual and civil-rights organizations, including the Lambda Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Gay and Lesbian Advocates and Defenders, the Bar Association for Human Rights of Greater New York, National Gay Rights Advocates, Lesbian Rights Project, Women's Legal Defense Fund, Bay Area Lawyers for Individual Freedom, Los Angeles Lawyers for Human Rights, the Massachusetts Lesbian and Gay Bar Association, and other groups. Some religious and additional professional organizations also supported Hardwick.

On March 31, 1986 *Bowers* v. *Hardwick* was the first case orally argued before the Supreme Court. Tribe was joined at counsel table by another member of the Harvard law faculty together with an attorney from the American Civil Liberties Union of Georgia. Alongside Michael Hobbs was a more senior Georgia Assistant Attorney General. To an observer it seemed unlikely that Justices William Brennan and Thurgood Marshall—or, on the other side, William Rehnquist and Chief Justice Warren Burger—would have much difficulty with the case. The question was likely to be resolved by the five Justices in the middle.

Michael Hobbs did not use all of his allotted time for argument. He ignored the AIDS problem, and, in response to questions from Justice John Paul Stevens, he unnecessarily conceded that the Georgia statute was unconstitutional in part. (Some members of the Court seek such concessions and sometimes rely upon them in their opinions, although counsel for the states are not authorized to make them even on behalf of their own state, let alone the other states which are affected by the decisions of the Court.) Tribe argued brilliantly, explicitly seeking only a very narrow ruling

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requiring heightened scrutiny of proscriptions against consensual adult sodomy in the privacy of the home. Once established, such a principle could be readily expanded in later cases. Epidemiological concerns were raised only by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, in a question to Tribe at the end of his presentation. He replied by immediately citing from memory relevant pages of the APA/APHA brief.

It has become a common phenomenon in litigation before the U.S. Supreme Court that publicly-employed attorneys for the states come up against lawyers affiliated with national organizations seeking to mandate social change. Not only are these latter proponents of new constitutional doctrine generally better prepared to present effective briefs and arguments; they can also choose cases with the most "sympathetic" facts, such as an arrest in the bedroom of the client's home. The result of such an imbalance is not simply regettable for those interested in observing a close game. Courts are greatly assisted if the issues to be decided are brought into focus by powerful presentations on both sides. It does not slight Michael Hobbs, who spoke with modesty and sincerity in what was his first Supreme Court presentation, to observe that in *Bowers* v. *Hardwick* this did not occur.

In the same week in which a case is argued before the Supreme Court, the members of the Court confer and tentatively vote their decisions. The contents of that meeting are ordinarily a closely held secret—but not, apparently, in the case of *Bowers* v. *Hardwick*. After the decision was publicly announced, the Washington *Post* reported that the initial vote had been five to four in favor of Hardwick, but Justice Lewis Powell had subsequently changed his mind and joined with the four other Justices who held that the constitutional right to privacy did not prevent Georgia from proscribing homosexual sodomy. The reason for this switch was unknown to the *Post*'s informant. In the St. Louis *Post-Dispatch* a columnist speculated that the statute was sustained because of the AIDS epidemic, but we are unlikely ever to learn whether this was so.

THE majority opinion was written by Justice Byron White. In sustaining the Georgia statute as applied to homosexual sodomy, the situation presented by Hardwick, the opinion relied on the historical ubiquity of sodomy laws, the absence of constitutional text supporting the view that such laws are invalid, and the permissibility of statutes reflecting moral choices. Justice White pointed out that the prior cases involving the issue of constitutional privacy had dealt only with personal decisions relating to marriage, childbearing, child-rearing, and education. His opinion did not resolve other possible constitutional challenges (although it also did not encourage them).

Justice Powell, the Court's leading advocate of the view that criminal punishments must be proportionate to the crime committed, filed a concurring opinion. Noting that the Georgia statute carried a maximum of twenty years' imprisonment, he hinted that any substantial prison sentence would in his view constitute cruel and unusual punishment.

Justice Harry Blackmun, the author of the 1973 abortion decision, wrote a passionate dissent, emphasizing the interests of liberty and the concerns of privacy in an opinion which strikingly invoked the liturgies of autonomous hedonism. In a footnote he referred to the epidemiological issues which I had attempted to raise, but suggested that since they involved disputable facts, they should not be considered by a court prior to trial. This is true as a general rule when the facts in question refer to the particular case being litigated—for example, what was Hardwick doing at the time of his arrest?—but not when the facts are relevant to the constitutional issue before the Court—for example, what would be the effect on the struggle against the AIDS epidemic of a constitutional protection of sodomy? The propriety of presenting and considering factual information of the latter sort has been accepted since 1908, when an attorney by the name of Louis D. Brandeis filed the first "Brandeis brief." Indeed, the very disputability of such facts can form the basis for a decision by a court not to impose a single command upon the nation but to leave a given issue to the other branches of government and to the states for their varying conclusions.

ALTHOUGH some critics of the decision in *Bowers* v. *Hardwick* have reacted as though it signals the end of sexual privacy in the United States, its direct applicability to that concern is not large. Privacy in matters of intimate sexual behavior is already strongly protected by the Fourth Amendment, which specifically defends the "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures. . . ." The Court has rigidly and increasingly restricted police searches of the home. The invitation by Hardwick's house guest to the policeman that he look around the house, at the very time that Hardwick was engaged in a violation of the Georgia statute, was an extraordinary occurrence. Furthermore, the disinclination of the Atlanta prosecutors to proceed with the case reflects the usual practice both in Georgia and elsewhere when there is no violence, exploitation, commercialization, or public display in sexual behavior. These patterns of tolerance are likely to continue.

The decision of the Court is also consistent with democratic values, since it allows the states the freedom, through their elected legislatures, to express varying views with respect to the permissibility of behavior not clearly protected by the language or history of the Constitution.

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True, the decision in *Bowers* v. *Hardwick* did deny advocates of homosexual rights the symbolic message which they were primarily seeking: that homosexual practices are protected by the highest authority in the land, and that those practices are as deserving of respect (and possibly encouragement) as heterosexual practices. But from the epidemiological point of view the denial of that message of approval may also be the case's most useful contribution, as Americans struggle to develop attitudes that will help fight the spread of AIDS.

In their brief in support of Hardwick, the APHA and APA suggested that sodomy statutes "may" interfere with educational and treatment efforts. States which are of that view are of course free to decriminalize. Yet states taking the opposite view are relying less on the (unlikely) prospect of punishment as a deterrent than on the inhibiting power of publicly proclaimed community norms. A number of years ago, in the course of working on another constitutional case before the Court, I reviewed the striking empirical literature correlating alcoholism rates with the moral attitudes of different groups toward drinking to the point of intoxication. To the extent that law encourages such community-wide attitudes and values, there is a hope that voluntary behavior may be affected accordingly. To take an illustration from another realm, civil-rights law enforcement has almost surely influenced how people voluntarily treat their fellow human beings. In this there is a lesson for state officials and legislators seeking ways to reduce through law the alarming transmission of AIDS infection.

Bowers v. *Hardwick* will also be helpful in preserving subsidiary legal strategies, such as closure of sex-facilitating bathhouses and bars, and in attempting to reduce the incidence of prostitution, both homosexual and heterosexual. In San Francisco, defenders of the bathhouses, which provide opportunities for multiple-partner, anonymous sex, presented the same constitutional-privacy arguments as were made in support of Hardwick. In New York, following its 1980 decision constitutionally protecting sodomy, the Court of Appeals, using the same rationale, struck down a statute prohibiting loitering in a public place in order to engage in or solicit sodomy. One hopes that courts and other decision-makers may now be less likely to reject such measures.

True, the level of courage shown by many public officials—including health officers—has thus far been disappointing, but if there is any basis for optimism with regard to future policy, it rests, ironically, in the tragically widening scope of our present epidemiological crisis.

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Our Conservatism and Theirs

Brigitte Berger and Peter L. Berger

In common with any other ideological camp, conservatives quarrel among themselves, but it is only recently that their quarrels have begun attracting the attention of outsiders. Thus the (more or less) liberal *New Republic* not long ago devoted its cover and a slew of articles to the debates that have erupted in the past few months among a number of different conservative groups over the true meaning of conservatism. What the *New Republic* wished to convey was the impression that a formerly unified or monolithic movement was breaking apart—or, as the editors put it, "Having vanquished the liberals, right-wingers are starting to turn on each other."

In fact, however, factionalism has characterized the intellectual Right in America since its reconstitution in the wake of World War II. Up to the time when George Nash wrote *The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America* (1976), there were at least two major philosophical groupings, which he called traditionalists and libertarians.* Obviously, there were also divisions among the traditionalists, since it was never a matter of consensus just *which* tradition was to be foundational for American conservatism. Since the early 1970's the picture has become even more complicated. Now there are the neoconservatives, most of them refugees from a liberalism gone berserk in those years, as well as the New Right in both its religious (mostly evangelical Protestant) and secular versions.

Of all the conservative intellectual groupings, the New Right is probably the only one with massive roots in a popular movement, that "bourgeois insurgency" (the apt phrase is Richard John Neuhaus's) which has twice swept Ronald Reagan into the White House. Needless to say, this has made a big difference for *all* brands of intellectual conservatism. Nash, in a recent article in *Policy Review*, may be a bit premature when he argues that the Reagan administration has brought about "the emergence of a conservative ruling class." But it is certainly true that conservative intellectuals have felt somewhat less isolated since 1980.

In trying to understand the differences among these groups, it is useful to bear in mind that most conservatives view history as a decline from a past that was better than the present in at least some significant respects. In other words, at some point in the course of history, something went wrong and the present situation is the result of this catastrophe. It is in where they locate the relevant catastrophe that contemporary American conservatisms define and distinguish themselves.

Thus, among the traditionalists, one subspecies, the Roman Catholic conservatives, have typically posited the Middle Ages as that high point from which the descent took place into the current mess. The Middle Ages covers quite a stretch of time, and different Catholic conservatives may prefer this or that portion of it over others, while dissociating themselves from some of the less inspiring characteristics of the putative golden age of Christian civilization (such as the massacres of heretics). Still, an ideal type of medieval society, if not all of it in its empirical plenitude, serves as a standard against which the depressing realities of the modern West can be measured. For English-speaking Roman Catholics, G.K. Chesterton and Hilaire Belloc have (fairly or not) represented this vision. Then there is the Anglo-Catholic subdivision of the genre, well represented by T.S. Eliot, where the descent into depravity is dated from the 17th rather than the 13th century. In America there is also a homegrown version of this perspective in the Southern Agrarians, with the Civil War perceived as the watershed between an essentially wholesome antebellum society (perhaps even slavery has gotten an undeservedly bad press?) and the morass of modern pathologies. And then, still within the traditionalist encampment, are the followers of Leo Strauss. For the Straussians things have been going downhill ever since the fall of the Greek *polis* (could it be that Straussianism has been particularly attractive to Jewish

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* Since the third of Nash's groups, the anti-Communists, mainly overlapped philosophically with the other two, we are leaving them out of consideration here.

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scholars because it allows them to locate the golden age *before* the advent of the much-vaunted Christian civilization?).

For libertarians, with their philosophically enthusiastic embrace of capitalism, the golden age would presumably be that of the late-19th-century robber barons. The New Right, especially in its evangelical embodiment, also looks back to the 19th century, but here the ideal image is that of small-town America. As to the neoconservatives, a hermeneutic of their writings very quickly locates the catastrophe: it was the late 1960's. No wonder, then, that traditionalist conservatives perceive this group as Johnny-come-latelies: the neoconservatives, it appears, are late by anything from one to six centuries at the very least.

From the point of view of the traditionalists, the New Right and the libertarians are also belated, but that is the least of their sins. The traditionalists find the New Right vision, with its Norman Rockwell icons, vaguely *simpatico* but unspeakably vulgar. And for the libertarians, the traditionalists, who are not generally pro-capitalist, have hardly any use at all (and vice versa).

Capitalism is also one of the issues that divides the neoconservatives from the libertarians. The neoconservative attitude has been perfectly caught in the title of one of Irving Kristol's books, *Two Cheers for Capitalism*. By contrast, it is fair to assume that any good libertarian disciple of F.A. Hayek or Milton Friedman would find it within himself to utter three cheers (such followers of Ayn Rand as are still around give at least six).

Even more serious than these disagreements over capitalism is the split between the libertarians and the other major conservative groupings over the question of state power. The libertarians' radical hostility to state power as such has led them to advocate measures like the legalization of drugs and deep cuts in defense spending (the Pentagon being an agency of state power) and has thus brought them into sharp conflict with both the traditionalists and the neoconservatives.

It is not, however, the libertarians but rather the neoconservatives who have lately been coming under fire from the traditionalists. For example, at a meeting of conservative intellectuals last April, a number of traditionalist speakers argued that the neoconservatives were not really conservatives at all. At heart, they were still children of liberalism and all its metaphysical illusions. They were modern pragmatists, without a unifying philosophical point of view and without the allegiance to the values of Christian civilization that alone could serve as a viable basis for conservatism.

The element of truth in this unpleasant and sweeping charge is that despite this or that philosophical reservation, most neoconservatives would be quite at home in 20th-century America if it were not for the political and cultural legacies of the 1960's. By contrast, most traditionalist conservatives, while agreeing that the late 1960's inaugurated a particularly nefarious phase in the unfolding of modern pathology, are not so at home.

Perhaps nothing illuminates the difference better than the fact that so many influential neoconservatives live in New York City, while Russell Kirk, the *doyen* of traditionalist conservatives, has chosen to live in Mecosta, Michigan. Indeed, this difference is more revealing than the much more frequently cited fact that Jews are more numerous in the neoconservative camp than they are among the traditionalists (although it should also be said that many more non-Jews identify with neoconservatism than is often supposed).

For the issue here, quite simply, is the issue of modernity—but not modernity as an assemblage of techniques. After all, most traditionalist conservatives have made their peace with the telephone, the computer, and bypass surgery. The issue rather is in the area of modern consciousness, and specifically the experience of relativity*—the awareness that all world views and value systems are contingent upon specific historical and social circumstances. Another crucial element of modern consciousness is a generally pragmatic attitude, a vision of the world as "makable" and, consequently, a "tinkering" approach to the handling of most if not all problems. Both the experience of relativity and the pragmatic attitude have been theoretically elaborated, more than anywhere else, in the social sciences. It is, therefore, "no accident" that so many neoconservatives have come out of the social sciences or, if not, are sympathetic to the social-scientific enterprise, while traditionalist conservatives are generally hostile to all the social sciences and especially to sociology (which they perceive, correctly, as the modern discipline *par excellence*).

The experience of relativity was classically formulated by Pascal in his statement that what is truth on one side of the Pyrenees is error on the other. It cannot be stated emphatically enough that this does *not* imply that there is no such thing as truth; it hardly needs saying that Pascal, of all people, intended no such implication. The experience of relativity, however, makes it difficult to hold beliefs in the taken-for-granted, untroubled way that has always been characteristic of tradition. The individual who has passed through the experience may hold very firm beliefs, but he will be conscious of the fact that he has *chosen* them. The traditionalist holds his beliefs as givens. Modernization, at its very core, is a movement of the mind from destiny to choice.

* The degree to which the habitual use of telephones and computers necessarily carries with it the entire "package" of modern consciousness is a question we discuss in detail in our book *The Homeless Mind* (1973).

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To be modern, however critically, means to assent to this movement. We would argue, in fidelity to our discipline of sociology, that the explanation for this shift must be sought in the institutional realities of modern society rather than in some Platonic realm of ideas operating independently of the social context. Be that as it may, however, the modern historical and social sciences, as well as modern philosophy, psychology, and (last but not least) literature, have endlessly elaborated this root experience on the level of theoretical reflection. To the traditionalist, all this theorizing is part and parcel of the intellectual degeneration of modernity, the alleged diagnosis that is in fact the disease.

The pragmatic attitude may be less fundamental to modernity than the experience of relativity. It is presumably rooted in the scientific and technological practices epitomized in the mind set of the engineer (Thorstein Veblen's "instinct of workmanship"), but it could, theoretically, coexist with a traditional world view. Empirically, especially as conjoined with the experience of relativity in modern consciousness, this "tinkering" attitude involves a readiness to experiment, to compromise, to look for "what works" rather than for what is eternally true. Again, the social sciences have taken the lead in the theoretical elaboration of this attitude. Again, traditionalists see it as proof of the intellectual and moral degeneracy of the modern age.

Some traditionalists call this configuration of cognitive and normative habits "utilitarianism," but that is a misnomer. The philosophical school of that name was a passing and not very interesting episode in modern thought. Yet the term does touch on something real. The modern consciousness of relativity and pragmatic "makability" does indeed mean that values are held in a less than absolutist manner. It is precisely this that impresses the traditionalist as a foreign thing, and as morally repugnant to boot. Against it, he will posit the perennial verities of his cherished tradition. We would argue that he is under an illusion, for he has in fact *chosen* his tradition and nothing he does following this act of choice can restore him to the untroubled certitude that characterizes people living in a pre-modern traditional world. But, illusion or not, this perception of the modern world will necessarily lead to a negative judgment on all those who have accepted the "quest for certainty" as open-ended.

As we ourselves reflect upon our own personal relationship to the panorama of American conservatisms, we are conscious, if only as sociologists, of our biographical peculiarities. Both of us left Central Europe as young adults, and our enthusiastic embrace of America was certainly shaped by our childhood experiences of totalitarianism and war. It was to New York City that we first came, and although circumstances have led us to live elsewhere, we retain a fierce attachment to that locality and the spirit it represents. We are Christians. We are social scientists. Yet for all these peculiarities, our biographies are not so unusual that our present position must remain inaccessible to anyone with a different background. What, then, do *we* mean when we describe ourselves as "conservatives" and when, given the empirically available groupings, we locate ourselves (with a reservation here and there) in the neoconservative camp?

We begin with a general view of history and of the human condition that can be characterized as generically conservative. It is rooted in a rejection of the idea of progress in history and a belief in certain unalterable realities of human nature. Such a view makes one inevitably skeptical of all projects of radical change, of all forms of utopianism, especially those that intend this or that realization of a "new man" (or, for that matter, a "new humanity" in a gender-free future).

To reject the idea of progress is not to see history as the night in which all cats are morally gray. There is no progress, but there are *progresses*. Thus modernity is far from the pinnacle of human evolution. It may even be a retrogression in certain areas (for example, in the loss of the sense of transcendence among many modern people). But modernity has brought progresses, as in the movement from despotism to democracy; or in the replacement of the "biological *ancien régime*" (Fernand Braudel), under which most children died, by the contemporary situation in which most children live to be adults; or in the modern conviction that every individual has rights even against his own community.

Such a view of history makes it difficult to choose a particular catastrophe from which all current evils can be derived. In one sense, *all* of history is a catastrophe, a long story of cruelty and folly, occasionally interrupted by compassion and sanity. Put more positively, in Leopold von Ranke's wonderful phrase, "every age is immediate to God"—that is, every age has its unique cognitive and moral challenges, disasters *and* discoveries. To live responsibly is to recognize and meet the challenges of one's own age. This view does not preclude sympathy with, even nostalgia for, the past. But it does preclude elevating the past (or, more accurately, any specific past) to the status of absolute standard, and it can incorporate quite comfortably the key modern experience of relativity.

In principle, such a generic conservatism could be reconciled with a great variety of positions this side of utopianism. There is also, however, a more strictly political level to the conservatism we would espouse. Here the word "conservative" applies literally. Given the realities of the contemporary world, we are in favor of maintaining and defending the major existing institutions of American society. These institutions are, roughly,

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contained in the phrase "democratic capitalism." Needless to say, this political conservatism can coexist with criticism, even sharp criticism, of this or that feature of the status quo. However, we locate ourselves politically by affirming the moral superiority of democracy and capitalism over all existing alternatives, in America or elsewhere, and we draw a long list of consequences from this affirmation both for domestic and foreign policy. Some of these consequences separate us from the prevailing liberal consensus, others do not, at least not necessarily. But our political conservatism, as defined, sharply separates us from the positions of the Left (old, new, or in-between).

The leftward lurch of American intellectuals in the late 1960's and its institutionalization in academia since then has been traumatic for us as university teachers of a conservative bent. In this limited sense, then, we share the catastrophic experience at the basis of neoconservatism—although we do not share the ideological background of many "New York intellectuals." Even in our active opposition to the Vietnam war we were never on the Left (though we did work with the Left in the anti-war movement), and we were "liberals" only in the sense that prior to the late 1960's we felt quite comfortable in the broad political ambience of the Democratic party (one of us, perhaps in a triumph of hope over experience, is still a registered Democrat, the other has been on the Republican rolls since 1968).

In other words, we have defined ourselves politically in the American situation in response to the sudden descent of the elite culture and political liberalism into an orgy of utopian lunacies. We have been kept in this political self-definition by the fact that, while the orgy has abated, the lunacies have become organized into a cultural and political establishment. Not surprisingly, we can communicate most readily with neoconservatives. We cannot participate in the alleged certitudes of the other conservative groupings. We are, if you will, conservatives not by faith but by skepticism.

Having thus located ourselves, we should spell out in somewhat greater detail what this location implies in terms of three issues that divide Right-of-Center people today—the issues of morality, of religion, and of political alliances.

Traditionalists of all varieties keep on saying that there are absolute values. We do not really care to dispute this. Our problem is that we are not quite sure what these values are. We are not able, at least not honestly, to accept any particular moral tradition *in toto* as being the necessary and unquestionable manifestation of divine will, natural law, or reason. Rather, we see history as the successive disclosure, occultation, and rediscovery of moral insights, and while we are very certain of some of these insights (such as the infinite value of every individual human being and, therefore, the moral repugnancy of acts or institutions that deny this value), we are not in a position to affirm without qualifications any of the specific traditions in which these insights have come down to us. This is not "utilitarianism." But neither is it the apodictic certitude that traditionalists like to exhibit. Having drunk from the well of relativity, we cannot pretend not to have done so.

Such a moral stance tends to be negative rather than positive; it tends toward proscription rather than prescription; it allows strong, even passionate moral judgments, but it will not accord ultimate legitimacy to any empirical (*ipso facto* historical and "socially constructed") institution. On the practical level, it is a moral stance that is more concerned with consequences than with principles.

Max Weber, in his classic essay, "Politics as a Vocation," distinguishes between two kinds of ethics, an "ethic of absolute ends" (*Gesinnungsethik*) and an "ethic of responsibility" (*Verantwortungsethik*). The almost instinctive procedure of the first type of ethics is to compare any given situation with the unchanging and unerring table of values, and then to act accordingly no matter what the consequences (*"fiat iustitia, pereat mundus"*). Traditionalists with intelligence and a sense of compassion will, of course, repress this instinct from time to time, but it keeps asserting itself. By contrast, an "ethic of responsibility" will always be calculating, weighing intended and imaginably unintended consequences, willing to compromise with the lesser evil, even daring to be morally wrong. Mark Twain (to the best of our knowledge not a disciple of Weber) expressed this stance well: "When in doubt, do the right thing."

Take two very important issues on which most conservatives find themselves in general agreement—the moral repugnancy of Communist regimes and the morally dubious quality of the Western welfare state. An "ethic of absolute ends" will undeviatingly reject the first and will be bent on totally dismantling the second. An "ethic of responsibility" will give moral warrants to much more cautious approaches.

Thus, while we have no illusions about the moral character of the Communist regime in China, as adherents of an "ethic of responsibility" we have favored rapprochement between the United States and China because of its consequences for the much more threatening relationship with the Soviet Union. Thus, too, we feel a deep skepticism about the fruits of what may loosely be called the "Swedish model" of the welfare state—for example, the harm it does to the value of individual responsibility—but, conscious of the human and political costs of a radical assault on it, we are much more in favor of a gradual, experimental, "tinkering" approach to this exceedingly complicated set of institutions.

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Needless to say, this sort of moral stance cuts against the absolutism of the Left as well as of the Right. Against both it affirms that politics is not intended to save our souls but to accomplish specific, necessarily limited, purposes in the real world in which men live.

THE language we have just used leads us into the realm of religion. In our judgment, the traditionalists are correct to the extent that they perceive religion as a root issue in the political positions one takes. They are terribly wrong in seeing this issue as one between religion and irreligion. Of course there are atheists and agnostics, and both atheism and agnosticism have been politically relevant phenomena in the modern world. But the question in America today (by all the evidence the most religious of advanced industrial societies) is rather *what kind* of religion one brings to politics.

Our kind is Lutheran, and it is Lutheran in a liberal vein (the term "liberal" here referring not to politics but to theology—that is, to that strand of modern Protestant thought which, ever since Friedrich Schleiermacher, has applied historical reason to the Christian tradition). Both facets of this religious profile are highly relevant to the point under contention here.

Of all the major Christian traditions, Lutheranism has probably been the most consistently anti-utopian. This aversion to perfectionist projects in the world stems from two core elements of the Lutheran version of Christianity—its conviction that men are saved by faith and not by works, and its doctrine of the two kingdoms. The innermost center of Luther's rebellion against Rome was his understanding of salvation as coming from God's grace alone, which grace man can only accept in faith, and as *not* coming from man's own efforts to attain purity. Out of this center flowed the entire stream of Lutheran ethics —realistic, non-radical, aware that the moral life in this world is always ambiguous, and that, therefore, at the end of the day man can only try to do his duty and trust in God's forgiveness.

Such an ethical orientation precludes adherence to an ironclad table of values. Indeed, it leads precisely to an "ethic of responsibility" as advocated by Weber (who was an agnostic but also what may be called a "cultural Lutheran"). And the doctrine of the two kingdoms—the kingdom of grace and the kingdom of law—emphasizes that this world, including the entire political sphere, is not the arena in which men are called upon to realize the final good. In the fullness of time God will establish His reign on earth; in the meantime, men are only called upon to safeguard certain basic conditions of justice, and that justice will always be partial and flawed.

Some of these ideas, of course, are quite alien to people from other religious traditions. Roughly the last thing in the world we are interested in is to propagate Lutheranism. Rather, we would think that other Christian traditions (Catholic, Anglican, and Calvinist, as well as Eastern Orthodox) also contain central elements which militate against moral rigidity and political perfectionism (though, of course, we are aware of the millenarian strand in Christian ethics). As to Judaism, it has very strong safeguards both against absolutism and utopianism in politics. After all, the principal affirmation that has separated Jews from Christianity is their insistence that the messiah has not yet come, and as long as Jews have been close to their own religious tradition this has, with some few exceptions (such as the Sabbatean movement), led them to a very sober view of the possibilities of politics.

To return to the current controversy, we would certainly reject, with some vehemence, the suggestion that our own political position is divorced from religion. On the contrary, we understand our political activities as being mandated by the Christian's responsibility in the world. To be a citizen is in our view to exercise a religious vocation. This vocation is violated by an ethic and by a political approach which ignore the consequences of one's actions. The foremost social commandment is to love one's neighbor, which we understand as meaning all others within the range of our actions. An "ethic of responsibility" is concerned, precisely, with the well-being of one's neighbors, as against one's own spiritual or moral purity. The modern experience of relativity and the modern attitude of pragmatism, while they obviously are often associated with people who have no religious commitment, in our case tally perfectly with our *religious* understanding of the nature of this world and of the moral obligations of a Christian. Conversely, we see the moral absolutism proclaimed by most traditionalist conservatives not only as politically ineffectual but, much more fundamentally, as being based on a far-reaching theological error—the one that Luther, pejoratively, called "works righteousness."

FINALLY, there is the issue of political alliances. Here we would make a distinction between foreign and domestic policies. We believe that the most important political and moral challenge of our time is the struggle for the survival of freedom. In the international context this struggle has its focus in the resistance to the spread of Soviet-style totalitarianism. We have learned through bitter experience (especially through our involvement in the anti-war movement of the late 1960's and early 1970's) that one must never enter into alliances with those who defend totalitarianism in the name of any cause or who deny the realities of totalitarianism.

Put simply, in the international struggle for freedom and for minimal decency in societal arrangements, the sharp line is between democrats and anti-democrats. We think that, given

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the seriousness of the conflict, one should be prepared to enter into alliances with anyone on the democratic side of the divide. This includes, most emphatically, that broad, loose camp of social democrats—people with whom we might disagree on many matters but who understand that the greatest threat of all is totalitarianism. Conversely, this means refusing alliances with all those on the other side and those who fudge the issue. Regrettably, most on the Left, along with a depressing number of people calling themselves liberals nowadays, fall into this category.

Domestically we would throw a wider net. Within the game of American politics (the same is true of other democracies), the major domestic issue dividing Right-of-Center and Left-of-Center groupings is the nature and scope of the modern welfare state, and the policies to be adopted with regard to the latter. We cannot see this (*pace* the libertarians) as an issue with the same moral gravamen as the opposition to totalitarianism. Here, it seems to us, all sorts of alliances are possible within the spectrum of American politics. Consequently, we are extremely uncomfortable when Right-of-Center groups raise absolutist battle cries on domestic issues that more properly belong in the area of foreign policy.

Once more, in our view both of the international scene and of domestic policies, we find ourselves at home with neoconservatives and ill-at-ease among other sorts of conservatives. It seems to us that conservatives of all description face an important question in these waning years of the Reagan administration. They can revert to their old status as ideological sects—a huddling-together of people who agree on everything, congratulating themselves on their purity of principle, and having little or no political efficacy. Or they can build on the victories of recent years to institutionalize the still very fragile Reagan coalition into a durable force in American politics. It is not very difficult to list the principal foreign and domestic policies on which there is widespread agreement within this coalition. Nor is it impossible to mute or to compromise on many of the policies on which there is disagreement. Such flexibility, of course, is of the essence of politics in a democracy.

We would say, then, that American conservatives in 1986 cannot afford sectarianism and that conservative intellectuals should be able to understand this. We would go one step further and also say that, given the challenges of our time, conservative sectarianism is morally irresponsible.

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The Truth About Titoism

Nora Beloff

WHEN Mikhail Gorbachev told his Party Congress this year that "the international Communist movement" was a powerful entity, comprising one-third of the world's population and that, though its component parties did not always agree on everything, they were all pursuing "the same common objective," he was manifestly including Yugoslavia. In what he declared to be "the acute and dynamic confrontation between progress and reaction," the Yugoslav Communists plainly belonged on the Soviet side.

Four months later the intimacy was brought home when the Soviet delegation to the Yugoslav Party Congress in June was headed by Geider Aliyev, a full member of the Politburo and Deputy Prime Minister, who was able to applaud successive Yugoslav activists rededicating themselves to the common cause.

Over the years the Yugoslav Communist regime, like the Soviet Union's other partners, has trampled on domestic critics, particularly those who favor political pluralism; and, in this still very Christian country, it has systematically excluded religious believers from political life. Yet in its postwar transformation from peasant to industrial society, the country has received a great deal more help from the West than from the East. The leadership's participation in what Gorbachev presents as the inexorable advance of the collectivized, Communist world has never prevented Western governments from doing their utmost to outbid Moscow for Yugoslavia's favor.

This discrepancy is due, in the first place, to the exceptional acumen and great personal charm of the late Josip Broz Tito, whose picture is still ubiquitous all over Yugoslavia six years after his death. A large part of Yugoslav education, film-making, writing, and broadcasting celebrates his exploits, and to speak ill of him is a criminal offense—erratically, but sometimes ferociously, punished.

Tito, son of a kulak (in Soviet denomination), started his career as an agent of the Moscow-controlled Communist International (Comintern), served his political apprenticeship in Moscow during the Stalin purges of the 1930's, and wielded undisputed power over his country for thirty-five years, ending in 1980 with a funeral attended by over a hundred heads of government. This in itself testified to the reverence which Tito commanded in the Western world for what were seen as his three monumental achievements: initiator of wartime resistance to the Nazi invaders of Yugoslavia; first Communist leader to defy Moscow; and inspirer of a "Third Way," which, to this day, has kept Yugoslavia unaligned between East and West. Yet all three suppositions are contradicted by the record of what really happened inside Yugoslavia during and after Tito's lifetime.

Immediately after the Germans invaded Yugoslavia on April 6, 1941, Colonel Draza Mihailovic and his Chetnik followers took to the mountains to organize guerrilla resistance. Tito, selected by Moscow to head the Yugoslav Communist party, was still operating within the framework of the Stalin-Hitler pact. Accordingly, he told his own followers to denounce Mihailovic's, whom he later called "our principal enemies," to the German occupying authorities.

Tito won Anglo-American backing, which included the public repudiation of Mihailovic, on the basis of two promises: first, that he would not use Allied weapons to kill Chetniks; and second, that he would lead a coalition government of all anti-Axis groups until the occupiers were driven out and Yugoslavs were left free to decide their own future. Yet Tito, breaking both promises, slaughtered the pro-Western Chetniks as ruthlessly as he did the pro-Axis Quislings, while managing in the process to persuade the world that there was no difference between these two groups who had fought on opposite sides in the war.

IN the postwar years, Tito's liquidation of anti-Communists in his own country, alongside his expansionist policy in the Balkans, made him appear to the outside world as the most zealous of Stalin's followers. And in fact, Tito did identify with the hardest of hardliners in the Stalinist ranks, associating himself with the faction led by General Zhdanov in the power struggle inside the USSR. This group, however, fell from grace in 1948 when Stalin decided that its adventurism risked bringing the Soviet Union into collision with Truman's America and when Zhdanov himself was becoming suspiciously prominent. Zhdanov died, probably murdered; Tito, with firsthand experience of Stalin's methods, knew that if he obeyed Stalin's summons and placed himself within reach, he too would be doomed. To survive, he turned to the men who had fought and conspired with him during the war and who now formed a reliable political and military base.

In thus breaking with Stalin, the last thing on Tito's mind was lib-

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erty in the Western sense. Indeed, his first inclination was to be more Stalinist than Stalin. Repression was increased, nationalizations were accelerated, and the Yugoslav Communists set about collectivizing the land. The peasants, most of them owners of their own farms, reacted by minimizing production and starving the cities. Rather than risk disaster, Tito called off the campaign and changed tack. Judiciously exploiting his image of David versus the Soviet Goliath, he demanded and immediately received emergency aid from the West. Since then, he and his successors have exploited their anti-Stalinist and, by implication, anti-Soviet posture to obtain all manner of Western help. This, in spite of the fact that they have presided over a country with a collectivist economy, a compulsorily indoctrinated anti-Western creed, and a secret police ready to silence any democratically inclined opposition.

Nor was Western support diminished by the additional fact that the 1948 split with Moscow, on which good Western relations with the Titoists were based, was followed in 1955 by a reconciliation with Khrushchev. According to his memoirs, Khrushchev satisfied himself after visiting Belgrade that Tito was a sound Communist whose exclusion from the ranks had been a typical Stalinist folly.

FROM 1955 onward the Yugoslav and Soviet Communist parties agreed they would follow their "separate paths" to the same destination. As it turned out, Tito's path went by way of nonalignment: a Third World group dedicated to promoting movements of "national liberation" based on Tito's own dubious model, and on the exploitation of anti-American sentiment.

It was the Yugoslav-supported nonaligned movement which came to constitute the automatic anti-Western majority at the UN and its agencies and which also provided a platform for the Yugoslav backed New International Economic Order: a prescription for donations from productive to unproductive countries without any interference in their "internal affairs" (though it was often the internal affairs which were the reasons for the unproductivity).

It was also through its nonaligned connections that Yugoslavia sided with the "rejectionist" Arab leaders who favored the destruction of Israel and offered asylum and later training to international terrorists. After the U.S. punitive action against Colonel Qaddafi in April 1986, the Yugoslav foreign minister flew to Tripoli to extend condolences for the U.S. "unprovoked aggression" and in an exclusive interview on Yugoslav state-controlled TV, Qaddafi likened President Reagan to Hitler.

The Titoist concept of a "Third Way" between East and West, which found expression abroad in the term nonalignment, was matched at home by a system named "self-management," similarly presenting itself as somewhere in between the Soviet and Western models.

IN REALITY, however, Yugoslavia remained a Communist country with the means of production socially owned (though private enterprise functioned, it was only on sufferance, and property had no place in the Yugoslav constitution). True, all the enterprises, offices, and factories were supposed to be managed not, as in the USSR, by the state but by their own workforce. Yet as the sociologist Neca Jovanov has shown, behind the façade of self-management the people who really made executive decisions in the factories and offices were a small group which included the party's own man, the manager, the trade-union official, and other key people under party control. The workers had no control over take-home pay, and the real power brokers in the land were "a small number of party, state, police, and army functionaries."

For the Yugoslav leaders it was a convenient coincidence that self-management was introduced at a time when Yugoslavia, with copious Western assistance, was in the course of its industrial take-off period, recording hectic economic growth. The fact that this had nothing to do with self-management is demonstrated by evidence that the growth figures were comparable to those in the USSR and Rumania at similar periods of development.

The boom was recklessly prolonged by Tito, who refused to permit his ministers to reduce expenditures. After 1973, credits were plentiful, as petrodollars had accumulated in the banks and, because of the Western recession, needed other outlets. Ljubomir Madzar, of the economics faculty of Belgrade, has described economic policy during Tito's last four years as "national suicide." When the bills came in after Tito's death, the dinar collapsed; living standards are now back where they were in 1967.

When Tito was forced to abandon central planning, he delegated authority not to the theoretically self-managing workforce but to the party bosses in the eight federal units. In return for their loyalty these units were given comprehensive control over the local economy, including decisions on investment and patronage. The result was predictable: before his death Tito himself deplored "the eight little autarkies," each demanding its own heavy industry, petrochemicals, and banks, and ruining the country with internal rivalries. The irrational development of the economy made Yugoslav industry desperately dependent on imports: it has been calculated that 80 percent of raw materials and machinery now has to be imported.

It was Tito's successors who had to settle the accounts. In May 1986 the latest appointed federal Prime Minister, Bosnian chief Branko Mikulić, delivered a "don't blame me" speech in which he announced that within the last four years (the term of office of his predecessor) the real value of exports fell by 2 percent, industrial production was static, prices multiplied by three, and in the modernizing process Yugoslavia had fallen further behind neighboring countries of comparable levels of development. He esti-

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mated that efficiency, measured by the use of resources in relation to production, was 28 percent lower than it had been in 1970.

Mikulić might have added that even though every Yugoslav adult has the constitutional right to a job, the country currently has the highest rate of unemployment in Europe. When it became apparent, in the mid-1960's, that the system was incapable of creating enough employment, the Titoists were forced to allow their people to seek employment in the West. Today, one-fifth of the Yugoslav population lives on money earned (or wangled) abroad, and the country contains an explosive mixture of Western consumer expectations and a collectivized economy.

No one has tried harder or longer to disabuse the West about Titoism than the Slovene-born economist, Ljubo Sirc, who was present at its Bolshevik foundation. When the war started, Sirc was a left-wing student in Ljubljana who fell out with his Communist colleagues over the Stalin-Hitler pact and after the invasion joined others in trying to organize a resistance independent of the Communist-led partisans. Later he escaped to Switzerland in the hope of alerting Western allies; when Britain announced there would be an all-party coalition of anti-Axis groups, he volunteered to return and fight. After the war he made contact with non-Communists in Croatia and Serbia for the purpose of setting up a political opposition. He also told the British Consul in Ljubljana of the Stalinist repression which the Titoists were carrying out behind an almost impenetrable iron curtain. For this he was arrested and, after a show trial, condemned to death as a British spy. Reprieved, on account of his age, he was held for seven-and-a-half years in jail and subsequently escaped to the West where he carved out a distinguished academic career for himself.

The local police chief responsible for the Stalinist interrogation was Mitja Ribičić, later to rise to the top of the Communist hierarchy. When in 1969 Ribičić became Tito's Prime Minister, Sirc offered background material on him to a number of newspapers but was fobbed off as a prejudiced émigré. In 1979 Macmillan published Sirc's book, *The Yugoslav Economy Under Self-Management*, in which he based all his evidence on Yugoslav sources and correctly predicted the coming crisis. When he asked a well-known Swiss editor to get it reviewed, he was told that the concept of self-management was such a fine dream that it seemed a pity to have it discredited.

Last year Sirc made another vain protest against the presence of two leading German politicians, Walter Scheel and Willy Brandt, at ceremonies to mark the publication of Tito's collected works, at which none other than Mitja Ribičić (who had just declared in an interview on Budapest TV that the Yugoslav dissidents were part of President Reagan's offensive against Communism) was to be the official eulogist.

A lesser man would have lost heart. Instead Sirc took an early retirement from Glasgow University's department of political economy to become the director of a new center of research into Communist economics. The center has already published two challenging books from the new Yugoslav generation: *Marxist Utopia?* by Neven Sesardic (from Zagreb) and *The Enemies of the People* by Kosta Gavoski (from Belgrade). Both are too young to remember the war, and neither conceals his rejection of Marxist-Leninist dogma, which they see as an impediment to their country's reform and renewal.

But while a new generation of Yugoslavs has been challenging received opinions, Western dignitaries cling to the myths of a Third Force. In 1981 when I offered the Atlantic Institute a study of present-day Yugoslavia, its director, former U.S. Ambassador Martin Hillenbrand, rejected the text on the grounds that it unfairly described the country as Communist. He recalled having himself been in Washington when Tito had sent a visiting delegation to explain that the Yugoslav system was neither Communist nor capitalist (otherwise, said Hillenbrand, they would never have received U.S. help).

Or again, in 1982 the International Labor Organization (ILO) published a booklet on Yugoslav self-management based not on what was really happening but on what the textbooks said should happen.

Similarly, delegations from the European Economic Community have repeatedly praised Yugoslavia's "unique form of socialism"—instead of pointing out that a country which locks up unorthodox historians and poets cannot qualify as part of civilized Europe. And though the Yugoslavs have repeatedly defaulted on the conditions laid down by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for their loans, officials go on hoping that, with a little encouragement and a few extra hundred millions of dollars, a collectivist regime will become capable of operating a competitive market economy.

By the summer of 1986, however, it had become increasingly difficult even in the West to fudge the failure of what used to be called "the Yugoslav experiment." On March 21 of this year the *Times* of London published a feature on Yugoslavia under the headline "Belgrade's Cart Deep in the Mire with Nowhere to Go," and on April 13, the New York *Times Sunday Magazine* published a much longer piece entitled "Yugoslavia Since Tito" and bearing the subtitle, "Today a nation of competing nationalisms, resurgent religion, economic disorder, and bureaucratic paralysis."

But even if Yugoslavia has no "Third Way" to offer, there are still those in the West defending a policy of protecting Titoism on the grounds that the Communists are the only ones who can prevent the rival ethnic, national, and religious groups from tearing each other apart. Yugoslavia, which was created in 1918 out of several different remnants of the old Austro-Hungarian empire and two formerly independent kingdoms, has indeed remained a single political entity, but the word "distintegration" has increasingly crept into

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official parlance. Many observers agree that, with the exception of the war years, interethnic tensions are now higher than ever before. We have already seen how Tito gave ethnic rivalries an economic foundation by delegating authority to local party chiefs. And though during his national-liberation struggle the slogan was "brotherhood and unity," both he and his successors have so effectively observed the time-honored principle of "divide and rule" that today the main ethnic groups tend to blame one another rather than their rulers for their present miseries.

Tito's cruelest misuse of power was in Kosovo. Here there had been fierce fighting at the end of the war, when the Albanian majority resisted being reincorporated into Yugoslavia. Tito subsequently assigned the subjection of the Kosovo Albanians to his tough police chief, the Serb, Alexander Ranković. But then, confronted with disturbances in 1966, Tito turned his policy upside down, and police and patronage were handed over to a trusted Albanian, Mahmut Bakali. The Albanians took their revenge; from then on, teachers and propagandists were brought in from Albania, and it was the Serbs who were discriminated against and physically harassed. The hardliners among the Albanians evidently hoped the Serbs could be driven out, leaving behind an ethnically "clean" Kosovo. Now the Serbs are in revolt; though Bakali has been expelled from the party, the Albanians still control the police and the Serbian exodus continues.

Before the war anti-Yugoslav feeling was strongest in Croatia. Today Serbia, which has historic bonds with Kosovo, is the principal focus of discontent, and many believe that Yugoslavia itself could not survive if it were repudiated by the Serbs, its most numerous national group. This possibility is taken seriously enough in the Balkans today to incite both Papandreou's Greece and Zhivk's Bulgaria to revive their challenge to Yugoslav Macedonia. Most though not all of this disputed region is now part of the Yugoslav federation, the Communists having given it its own literary language and its own church, neither of which is recognized by its neighbors.

IF INDEED Tito's successors are incapable even of holding Yugoslavia together, why should the West support them?

By far the most important argument put forward is that Western support for the Yugoslav Communists since 1948 has paid off in preventing the Soviets from reaching the Adriatic. The evidence suggests, however, that it was not fear of local resistance that held back Stalin and his successors, but the knowledge that a Soviet drive into an area of Europe which the Russians never occupied nor claimed, would provoke a head-on collision with the West.

In our own times, the poorly equipped and internally divided Yugoslav army would be as helpless against the Red Army as its predecessors were against the Nazis. But unless Gorbachev's Politburo anticipates global war, it is inconceivable that the Soviets would risk trying to occupy Yugoslavia. Nor do they need to: Stalin's successors have learned that in time of crisis, such as the Middle East wars of 1968 and 1973 and the Ethiopian airlift of 1977, Yugoslavia is ready to provide the air, sea, and land facilities which they need.

This in itself refutes the other common justification for Western backing of the Yugoslav Communists: that the enemies of our enemies are our friends. Not only are the Yugoslav rulers no longer the enemies of the Soviet Union; they are still effective advocates of the Third World fantasy that sooner or later the Communists will inherit the earth.

Whether it will be possible for Yugoslavia to break out of the Marxist-Leninist straitjacket, and if so when, is something which the Yugoslav peoples will have to decide for themselves. In the meantime, it would help no one for the Western democracies to turn their back on a crisis for which they are in part responsible. While it would be highly sensible to be more selective in providing fresh capital, it would be unjustifiable to inflict damage on the Yugoslav people by rupturing relations with the state, suspending trade, or refusing to reschedule debts which the country cannot now repay.

Even without direct intervention, however, our diplomats, scholars, and travelers could usefully make it clear that they share the views of most educated Yugoslavs (some prominent in high places) who now recognize that recovery is impossible as long as unelected and irremovable politicians continue to exercise a monopoly over public life and over the appointment of their own successors. At best our influence can only be peripheral, but surely the least we can do is ". . . not to strive, officially to keep alive" a tottering regime living off the fading Titoist mythology, to which the West has contributed so harmfully, for so long.

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Walter Laqueur at Sixty-Five

Roger Kaplan

TO COMMEMORATE his sixty-fifth birthday, there has just appeared a bibliography of the writings of Walter Laqueur,* the prolific, erudite, polyglot, polydisciplinary historian and journalist who is known not least for his long-standing association with COMMENTARY. The bibliography is limited for the most part to English-language publications, and it omits a full decade's worth of daily journalism; even so, it runs to an astonishing sixty-six pages, and conveys well the range and depth which Laqueur commands in his work on 20th-century European history, the Jewish national movement, contemporary Middle Eastern politics, Soviet and East European affairs, United States foreign policy, and the Holocaust.

Laqueur has returned time and again to many crucial areas of 20th-century politics. The two subjects to which he devoted most of his journalism from 1947 to 1960 have been definitively illuminated by his 1972 study, *A History of Zionism,* and the often reprinted *The Israel-Arab Reader* (1969), not to mention numerous magazine and newspaper articles. His contributions to the understanding of the Soviet Union and international Communism have been indispensable, ranging across the decades and embodied both in books and in a whole series of seminal articles; he also served as the first editor of *Survey,* the London-based quarterly on Soviet and East European affairs (now edited by Leopold Labedz). And of course he has been a tireless interpreter of Western European politics to British and American readers, from the fascist phenomenon in the first part of the century to the attempt to find a fresh moral anchor for European civilization in the second part.

Laqueur is not a university man, although he has taught at universities and holds a formal academic position as University Professor and chairman of the International Research Council of the Center for Strategic and International Studies at Washington's Georgetown University. And there is no doubt that he has paid his scholarly dues. His gift, however, is to write of difficult and even abstruse matters for a general audience. Laqueur's two most recent books demonstrate once again the wide talents, and also the central preoccupations, of this journalist/scholar who was born in 1921 in Breslau, Germany, grew to maturity in Palestine-Israel, spent much of his adult life in London, and now divides his time between Washington and Tel Aviv.

A World of Secrets,† Laqueur's book on the spying trade, is a *tour de force* that illustrates the demands and the capabilities of the intelligence community in the United States with careful reference to the historical record. Its thesis, as simple as it is important, is that however technical or professional the "craft of intelligence" (as former CIA director Allen Dulles called it) may be, the uses to which intelligence is put is an entirely political matter.

Laqueur calls his thick but readable study a "guide to action." He starts with a question: Just what sort of a contribution can—and does—the intelligence community make to the formulation and execution of foreign policy? For an answer, he looks to the record of American intelligence since World War II (before then, the American attitude was summarized by the remark that gentlemen did not read one another's mail), bringing to bear examples from elsewhere, some fairly extensive, for comparative and illustrative purposes. He does not go into great detail on the issues associated with covert operations, but concentrates instead on the classic job of intelligence: putting useful information into the hands of those who need it to make policy decisions.

Intelligence agencies received some hard knocks in the 1970's, both from within government and from outside it. As Laqueur points out, this was especially so in the U.S., though all democratic regimes produced currents of skepticism regarding the operations, and even the basic purposes, of their intelligence services. The damage these knocks caused will not be fully comprehended for years to come. The extent of the harm done to the counterintelligence capability (spies catching spies), for example, can only be estimated, as spy rings against which the nation might have been guarded are unmasked and prosecuted. What is significant is that the assault upon the intelligence community was, in reality, an assault upon the foreign policy of the United States. It was precisely because so little was known about the secret services (a situation now more than adequately compensated for) that it was possible to make them the scapegoats for all manner of dissatisfactions that were political and cultural in nature.

LAQUEUR insists that, in reality, "far from wielding great influence in the councils of state," far from being an "invisible government" as critics of the intelligence community have claimed, "intelligence has frequently been disregarded or ignored by decision-makers." To take a particularly painful example examined in *A World of Secrets,* in the mid-to-late 1960's the CIA (which is only one part of the intelligence establishment) consistently criticized the military's generally optimistic view of the conduct of the war in Vietnam. Early

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* Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, 66 pp., $7.95.

† Basic Books, 404 pp., $21.95.

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on, John McCone, then CIA director, favored a knockout blow against the Communists; short of that, he said, it was better not to get "mired down . . . in a military effort that we cannot win." This advice, needless to say, was ignored.

According to Laqueur, the synchronization of foreign policy and intelligence "production" was most effective in the Eisenhower administration, in large part because of the close relationship between Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and his brother Allen, widely regarded as the best director the CIA has had. On the other hand, John McCone's CIA, with its formidable intelligence-gathering capacities, could not dent the shortsighted, rationalistic views of the early managers of the Vietnam war. In the 1970's, Nixon and Kissinger paid little attention to intelligence that contradicted their designs for détente. Jimmy Carter, for his part, did not believe in hostile Communist intentions, in South Asia or in Central America, until he saw them on the ground.

None of this, as Laqueur points out, has much to do with the *quality* of intelligence. American intelligence has been and remains excellent by any meaningful criteria. True, there have been grave shortcomings—for example, McCone had to insist, over the views of his own analysts, that his hunches were right at the time of the Cuban missile crisis; the Soviet strategic build-up of the 1960's and 1970's was inadequately measured—but other vaunted services, such as the French and the British between the world wars, registered comparable mistakes alongside their successes. Still, after examining the methods by which spies gather and analyze information, Laqueur concludes that even when intelligence has been right, "it has seldom had a decisive influence on the conduct of U.S. foreign policy." Or, as he puts it elsewhere in this book, "unless a country has a more or less effective foreign policy, the quality of intelligence at its disposal is of little or no importance."

To say that the political mind, with all its inevitable biases, is finally bound to overrule the intelligence dossier, no matter how complete and no matter how well served by technical marvels, is not only to accept reality as it is but to place a heavy burden of responsibility on those who study, and those who make, foreign policy. For Laqueur, whose appreciation of the problems of intelligence services is in keeping with views on politics, international relations, and contemporary history that have been developed over many years, the ends of policy are what count. In this respect, perhaps no subject has engaged him more deeply over the years than the attempts of the democracies in this century to devise policies for dealing successfully with totalitarian aggression—then of the fascist variety, now of the Communist.

In 1980, Laqueur published a book called *The Terrible Secret*, which dealt with the psychological reasons for the Allies' failure to rescue European Jewry during World War II. Unlike some retrospective moralists, Laqueur was not prepared to lodge wholesale accusations of criminal negligence against people who supposedly should have known better and should have been able to act upon what they knew. Those who, with all the advantages of hindsight, claim that something could have been done to save the Jews, or at least large numbers of them, overlook the speed with which the Final Solution was implemented. They overlook the fact that England and the Soviet Union, the only countries that could have taken active measures to try to arrest the mass murder (as opposed to such passive measures as were taken, heroically, in Denmark, Italy, and elsewhere), were themselves fighting for their national survival. The United States was not geared up for an assault on Nazi-occupied Europe until late 1943, by which time European Jewry was effectively lost. Finally, anyone who thinks it is a simple matter for a national government to decide to "do something" ought to reflect upon how long it took America, or some other beacons of liberty in today's world, to make up its mind to do nothing in the case of the Cambodian holocaust, *circa* 1975-78.

This said, it remains a fact, as Laqueur was dismayed to find, that preceding the practical inhibitions on a rescue attempt was a psychological one. A great many people simply refused to believe the Holocaust was happening, despite credible evidence to the contrary. Some, including individuals in the U.S. State Department, had motives for dismissing the evidence, shameful motives. But Laqueur makes a strong case in *The Terrible Secret* that what doomed the Jews was widespread incredulity, in the literal sense, regarding Nazi intentions.

Evidence that the Final Solution had been decided upon and was commencing came from a variety of sources. The Allies (as Laqueur explains) had virtually no human agents inside the Reich. They were extraordinarily successful in cracking the German codes, but messages about the Holocaust were not transmitted by radio. In consequence, information came mainly from Jewish and Polish refugees and couriers. Their message was greeted with a degree of skepticism that seems criminal in retrospect.

In July of 1942, however, just as the Final Solution was entering its most horrific and devastating phase, a source reached the Allies through Switzerland that should have been unimpeachable. The identity of this source had eluded specialists for many years. Now Laqueur and Richard Breitman, a historian at American University, working at first independently and then together, have paid him a belated tribute in *Breaking the Silence*,* a meticulous biography that reads like a thriller.

THE source was Eduard Schulte, a convinced anti-Nazi who also happened to be one of the most important industrialists in Germany. Schulte's own sources were excellent. His personal eminence—by the late 1920's he was already one of the best-known businessmen in Germany—and his importance to the war economy gave him easy ac-

* Simon and Schuster, 320 pp., $17.95.

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cess to top military and state officials, as well as to high-ranking Nazis. The fanatical Karl Hanke, *Gauleiter* of Lower Silesia, was a "friend," as were other party men imposed on Schulte's company by the regime. There was thus no way Schulte's information should have been received with anything less than the utmost seriousness—among many other things, he had informed his contacts in Switzerland of the imminent Nazi invasion of Poland and was one of those who corroborated the plans (indeed the date) for the invasion of the Soviet Union.

Schulte, as Laqueur and Breitman demonstrate by a careful examination of his life and opinions, was a sophisticated as well as a deeply moral man. He judged that the Allies "had their own worries, and the fate of the Jews would not figure very highly among them." This was why, in July 1942, Schulte—within hours of learning that the Final Solution was under way—went not to his usual contacts in Zurich but to Jewish acquaintances. It was August 1 by the time these got to Gerhart Riegner, the Geneva representative of the World Jewish Congress (WJC) and himself a refugee from Nazi Germany.

Riegner, after consulting with Swiss Jewish leaders who knew Schulte's reputation and could vouch for it, gave the information to British and American diplomats for transmittal to their governments and to Rabbi Stephen Wise, the head of the WJC. The British acted promptly, but the Americans hesitated. On August 10, a cautious message was sent to the State Department, which chose not to contact Wise.

The British Labor M.P. Sidney Silverman, who also served as London representative of the WJC, now sent Riegner's message directly on to Wise. Confronted with Wise's demand that it do something, the State Department sent the case back to Riegner, who, at the department's request, prepared more extensive dossiers, as additional information was arriving from the east. Reluctantly, Riegner also gave Schulte's name to the American minister, Leland Harrison. As the State Department procrastinated further, Wise went public in late September. But it was not until December that the U.S. government, following the lead of the British cabinet, denounced the mass murder and warned of retribution for those responsible.

IT IS futile to speculate about what might have happened had the U.S. government, acting on the information supplied by Eduard Schulte, made a forceful public statement in July rather than December. In July, it is possible that the Nazis might still have weighed the consequences of their deeds against a clear American warning that they would not go unpun-

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

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ished; by December, the machinery of death was in full gear, unstoppable except by the total defeat of the Reich. But it would be to misunderstand the logic behind the Nazi movement to think that the "Jewish question" was an area in which calculated restraint was a real possibility. And in any case, Laqueur and Breitman's point is not to speculate about what might have happened with a less callous U.S. diplomacy (not that they make any attempt to view it generously). The authors do not mean to judge the American side. They mean, rather, to shed light on the most awful event in human history.

As it happens, the light they do shed strongly illuminates the general point Laqueur makes as well in *A World of Secrets,* and that may be taken, in fact, to undergird a very great deal of his writing on world affairs: that the minds and aims of men—politics, in short—matter more than the best dossiers. *Breaking the Silence,* though primarily a powerful and moving work of history, confirms Laqueur's basic thesis: facts matter, and sound policy-making benefits from clearly presented facts—but belief, and the will to act on it, is all.

WHAT do we need to be, or think, in order to act appropriately upon what we know? Eduard Schulte knew a great deal; he was also, more importantly, a man of profound, if quiet, moral passion. That his specific mission failed, at least in its immediate purpose, does not mean, in Laqueur's estimation, that we are all bound to fail in the larger struggle against totalitarianism. To the contrary: the chemistry of moral sense, intelligence, and knowledge cannot be quantified, but that the "right" combination exists, and that it can be catalyzed into action, may be seen as the unspoken premise behind Walter Laqueur's endlessly fertile, sometimes gloomy, but at bottom guardedly hopeful life's work.

The Intelligent Layperson's Guide to "Star Wars"

"This 'Guide' sheds some sensible—and much needed—light on a hotly-debated topic. The authors provide a leakproof intellectual shield against the many myths associated with SDI."
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Warring on the Pentagon

AMERICA CAN WIN: THE CASE FOR MILITARY REFORM. By GARY HART, with WILLIAM S. LIND. *Adler & Adler. 301 pp. $17.95.*

Reviewed by ALVIN H. BERNSTEIN

THE first two-thirds of this book by Senator Gary Hart and William S. Lind chronicle in laborious but loving detail, and without the benefit of a single serious counterargument, what the authors take to be the misdeeds, defects, and outright idiocies of a deeply-flawed military. This is the story of a military that was defeated in Vietnam, lost forty-one Marines trying to rescue forty seamen aboard the *Mayaguez*, failed ignominiously at Desert One on the way to the U.S. embassy in Teheran, and carelessly allowed another 241 Marines to become the victims of a lone terrorist bomber at Beirut airport. Well, did not the Grenada operation, at least, succeed? No: Hart and Lind reveal that the 82nd Airborne Division disgraced itself and marred the enterprise by its inability to handle a few hundred Cuban construction workers. Though last April's bombing raid on Libya occurred too late to figure in this book, one can guess what the authors would want to say about it; indeed, the dust had hardly settled over Colonel Qaddafi's bunker before Senator Hart rushed onto television to expose that mission's shortcomings as well.

This string of botched assignments, the authors gravely warn, "reveals a military system that threatens our existence as a nation." This is no trivial threat. We face nothing less, according to this book, than annihilation, which will fall on us through a combination of inadvertence and incompetence. Hart and Lind foresee a scenario in which war breaks out in the Persian Gulf between the Soviets, who are no longer frightened by our nuclear arsenal, and one of our (unnamed) regional allies. When we are forced to go to the ally's defense, our military will inevitably fail us yet again—and this time, to prevent a humiliating defeat at Soviet hands, we will begin pushing nuclear buttons, thereby triggering the nightmare that haunts us.

Senator Hart thinks he can save us and the world from this fate, but it will not be easy. His indictment covers virtually every aspect of our military system, from the way it is organized to the way it performs to, above all, the way it thinks.

As the authors see it, our operational concepts invite disaster. The Army misguidedly plans to fight a war of attrition (Verdun-style) against the Soviets, an absurd idea when the Soviets have 200 divisions and we have only 20 (if you count both the Army and the Marine Corps). Our Navy depends upon an antiquated, World War II force structure, based on the aircraft carrier instead of the true capital ship of the 1980's, the submarine. Worse still, the admirals of our fleet have developed what they perversely call a maritime strategy which, in the early days of any global conflict, would deploy our naval assets in forward positions hazardous both to the carriers and to our badly outnumbered submarine force. As a result, we would almost immediately lose them all, and so the war at sea. This would deprive us of the ability to sustain a land war either in Europe or in the Middle East.

As for the Air Force, our generals still consider part of its role to be strategic, whereas they should have figured out that strategic bombing is passé—it only makes a populace more determined to resist—and that tactical bombing must be the new name of the game. The Air Force should rather think of itself as a sort of flying combat artillery, soldiers first, fliers a distant second. This, however, it has considerable difficulty doing since, like its two sister services, it lacks the capacity to think operationally.

Beneath the level of operational planning the authors find that the military services do not get much else right, either. Weapons procurement is irrational. The services choose complicated, hi-tech systems that will not function in combat. Training is hopeless: not enough time is allocated for it—a U.S. Marine gets less than half the training time of a Royal Marine—and that time is badly used in rehearsing rigid set pieces that bear little relation to actual combat. Our troops are sent out with too little ammunition, not enough spare parts. They endure incessant rotations, which destroy unit cohesion, that special ingredient of personal loyalty and pride that builds up over time and keeps men fighting in the face of danger and possible death. Their costly field radios could be purchased much more cheaply at Radio Shack, and anyway encourage them to talk too much on the battlefield, "micromanaging" each other's actions to a fault.

There are—the bill of particulars goes on—far too many officers; where at the end of World War II there was one officer for about every 100 enlisted men, now there are more than five per hundred. All the services have too many support personnel. In Vietnam it took 550,000 people in the country to keep 80,000 in the field. Our Air Force needs 170 people on the ground for every plane it puts aloft while the Israelis require only 30, the Swedes 27. This unfortunate and unnecessarily cumbersome "tooth-to-tail" ratio (about two and a half times higher than it need be) is a large part of the reason why we and our allies are badly outnumbered both in Europe and in Korea, where population figures suggest our forces ought to be numerically superior.

THIS is only a sampling of the countless faults the Hart/Lind

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team finds with our military. To their credit, let it be said that the authors rarely issue a specific criticism without suggesting a way to improve things. Some of their prescriptions are old-hat, as when they insist on the need for unit cohesion. Some of their points are just silly: how compare the tooth-to-tail ratio of the Israeli or Swedish air force with our own without comparing the range of their global obligations with ours? Much of their criticism shows that the authors have only partly understood or are willfully misrepresenting the views of those they ridicule. Thus, they attack our Navy's force structure but do not try to comprehend why the Soviets themselves are cutting submarine production and have begun to build large aircraft carriers modeled on ours; they criticize forward deployment in a war with the Soviets but fail to acknowledge that without it, the oceans could be filled with the very Soviet submarines they so admire; they write about attrition as though it were an option and not a condition of warfare, and they irresponsibly insinuate that the way to deal with the Soviets in Europe is through a surprise attack. The authors are happiest when deepest into the weeds, dealing with the minutiae of weapons procurement and management. At such moments they sound like nothing so much as throwbacks to the era of Robert S. McNamara when planning was king and strategy a forgotten art.

CUMULATIVELY, however, the aim of this picayune and boring handbook for the military reformer (certainly not for the general reader) is not really to put right all the things wrong with the American military establishment. Through the very exhaustiveness of its litany of defects it means, rather, to reveal the absurdity of resorting to a series of *ad hoc* measures. What, after all, would be the point of sewing countless silk patches onto a gigantic, incorrigible, and uncamouflageable sow's ear?

The authors' real agenda lies elsewhere, in nothing less than a transformation of the military mind. According to Hart/Lind, the reason the Pentagon, the officer corps, the military-industrial complex, and even the Congress are all hopelessly misguided when it comes to the defense of the country is that their thought processes are inadequate to the task. This is a particularly unforgivable deficiency in the denizens of the Pentagon and in senior officers whose business should be the art of war but who have forfeited the right to call themselves warriors, having become instead bureaucrats in uniform, "milicrats" and "courtiers." Their mentality, the way they are educated, the traits for which they are promoted, their unabashed careerism, all serve to stifle critical and innovative thought, and this in turn is what has created the current, perilous status quo.

In the judgment of Hart and Lind, it is above all these mental processes that must be reformed.

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

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What, then, is their solution? Astonishingly, it is brainwashing, Japanese-management-style. Let the social engineers speak for themselves:

> If the contradiction between the bureaucratic organizational model and the kind of institutional behavior and people we need for success in combat is evident, what is the solution? The answer is another organizational model, known as the "corporative" model. . . .
>
> How does it work? The institution . . . makes a great effort to get its employees at every level to adopt the institution's *external* goals and purposes as their personal goals and values. These goals and purposes are constantly inculcated in everything the organization does, from starting the workday by singing the company song, through uniforms, the sharing of onerous tasks by management and workers alike, and the way the rewards and promotion systems work.
>
> The task is an enormous one, because it means changing the way people think and behave. . . . But it must be done. . . . If we just change the superstructure while perpetuating bureaucratic behavior, we will freeze in a new mold that will, in time, become as irrelevant as the present one.

ANY genuine issues Hart and Lind have together managed to raise are trivialized by this final prescription, which is vastly more odious than the disease it is designed to cure. In this absurd utopia, some new President (guess who?), a Great Warrior in the Sky, would presumably hand down the principles for his faithful minions to inculcate in the childlike masses. (One envisions vast Department of Defense choirs intoning their martial service songs in the Pentagon's parking lots at daybreak.) Can one conceive of a President, or a presidential aspirant, so out of tune with the values of his own country that he can suggest the creation of a military patterned on a model completely foreign to U.S. tradition? Such a creation would be an alien appendage grafted inappropriately onto a libertarian body politic, inevitably to be rejected by it.

No sensible observer would maintain that the U.S. military is perfect as it is, and any institution worth its salt should be constantly on the lookout for ways to improve itself. In fact, although one would hardly know this from reading *America Can Win*, the American military has spent much of the last decade floundering in self-doubt, trying to recover simultaneously from the trauma of Vietnam and from rejection by large and vocal segments of American society.

One cause of this self-doubt—and a better candidate for the Hart/Lind list of "failures" than any they adduce—has been the military's inability from Vietnam on to deal successfully with unconventional operations. Trained primarily for conventional combat, the armed forces have only recently begun to develop their ability to cope with guerrillas and terrorists. This is only part of the problem, however. The other, related part has to do with our sense as a nation of what our position in the world is and should be, and what means we are willing to use to maintain it. In other words, we need to answer the question, what is our national strategy?

GARY HART *has* no strategy, and this book actually brags about the fact, deriding those of his colleagues in the Congress who insist that, "You must tell us what the strategy is before we can decide anything else." In a passage that shows a stunning lack of understanding of their subject (and of anything that happened in Vietnam), the authors claim that the tactical and operational are what really matter, and that these must be *independent* of strategy because strategy is likely to change more rapidly than we can change our policies and practices.

How, then, are we to design a military without having a clear conception of the kinds of operations we expect it to perform? How set priorities, choose among weapons systems and the operational techniques to be emphasized in training? How think about the use of the military in the absence of any conception of where, when challenged, we should or should not respond? How even talk about combat effectiveness without a framework that tells us how vital, in a global conflict with the Soviet Union, such countries as Turkey, Norway, Pakistan, the Philippines, or Japan (to take but a few examples) are going to be?

The answer is that none of these things is possible. Senator Hart, however, is pleased to pretend otherwise—and one can even understand why. Were he to hint in public that there are actually places and interests worth fighting and dying for, he might alienate a substantial number of the left-wing Democratic voters he is trying to woo for his presidential candidacy; if, on the other hand, he were to reveal himself as an isolationist, he would risk perpetuating his party's recurrent error of appearing weak on national defense. Given his own global aimlessness it is little wonder that Senator Hart can envisage us drifting into a nuclear war with the Soviet Union on behalf of some anonymous Persian Gulf ally. With his blinkered emphasis on effectiveness, and his complete lack of strategic vision, he might well have us either retracing the route taken under McNamara, or fiddling while the Third World burned.

Hart and Lind have served their readers an indigestible stew of Japanese "corporative" meat, sprinkled liberally with McNamaran cost-effectiveness, garnished with shredded military history, all haphazardly stirred together like Jimmy Carter's foreign policy. When faced with complexity they simply throw up their hands and cry, "Change everything!"

The Lure of Socialism

THIRD WORLD IDEOLOGY AND WESTERN REALITY: MANUFACTURING POLITICAL MYTH. By CARLOS RANGEL. *Transaction Books. 180 pp. $19.95.*

Reviewed by SCOTT MCCONNELL

IN THE post-colonial era, few political events have come to seem more predictable than the procla-

SCOTT MCCONNELL, *a historian, contributed "Homage to Raymond Aron" to our May 1984 issue.*

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mation by a new Third World government that it intends to pursue a socialist path of development. Whether or not such a proclamation is followed by an influx of "teachers" from Cuba or internal-security specialists from East Germany, the idea that Third World nations aspire to be socialist would seem to require no more explanation than the desire of young boys to be baseball players.

Yet as the memory of European colonialism and of the struggles for independence grows faint, and the rulers of the new states acquire their own records of political and economic leadership, it has become apparent that this link between socialism and the aspirations of the Third World requires some rethinking. For one thing that can be said about socialism in the Third World (leaving aside its more hideous varieties) is that it has failed to bring about the sustained economic development unanimously felt to be the most pressing need of these states. In this regard it has failed most notably by comparison with the handful of developing countries whose leaders have permitted the growth of a dynamic private sector.

With this in mind, one approaches Carlos Rangel's *Third World Ideology and Western Reality* with keen anticipation. In his previous book, *The Latin Americans*, published a decade ago, the Venezuelan journalist, commentator, and former diplomat showed himself to be a deft and fearless debunker of the most widely accepted tenets of Latin American political mythology. Not only was Rangel one of a handful of eminent Latin American writers willing to speak the truth about Fidel Castro; he also did not shrink from analyzing, and judging, the story of the late Salvador Allende's unconsummated fealty to the Cuban model.

In the present study, Rangel ranges far from Latin America. In a work that is historically broad, speculative, and often sharply polemical, he explores the issue of why, when socialist systems throughout the world have so frequently ground against the grain of human hopes, socialism is still the name that Third World leaders most often give to their political programs and aims. In the end he arrives at conclusions that are deeply pessimistic, perhaps even excessively so.

As RANGEL shows, Third World ideology is a stream fed by many sources. Central to it is the notion that the Third World is poor because the industrial world is rich—that the explosion of capitalist development which took place in the 18th and 19th centuries resulted in a transfer of wealth from the southern parts of the world to the West. Such are the political and psychological interests vested in this theory that it may well be immune to factual and analytic refutation. Nevertheless, it remains true that those countries most thoroughly incorporated into the European colonial systems fared economically better than those, at analogous levels of development, which Europe ignored. It is equally plain that those Western nations which were not avid seekers of national grandeur in Africa and Asia experienced rates of economic growth even higher than those that were. To help clinch this point, Rangel mischievously enlists Karl Marx, who was decidedly unsentimental about the possibilities of economic growth in Asia and Africa without the stimulus of contact with 19th-century European capitalism.

Lenin came to rather different conclusions. In trying to account for the fact that the Western working class was failing to behave like a proper revolutionary proletariat, he attributed the modest level of class conflict in the capitalist countries to the successes of imperialism. This proposition turned out to be a fine tactic for creating an alliance between nationalist anti-colonialism and the Soviet state.

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In time, indeed, those wishing for further socialist victories, and disappointed in the record of workers in the advanced capitalist world, came to view the colonial peoples not merely as allies of the Communist movement but as substitutes for it. If the Western working classes would not carry out their assignment, the "proletarian nations" (the phrase is Mussolini's) would.

This belief took root in circles far beyond those allied with the Third International, becoming a commonplace of many Western socialists and liberals who may have recoiled at the idea of Communist dictatorship in their own countries. Most significantly, it became the dominant ideology of a generation of young Asians and Africans who were schooled in Paris and London between the wars, and who then assumed key positions in the first independent Third World governments. "Anti-imperialism" became, for the ruling elites of the former colonies, a ready excuse to avoid grappling with the real factors that could unleash economic development. In particular, the socialist component of the ideology offered a theoretical justification for attempting a maximal concentration of power in the hands of those who ruled the state. It is ironic, Rangel suggests, that the single most destructive consequence of the West's contact with the underdeveloped world should have turned out to be the idea that the government should exert the greatest possible command over the economy.

RANGEL stresses the extent to which the ideology of Third Worldism has become, for Westerners, a vehicle for utopian and millenarian hopes of a quasi-religious nature. Perhaps in part because utopian system-builders throughout the ages have thought in thirds, the very phrase "Third World" has a certain resonance in Western ears. It carries an echo, for instance, of the "third age" of spiritual bliss described by the 13th-century mystic Joachim de Fiore, and gives off as well a faint aura of the Hegelian dialectic, sweeping history along from thesis to antithesis to synthesis. One might also adduce in this connection the work of the German writer Moeller van den Bruck, whose influential book *The Third Reich* became a Nazi slogan and goal, as well as the "third period" defined by the Comintern's "scientific" strategists as the age of capitalism's final collapse.

By tapping into such ancient powerful currents, the idea of Third World socialism has strengthened itself immeasurably. The fact that no reasonable approximation of a good society, much less earthly salvation, has taken place under the aegis of that ideology does not necessarily weaken its millenarian appeal. As Peter Berger has pointed out, few prophecies have been damaged as a result of their contradiction by reality.

AS FOR the future, not only does Rangel think that Third World ideology will be dominant for a long time in the less-developed countries; he even speculates that the Western capitalist nations, increasingly lacking a sense of the legitimacy of their own achievements, may begin to reproduce variations of Third World socialism at home. The pessimism of this conclusion may be explained in part by the context in which Rangel's study was written. It was first published in Paris in 1982, where it served as a kind of crowning comment on a debate within the French intellectual Left that had begun when the socialist states of Cambodia and Vietnam went to war with each other in the late 1970's. France, after all, had been *the* Western center of Third Worldism, the intellectual home of Frantz Fanon and the alma mater of the Khmer Rouge; in the early 1980's Régis Debray, perhaps the most influential Western ideologue of Third World socialism, had become an adviser to the newly elected Mitterrand government.

While many important figures in this debate reaffirmed their support for harsh measures by Third World leaders so long as they were pushing their societies leftward, the debate itself marked the beginning of a retreat by French intellectuals from their long-held enthusiasm for Third World socialism. And since Rangel's work was first published, the idea of Third World socialism has lost even more of its luster, both for its enthusiasts in the West and, more significantly, for some among the new generation of leaders in the Third World. Several governments in Asia and Africa have evinced a fresh curiosity about the power of the market economy as an engine of economic growth, opening up the tantalizing possibility that a new-found respect for political freedom may yet follow. Indeed, although the political struggles in the Third World have in no way diminished, and although one does not wish to exaggerate the extent of the movement away from socialism, it is fair to say that since Rangel first wrote the ideological terms have changed, as have some of the issues.

One sign of this is that allies of Third World socialism in the West are now more likely to spend their energies attacking anti-Communist guerrilla fighters than in defending the putative achievements of the new societies. Another is the turn toward state terrorism by several of the Third World's more radical regimes, a move which, though it may enhance their power, seems to constitute an admission of lost faith in the mobilizing force of socialist ideas. Finally, and for reasons both related and unrelated to developments in the Third World, the hegemony of those Western intellectuals who helped to nurture Third Worldism has diminished markedly in the past decade, and this in turn may influence the future ideological climate in the Third World in subtle and interesting ways.

It must be stated, finally, that Rangel has not been particularly well served by his editor and publisher. The English translation is his own, but sentences which read gracefully in the original French seem awkward here. The edited text is also marred by misspellings and occasional repetitions. Despite these problems, however, *Third World Ideology and Western Reality* remains a provocative treatment of a compelling and momentous subject.

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Who Won at Camp David?

CAMP DAVID: PEACEMAKING AND POLITICS. By WILLIAM B. QUANDT. *Brookings Institution. 420 pp. $32.95.*

SADAT AND BEGIN: THE DOMESTIC POLITICS OF PEACEMAKING. By MELVIN R. FRIEDLANDER. *Westview Press. 338 pp. $25.00.*

Reviewed by S. FRED SINGER

IN SEPTEMBER 1978, at the presidential retreat of Camp David in the mountains of western Maryland, the leaders of Egypt, Israel, and the United States concluded the framework agreement that led, in March 1979, to the first peace treaty between the Jewish state and an Arab nation. The Camp David accords, signed by President Anwar Sadat and Prime Minister Menachem Begin, and witnessed by President Jimmy Carter, also provided a framework for negotiating the final disposition of the West Bank (a.k.a. Judea and Samaria) and the Gaza Strip. But those negotiations, which would have involved Jordan and Palestinian representatives from the territories, have not yet come to pass. Even the interim negotiations involving Egypt have stalled.

William Quandt, then on the National Security Council staff and now at the Brookings Institution, was a direct participant in the Camp David process and in the discussions leading up to the peace treaty. He not only had access to the relevant U.S. documents but drafted many of them. His book thus supplies an (unclassified) negotiating record of Camp David and is of palpable historical importance.

Melvin Friedlander, then a member of the defense intelligence community and now a professor at George Mason University, covers the same topics as Quandt but devotes more space to the internal political forces which drove Sadat and Begin toward Camp David while also limiting their freedom to act. Both men are portrayed as superb politicians; Sadat, in Friedlander's view, was especially adept at balancing off competing forces within Egyptian society.

Quandt writes well; in his telling, even the dry details of negotiations become interesting. And there are inside stories to hold the reader's attention: these include Quandt's rendition of Jimmy Carter's initial view of the Middle East in terms of his civil-rights experience in Georgia, with the Palestinian Arabs taking the place of the blacks, and of the secret understanding between Carter and Sadat, which did not work, to force concessions from Begin. Other miscalculations by Carter retailed by Quandt include his cool treatment of then-Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin during a 1977 Washington visit—which ended up helping the election effort of opposition leader Begin—and his attempt, which backfired, to drive a wedge between an "intransigent" Begin and American Jews. Much to Carter's chagrin, Begin quickly learned how to appeal to the Congress and thus in effect influence U.S. policy over the President's head. Finally, there was the well-publicized misunderstanding at Camp David between Begin and Carter concerning a "freeze" on Jewish settlements on the West Bank. Quandt, for one, does not share Begin's interpretation that the freeze was to last only three months. (Friedlander, however, cites others who do.) In any case, this misunderstanding did much to sour relations between Carter and Begin.

Quandt does not deal with an even deeper level of misunderstanding in the Carter administration: the one concerning the world oil situation. Carter's belief that the 1973 price increase was the result of the Yom Kippur War, and his concern that an energy crisis was

S. FRED SINGER, *a new contributor, is a Visiting Eminent Scholar at George Mason University, on leave from the University of Virginia. His latest book is* Free Market Energy.

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imminent, affected not only his domestic policies but his view of the Middle East. Influenced by dubious economic studies, he accepted as an article of faith that an oil shortage would overwhelm the world by 1983 unless the Arab-Israel conflict, and especially the Palestinian problem, were settled. In this connection it is especially ironic to recall that Camp David and the Egypt-Israel peace treaty were followed not by a drop in the price of oil but by the explosion of 1979, triggered by the fall of the Shah—and that the subsequent collapse of oil prices beginning in March 1983 coincided with Israel's invasion of Lebanon. So much for the correlation between the Arab-Israel conflict and oil prices.

FRIEDLANDER's revealing book fills in the political background that propelled Sadat and Begin toward their eventual peace treaty. In his reading, the role played by Carter in bringing this odd couple together, though vital, was completely inadvertent. Indeed, Begin owed his election victory in 1977 in part to the backlash created within Israel by Carter's espousal of the idea of a Palestinian homeland, together with his hints that he would negotiate with the PLO. But it was the joint U.S.-USSR communique of October 1977, holding out the unwanted prospect of an international conference in Geneva on the Middle East, that greatly strengthened Begin's position within Israel's political system. A centrist party, led by Yigael Yadin, now joined his coalition and enabled Begin to balance those of his supporters on the Right who opposed major territorial concessions.

As for Sadat, he had his own reasons for opposing the involvement either of the Soviets or of the radical Arabs in a settlement. His true and major objective (as Begin, unlike Carter, recognized early on) was to regain the Sinai territory, including its considerable oil resources, for Egypt. For this, he had to deal directly with Israel.

Sadat's concern for the Palestinian Arabs was not very great; he only wanted to establish a precedent for them and avoid too much Arab criticism, without having to give up the fruits of a peace treaty for Egypt. Sadat's advisers, however, were mostly hawks, much worried about Egypt's Arab connections and insistent on tangible results for the Palestinians. Sadat reportedly "froze out" his Vice President Hosni Mubarak from Camp David and went to great lengths to neutralize him. By contrast, Israeli ministers, notably Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan, were less hawkish than Begin, and in the end persuaded him to make major concessions, such as dismantling the Sinai settlements.

WHO won at Camp David? Quandt believes that Begin got the best of the others because he could not be moved. (The epithet "intransigent" appears frequently in Quandt's book.) Carter, according to this view, was thus forced to exact concessions from Sadat, who had to show tangible results from an initiative that had exposed him to Arab (and Egyptian) criticism. Yet Sadat too got what he was after: the return of the Sinai. Only Carter, who had invested his personal prestige in the peace process, failed to get what he really wanted: a comprehensive settlement, the holy grail of traditional U.S. Middle East policy.

But what, we may ask today, did Israel really gain? Recognition by the most important Arab state, but not a real peace with normal neighborly relations. True, as Friedlander points out, the treaty was to have precedence for Egypt over treaties between it and Arab states, and Egypt did keep the promise made by Prime Minister Khalil that in case of an Israeli invasion of Lebanon, Egypt would condemn but not go to war. But many Israelis now have grave doubts about the quality and stability of relations with Egypt. The withdrawal of Egypt's ambassador in 1982, the ongoing virulent attacks on Israel in the Egyptian press, the assassinations of Israeli personnel in Cairo, and especially the 1985 killing of seven Israeli tourists in the Sinai, when Egyptian authorities let four children bleed to death while their parents watched helplessly—these have all affected the Israeli public. One result is that there is little enthusiasm for further such treaties with other Arab states.

Egypt, on the other hand, has done very well, gaining tangible assets plus substantial and continuing U.S. aid. By now, moreover, Egypt has mostly reestablished its credentials within the Arab world.

For the United States the peace treaty proved to be an expensive undertaking. We agreed to make good Israel's economic losses from the agreement—actually, we have provided only a small fraction—and we have been generously supporting Egypt, currently at the rate of $2.5 billion per year. There was a brief hope that in return the U.S. could lease from Egypt the Sinai air bases built by Israel, but that opportunity was lost at Camp David—reportedly because the Pentagon then was considering the possibility of bases in Saudi Arabia. How different the strategic situation looks today!

DID Camp David and the Egypt-Israel treaty set a precedent? In particular, does Israel's complete withdrawal from Sinai foretell a similar eventual withdrawal from the West Bank, including East Jerusalem? Begin certainly believed that he had satisfied at least the letter of UN Resolution 242 ("territories for peace") by returning the Sinai, which was the bulk of the land captured in 1967. This, however, was hardly the U.S. view at Camp David; on that point Quandt and Friedlander agree completely. Significantly, Sadat may have set a precedent of a different kind by declining to press a claim for the Gaza Strip, territory of the Palestinian Mandate that Egypt had occupied from 1948 to 1967. This omission may in the future weaken the claim of Jordan to the West Bank, unilaterally annexed by the Jordanians shortly after its capture in 1948. Then, too, King Hussein may feel that he can do no less than Sadat, who recovered 100 percent of the territory he sought. But this very maximalism, impracticable in the case of the West Bank, may hinder the possibility of achieving a lesser goal.

In short, it very much remains to be seen whether, and how, the

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Camp David accords will affect the eventual status of the West Bank territories and their Arab inhabitants.

A Usable Past?

THE LYRICAL LEFT: RANDOLPH BOURNE, ALFRED STIEGLITZ, AND THE ORIGINS OF CULTURAL RADICALISM IN AMERICA. By EDWARD ABRAHAMS. *University Press of Virginia. 288 pp. $28.00.*

Reviewed by KENNETH S. LYNN

The Lyrical Left is not merely a historical account of the rise and fall of cultural radicalism in pre-1917 New York City, but a parable about the need for radical prescriptions in today's America.

Beset by physical and psychological torments throughout his life, Randolph Bourne, the first of Edward Abrahams's two main subjects, died of influenza in 1918 at the age of thirty-two. The essays that make up his best-known collections, *Youth and Life* (1913), *Untimely Papers* (1919), and *The History of a Literary Radical* (1920), are marked by the flowing rhythms of a poet, the polemical skill of an editorialist, and the dissident bravery of a Henry David Thoreau. All the same, there is a poignant thinness about his achievement, in intellectual substance no less than in numerical bulk. While to the 20's he became a romantic symbol of the revolt of youth, his legend faded fast with the fall of the stock market; in the reconsidered view of Lewis Mumford in 1930, "Bourne was precious to us because of what he was rather than what he had actually written."

Since the 60's, though, there has been a renewed interest in Bourne, for reasons not hard to fathom. Fun, truth, beauty, freedom, peace, feminism, youth, and a socialist revolution that would somehow not be socially encumbering were the ideals that filled his dreams. He sought, too, to reform education in order to end the alienation of students from their environment and from one another. Finally, he bitterly opposed America's involvement in World War I, which he saw as a fatal threat to unfettered individualism. "War," he said in his most famous formulation, "is the health of the state." Given these positions, it was almost inevitable that a paperback edition of Bourne's essays, entitled *War and the Intellectuals* (1964), would find a market on college campuses in the glory days when the younger generation, in Abrahams's words, was conducting a "principled opposition to the war in Vietnam," carrying on a "desperate search for community and individual redemption" and intoning the mantra that "imagination is revolution."

KENNETH S. LYNN *is the Arthur O. Lovejoy Professor of History at Johns Hopkins. His life of Ernest Hemingway will be published by Simon and Schuster in 1987.*

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"We have long needed an anatomy of Reaganism as an intellectual movement, and at last Sidney Blumenthal has filled the gap in this incisive, illuminating and enlivening work."
—Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.



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In the 80's, *War and the Intellectuals* is no longer in print. But if Bourne has ceased to be a beacon for students, liberal historians are paying more attention to him than ever. Thoughts of Ronald Reagan may be as crushing to them as thoughts of the wartime Woodrow Wilson were to the later Bourne—but in a time of darkness they continue to be solaced by the faith of the early Bourne that cultural radicalism is not only a means of pursuing the long-range triumph of a more comprehensive radical agenda, but indispensable to its meaningfulness. "Bourne's struggle still suggests," Abrahams writes in summation of him, "that political goals that do not have cultural ramifications and do not offer some hope for personal freedom and self-expression are incomplete." Which is why, Abrahams adds, Bourne's example "remains compelling to those who still believe that the right combination of political change and cultural renewal might yet fulfill the promise of American life."

ALMOST in spite of himself, Abrahams has composed quite an interesting appreciation of his second subject, the photographer and art-gallery proprietor Alfred Stieglitz. He begins, to be sure, with the daunting statement that he is going to concentrate on Stieglitz's ideas, as he has on Bourne's, even though "Stieglitz was, by and large, inarticulate." Wherefore, he says, he has had to rely not only on the confused and contradictory statements in Stieglitz's correspondence and elsewhere, but "also on what others said in his behalf, on whom and what he published, and, finally, on the kind of art that he showed over the years." As for formal art analysis, "I have mainly left [it] to the art historians." Fortunately, that last statement is not really true.

Stieglitz's career was so variegated as to defy categorization. He helped lay the foundation for the art of modern photography. He founded the Little Galleries of the Photo-Secession (on the fourth floor of a building at 291 Fifth Avenue) in order to exhibit the latest expression of modern art and modern philosophy. (America's first one-man shows of Matisse and Picasso were among 291's most notable achievements.) He published *Camera Work* and *291* as a means of disseminating the ideas of such exponents of modernism as Sadakichi Hartmann, Charles H. Caffin, and Marius de Zayas. And he communicated to a small group of American artists, including Marsden Hartley, Arthur Dove, John Marin, Charles Demuth, and Georgia O'Keeffe, whom he would marry, his prophetic faith that their work would make a difference to the future of the national sensibility.

In those pages in which the author of *The Lyrical Left* manages to forget his commitment to Stieglitz's ideas, an exciting sense of an extraordinary career comes through. But it is in his discussion of Stieglitz's photography that Abrahams is at his best.

The pictures that Stieglitz took of European peasants in the early 1890's sentimentally evoked an agrarian world that was fast disappearing. When he brought his camera into "ugly New York," however, in the years between 1893 and 1902, sentimentality all but vanished from his work. Yet if he captured objective qualities of urban life at the turn of the century, the pictures he shot were nevertheless profoundly personal statements. Thus, his own overpowering loneliness inspired him to photograph a man caring for horses harnessed to a public carriage. "How fortunate the horses seemed, having a human being to tend them," was his retrospective comment on *The Terminal* (1893).

Examples from Stieglitz's second series of New York prints have been reprinted so frequently, Abrahams justly points out, that they have formed our mental image of what the aggressive metropolis looked like on the eve of the modern era. Yet in these pictures, too, Stieglitz projected a self-conscious awareness. Gesturing toward the panorama of lower Manhattan, he exclaimed to Theodore Dreiser in 1902, "If we could but picture that mood!" It was a mood that in Dreiser's *The "Genius"* (1915) would be dominated by the tenseness of sexual desire. In Stieglitz's *The Hand of Man* (1902) and *The Flatiron Building* (1903)—the first a study of a locomotive belching black smoke in a railroad yard, the second a wintertime shot across a park of a vaulting structure that reminded Stieglitz of "the bow of a monster ocean steamer"—the artist was likewise aware of his masculine drives.

The Steerage (1907), his most famous photograph, taken on an eastbound crossing of the Atlantic but destined to become the quintessential visualization of the immigrant experience *to* America, superbly combines, as Abrahams well says, "Stieglitz's lyrical views of humanity" with an "intuitive sense for abstract composition." Among its early admirers was Picasso, who declared that Stieglitz was the only photographer who understood his medium.

Stieglitz stopped taking pictures in 1937, at the age of seventy-three. In the socially-conscious era of Ben Shahn's paintings and Walker Evans's photographs, he was a lonely and embittered man, for his emphasis on the self was as out of date as Randolph Bourne's. The final judgment, though, of the liberal Edward Abrahams is that the cultural vision of the lyrical Left constitutes a "usable past." At a time when American society is engaged in the enormously difficult task of defining and delimiting personal "rights," he apparently remains committed to a belief in their boundlessness.

Diatribe

THE RISE OF THE COUNTER-ESTABLISHMENT. By SIDNEY BLUMENTHAL. *Times Books. 369 pp. $19.95.*

Reviewed by JOSHUA MURAVCHIK

SIDNEY BLUMENTHAL began his career as a political reporter by writing for "alternative" newspapers in the Boston area and contributing to magazines of the radi-

JOSHUA MURAVCHIK *is the author of* The Uncertain Crusade: Jimmy Carter and the Dilemmas of Human Rights Policy.

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cal Left like the *Nation* and the *Progressive*. Toward the end of the 1970's he became the Boston correspondent for *In These Times*, an "independent socialist newspaper," published by the equally radical Institute for Policy Studies (IPS). Then, in the 1980's, he began to contribute to such liberal periodicals as the New York *Times Magazine* and the *New Republic*, the latter of which eventually hired him to cover the 1984 presidential election campaign. There, his work caught the eye of the Washington *Post*, which soon hired him as a "national correspondent" with what seems a vaguely defined assignment. His by-line has since appeared both in the news section and in the paper's Style section, where he specializes in exposés of conservatives, neoconservatives, and others seen to support the policies of the Reagan administration.

Now, Blumenthal has turned his special knowledge into a book about, in his words, "an event that is among the most startling and profound in modern American politics," namely, "the rise of a conservative elite." This elite has created a "Counter-Establishment" designed to counteract the "Liberal Establishment." Ironically, the liberal establishment, according to Blumenthal, never existed as anything more than a figment of right-wing paranoia, but its opposite is real. The conservatives "imitated something they had imagined, but what they created was not imaginary."

Not only is the conservative counter-establishment more real; it is also, so Blumenthal implies, more potent than the liberal establishment or, rather, than the institutions that the conservatives mistakenly believe constitute the liberal establishment. Writes Blumenthal of the conservatives: "Their version of Brookings—the American Enterprise Institute—would be bigger and better. The Olin Foundation would give millions, with greater effectiveness than Ford. The editorial pages of the *Wall Street Journal* would set the agenda with more prescience than the New York *Times*. And although the Washington *Times*, funded by the Reverend Sun Myung Moon, wasn't a formidable adversary for the Washington *Post*, a new generation of advocacy journalists, planted in a host of newspapers, would begin to create an alternative presence."

In truth, however, the Ford Foundation is much larger than Olin, and is also joined on the liberal side of the political spectrum by such other giants as the Rockefeller and MacArthur Foundations and the bulk of those with perceptible political leanings. Whoever may be more "prescient," the New York *Times* is more influential than the *Wall Street Journal*, and its liberal stance is shared by the Washington *Post*, as well as by the three commercial television networks, public broadcasting, and public radio. It is true that conservatives have done well at building Washington think tanks (although the example chosen by Blumenthal, the American Enterprise Institute, has for months been tottering at the brink), but liberalism remains unmistakably regnant in the worlds of the academy and publishing. And as for "planting" a new generation of advocacy journalists, the conservatives are clearly playing "catch up," Blumenthal himself being a noteworthy example of the Left's harvest.

To be fair, Blumenthal presents this whole tortured comparison, which appears in the book's opening pages, as a conservative aspiration, rather than an analysis of accomplished fact. But everything that follows—including dozens of knowing references to well-heeled conservative institutions and networks, never placed in the context of their liberal counterparts—suggests to the reader that the aspiration has been realized.

Although the book's subject is clear enough, its structure is hard to describe. It is neither a chronicle of the rise of the new elite, nor an analysis, nor even a polemic. Blumenthal's preface de-



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scribes the work as a "critical interpretation." But this barely gets the flavor of it, for what it is in fact is an outburst, a formless outpouring of venom, bounded by no ethics of discourse, nor by logic, consistency, or accuracy.

Thus: Blumenthal likens a remark of President Reagan's to something once said by Walt Disney, and comments damningly: "Appropriately, Reagan was the television broadcaster at the 1955 opening of Disneyland." He ascribes Norman Podhoretz's opposition to George McGovern to an unflattering remark that McGovern, unaware that Podhoretz and Midge Decter were married, allegedly made to Podhoretz about her appearance. He reports that Edwin Feulner, president of the Heritage Foundation, read two conservative classics in his freshman year in college, after which "his mind was set in a pattern that would never waver." William Kristol, one of the younger generation of neoconservative writers and a teacher at Harvard, secured a position at the Department of Education, says Blumenthal, in exchange for the support his father, Irving Kristol, had given to the appointment of William Bennett as Secretary of Education. The neoconservatives as a group embraced President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative as "a way to compensate" for their failure to "broker the Jewish vote for Reagan" in 1984. Further, "a desire for vengeance" against the culture of the 1960's "led some neoconservatives to feel a measure of vindication when John Lennon was killed" (though Blumenthal offers neither names nor specifics). William F. Buckley, Jr. was inspired to launch *National Review* by an obsessional anti-Semite. Arthur Laffer is fat.

And so it goes: 369 relentless pages of unrelieved sarcasm, ridicule, impugnment of motives, conspiracy theories, crackpot psychologizing, and invective.

BLUMENTHAL attempts to give his work a patina of seriousness by declaring at the outset that "The central idea of this book is that ideas and ideology are now central to American politics." And then in the conclusion he makes a couple of references to "the rise of an ideological politics" and "the paramount role of ideas." But, astoundingly, in the 300-odd pages that come between—the entire body of the book—this "central idea" never comes up at all. It is not reiterated. It is not elaborated. It is not demonstrated. It is simply not there.

There is something deeply ironic about this choice of camouflage, for if any unifying theme can be found in Blumenthal's potpourri of abuse, it is precisely the opposite of what he advertises as his "central idea." The inescapable implication of the body of his book is that ideas do *not* count. First, they seem not to count to the people who espouse them. Everyone Blumenthal discusses is shown to have ulterior or unconscious motives for the positions he takes. Neoconservatives "are sufferers from multiple forms of alienation" who adopt a strongly pro-American stance because "by casting a warm glow around places they believed to be at the center of national life, which they were never part of, they gained a vicarious sense of belonging." About the eminent economist, Milton Friedman, Blumenthal says that his views have "sources beyond the laws of economics. Friedman alone cannot explain Friedman. His thought is inextricably entwined with his own rags-to-riches tale." And the same, *mutatis mutandis*, for Reagan and Thatcher and Podhoretz and Kristol and the rest. None of the conservatives or neoconservatives is credited with holding an idea because he believes it to be true.

Second, Blumenthal denies that ideas are important to the electorate which provided Reagan with the triumphs that form the context for Blumenthal's critique. He attributes the President's success instead to his ability to construct a "mythology" that has enveloped American voters and whose grip is immune to rational challenge. He writes: "Reagan's ability to present conservatism as a mythological system insulated it from most criticism. . . . His policies might be contradictory and counterproductive, but his mythology remains appealing." But if Reagan's policies are as harmful as Blumenthal suggests, why hasn't the allure of the myth worn thin? Blumenthal replies: "The effects of Reaganism, however squalid, need not lead to disillusionment. For those with definite convictions and firm commitments, the unequivocal refutation of belief is insufficient to provoke apostasy."

But what about public-opinion polls showing not only that Reagan remains very popular, but also that voters agree with him on most issues and increasingly identify themselves as "conservative"? "Polls of the general public intended to demonstrate agreement or disagreement with conservative positions don't get at this central point. Only a thin slice of political life can ever be revealed by the statistical matrix of conventional social science." As for Reagan's landslide reelection victory, Blumenthal avers: "The myths Reagan employed required no discussion of policies to be understood." And he reminds us that Reagan made campaign appearances "with the Olympic medal winners, with Michael Jackson, and at the Grand Ole Opry with Roy Acuff, and (quack) talking with the man who was the voice of Donald Duck." How easy it is to carry forty-nine states!

BEYOND denying that ideas have been important in motivating either those who articulate conservative views or those who vote for them, Blumenthal himself shows little interest in or respect for ideas. He obviously disagrees fervently with his subjects, but he never argues with them, satisfying himself instead with sarcasm and ridicule.

Of all the things that suffer ridicule at Blumenthal's hands, none is more consistently singled out than anti-Communism. He mockingly identifies one of the key groups making up his "counter-establishment" as "repentant ex-Communists, who had penetrated every concentric circle of the Inferno and seen its terrible heart." The original prototype of these was Whittaker Chambers, described thus by Blumenthal: "The rumpled and heavyset Chambers was

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suicidal and conspiratorial. He passed himself off under numerous false identities, and led a furtive life as a homosexual. . . . Chambers's baroque version of subterranean Washington during the days of high liberalism, a capital crawling with Soviet spies and complicit New Dealers, seemed vindicated" by Alger Hiss's perjury conviction. Later he adds that "the ex-Communist's national security state [was] required to exorcise the nightmarish Communist-liberal Hades," and comments that "In the 20th century, the 'international Communist conspiracy' became the embodiment of evil for the right wing." Ronald Reagan, he says, "came to believe that if Communists like those he encountered in Hollywood won, the world would fall apart."

Accordingly, Blumenthal also ridicules the idea that some liberals see the United States and the Soviet Union as morally equivalent. He asserts that "moral equivalence" is "an idea [conservatives] claimed liberals backed," but that, in truth, " 'moral equivalence' was a formula contrived by Jeane Kirkpatrick. No liberals stepped forward to defend 'moral equivalence.' "

Yet some liberals have indeed espoused concepts of moral equivalence. For example, Paul Warnke, to whom Blumenthal refers in the book, made his intellectual mark by arguing that the United States and the Soviet Union were like "two apes on a treadmill." The Institute for Policy Studies, labeled "liberal" by Blumenthal in a remarkable feature portrait that filled a good part of three pages in the Washington *Post* Style section this past August, directly espouses the idea of moral equivalence, at least whenever the Institute is putting its more respectable foot forward. (Just as often, IPS fellows imply that the Soviet Union is morally superior to the United States.) And Blumenthal's own work is littered with variations on the theme of moral equivalence. Among the neoconservatives, says Blumenthal, "some of the former Trotskyites who have gained influence under Reagan have assumed the tone of Stalinist commissars." Irving Kristol's political activities, he says, "resemble [those of] no figure so much as Willi Munzenberg," a notorious Comintern agent. And in a classic statement of the "moral equivalence" creed, Blumenthal attacks Podhoretz because "He does not see America as one great power among other powers, attempting to achieve its ends through the traditional means of statecraft and motivated by the same impulses as other nation-states."

THE problem with Blumenthal's method of argument is not only that it is unpleasant, not only that long before page 300 it becomes a deadly bore, not only that, if taken seriously, his thrusts are so easily parried—the larger problem is that sarcasm, ridicule, and the rest constitute an evasion of his announced subject, which is indeed an interesting one. For the first time in generations, liberalism's ascendancy in the world of ideas is under challenge from its Right. Although at times Blumenthal implies that this

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is merely a consequence of assiduous organizing by conservatives and at times that it is nothing more than a natural historical cycle, he also gives evidence of knowing that something deeper is at work.

Liberalism has not recovered from the assault of the New Left in the 1960's. Under its impact, liberalism divided, one part making its peace with its youthful assailants by accepting, albeit in watered-down form, many of their tenets, while the other part, moved to battle against the New Left, was impelled on a journey that came to be called neoconservatism.

Blumenthal might have brought an interesting perspective to these transformations, having been himself a part of the New Left. Yet he barely mentions the New Left and is silent about his own intellectual journey, although one assumes that the move from the *Nation*, the *Progressive*, and *In These Times* to the New York *Times*, the *New Republic*, and the Washington *Post* was accompanied by some inner movement as well.

Whatever Blumenthal's own current opinions may be, his work bears some of the earmarks of his New Left origins. His style of no-holds-barred diatribe is reminiscent of the radical press's disdain for bourgeois niceties. Also, he matter-of-factly refers to America more than once as a "national security state," a term coined by IPS founder Marcus Raskin and typifying the New Left's hyperbolic anti-Americanism. And his journalistic work exhibits an inconsistency of standards that bespeaks an ideological bias.

Since arriving at the *Post*, Blumenthal's favorite target has been Prodemca, a group of anti-Communist liberals in the Henry Jackson-Hubert Humphrey mold that has advocated an activist U.S. policy in Central America aimed at encouraging democratization. The day before last spring's House vote on aid to the Nicaraguan rebels, the Washington *Post* published a front-page story by Blumenthal pointing out that Prodemca had run newspaper ads supporting the aid and had also served as a conduit for grants from the National Endowment for Democracy to the so-called "civic opposition" within Nicaragua. This raised the question, so Blumenthal hinted, of whether U.S. government funds had been misused to influence Congress. No other major news outlet picked up the story, waiting instead for the results of an emergency congressional investigation which concluded that Blumenthal's innuendo was baseless. The *Post* has never explained why, except for eagerness to influence the House vote, it could not have chosen, as all the other major news organizations did, to see if there was any evidence of wrongdoing before rushing into print.

On occasion, other kinds of liberals, too, have felt Blumenthal's sting. In the book he heaps contempt on Walter Mondale, as he did during the 1984 primaries, and in a much-noticed article in the *New Republic* last year he exhumed the connections between Geraldine Ferraro's family and various criminal elements.

IN SHORT, Blumenthal has labored to establish a reputation as an investigative reporter of unexcelled fierceness. But when in his *Post* portrait of the Institute for Policy Studies he took up the subject of his former colleagues of the New Left, his temper changed dramatically, and he produced a whitewash.

That article seemed to be a belated response to the controversy that swirled around IPS in the early 1980's. At that time, the publication of the best-selling novel, *The Spike*, which portrayed IPS as a Communist-front group, stimulated several magazine articles (including one by me) that documented IPS's affinity for Third World Communist revolutionaries.

In his portrait of IPS, Blumenthal did not get around to the accusations against it until after 60 paragraphs. Then he dismissed them in a few sentences. He wrote: "The focus of much of [the] criticism falls on Saul Landau, who befriended Fidel Castro in 1960 and made a film about him. But much of the rosy glow has faded. 'For me,' [Landau] reflects, 'Cuba is not a terribly attractive model. The stuff that seemed exciting to me twenty-five years ago—revolution—doesn't seem exciting now.'" Yet only a few years ago Landau told me that Castro was not "a dictator" but "a leader with enormous popular support," "one of the most brilliant politicians in the world today" who had imprisoned Huber Matos "for correct reasons" and was doing something "very important" for mankind by his intervention in Angola. Nor was Landau very different from other IPS leaders. IPS director Robert Borosage told me that both the United States and the Soviet Union were failed social systems, but that the Soviet Union had spawned "interesting social experiments" such as "Yugoslavia, Hungary, Poland, Cuba, Nicaragua."

Blumenthal's IPS feature inexcusably made no mention of the fact that he himself had served for some years as the Boston correspondent for IPS's newspaper. His failure to discuss his own views in his book is easier to justify, but it plays badly against the supercilious tone he maintains toward the views of others, and adds to the book's feeling of hollowness. It may be that he has yet to come to terms with his past ideas or to define his current ones, and this may have much to do with his failure to argue seriously with the ideas of the people he so glibly defames in this abysmal book.

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

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